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Editors’ Preface
Grace Cale and Lydia Shanklin Roll
The twenty-fourth edition of disClosure: A Journal of Social
Theory presents the theme of “Market Failures, Famines, and Crises.”
Within its pages, we hope to present the opportunity to explore ways of
understanding and interpreting times of financial uncertainty and
instability through an interdisciplinary lens.
In this issue, you will find scholarly articles and creative writing
that explore the topics related to the journal theme. The range of articles
presented cover content from reevaluations of current research on markets
to fiction inviting us to question how markets and the economy shape our
perceptions and life experiences. The journal includes scholarly articles
and essays, works of fiction and poetry, and interviews with prominent
scholars in fields relating to social theory and this issue’s theme.
The collection of scholarly articles and essays in this volume cover
a range of topics that critically examine different aspects of market
relations. Ulmer’s photo essay provides us with a closer look at how
markets influence the gold mining process in the Amazon. Luke takes a
step into the macro perspective to ask whether the market is truly
colorblind as its proponents claim. Janoski then guides readers to critically
examine and challenge dominant theories of just how these markets truly
work. Sharpe provides a meaningful reflection on the relationship between
the United States and the 1983 Ethiopia Famine. Finally, Phillips provides
an exploration of American capitalism.
Fiction and poetry provide a creative lens through which to explore
the impact of markets on the lives of individuals and communities. Sherry
explores the affective meanings of the market through four poems, This is
carried further by Joshi’s short story, A Town Without A Market. Banh
provides reflections on the Hong Kong Democracy Movement in two
poems. Wren’s six visceral poems explore issues related to crisis, trauma,
and personal failures.
Finally, the Spring Lecture Series of the Committee on Social
Theory gave our Collective an opportunity to discuss many issues related
to market failures, famines, and crises with leading scholars from a
variety of disciplines. The interviews with Drs. Greta Krippner and Peter
Temin explore topics such as the lessons from the Great Depression,
financialization, and how to bridge social theory with the study of how
seemingly abstract economic forces have real effects on human
experiences. An additional interview with Professor Margaret Archer
allows us to take a step back, to think about social theory and social
theorizing more broadly.
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Gold Mining and Unequal Exchange in Western
Amazonia: A Theoretical Photo Essay
GORDON L. ULMER
The Ohio State University

Figure 1. Caranchera (semi-mechanized mining machine) on the Madre de Dios River in Peru

Introduction
Two young men working in the Madre de Dios Watershed in Amazonia Peru
pump sediment through a caranchera (semi-mechanized mining method, (fig.
1) to extract gold from the riverbed. One miner is on the beach operating the
small motor while the other is submerged in the river, navigating a suction
pump into gold-bearing sand when a large tree limb floating downriver knocks
him unconscious and hurls him into the rapids. His body and countless others each
year subsidize the profits of gold investors in a chain of global trade linking to the
New York Stock Exchange. Illnesses and mortalities, coercive labor, local and
national government corruption, pollution from mercury contamination and fuel
1
spillage, and deforestation so vast that it is visible from Landsat satellites
beckon our attention to the devastating and undeniable consequences of the
twenty-first century gold boom in Madre de Dios, Peru.
Despite growing global awareness of the crisis in Madre de Dios, a
valence of mystification conceals the broader system of exchange that
1

For Landsat annual timelapse (between 1984 to 2012) of deforestation in Madre de Dios,
Peru due to gold mining, see this Google Earth Engine animation:
https://earthengine.google.org/#timelapse/v=-12.97805,-70.51164,9.853,latLng&t=2.87
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underwrites global profits at the expense of local life and environments.
Ironically, an advertisement for a gold investment firm was published in the same
Smithsonian February 2012 issue featuring the article entitled “The Devastating
Costs of the Amazonian Gold Rush,” which demonstrates the insidious ways
mystification works, even in the process of enlightening readers. Mystification
veils crucial linkages of global trade through popular media that hold local
laborers in Peru culpable while remaining virtually silent about the role Wall
Street plays in the destructive outcomes of gold fever. In this paper, I
reframe the problem to elucidate gold mining in Madre de Dios as part of a
global system of unequal exchange in which “the accumulation of money and
technology in core areas of the world-system occur at the expense of the
natural resources, environment, and health of their peripheries.”2 While global
trade is often critiqued for its uneven distribution of profits, an important and
often under-examined corollary is its uneven or asymmetrical distribution of risks
and consequences.
First, I discuss the interconnections between Amazonian gold mining and
global financial markets to outline important linkages and developments between
global trade and local history. Then, I examine health and social outcomes of
mining labor (embodied labor) and its environmental impacts (embodied land) in
Madre de Dios. Finally, I describe the processes of mystification and
fetishization, or how mining machinery and the miners themselves in Madre de
Dios are held culpable for these consequences, which in turn mystifies unequal
exchange by detracting our eyes from the broader machinations of capital
accumulation and the global gold trade.
This analysis examines the localized material, social, environmental, and
health consequences of the global gold boom in Madre de Dios. I synthesize
published data on public health and environmental impacts of gold mining in
Madre de Dios with my ethnographic research and fieldwork photography in the
region over a period of fifteen months between 2013 and 2015. Through the
camera aperture this photo essay literally illuminates how local and global forces
coalesce around gold mining and influence peoples and environments in Western
Amazonia. Photographs are theoretically contextualized with ethnographic
description and critical reflection to help visualize how global power relations
shape local environments and human life at the local level.

2

Alf Hornborg, "Zero-Sum World Challenges in Conceptualizing Environmental Load
Displacement and Ecologically Unequal Exchange in the World-System," International
Journal of Comparative Sociology 50, no. 3-4 (2009): 237-62.
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Interconnections Between Amazonia and Wall Street
The gold mining economy in Madre de Dios is an outcome of local, national, and
global articulations. Madre de Dios is located in the southeastern lowland
Amazonian region of Peru and shares international borders with Bolivia and
Brazil and departmental borders in Peru with Cusco, Puno, and Ucayali. The
construction of roadways in 1965 joined Andean and Amazonian regions of the
country and enabled a boom of logging in the north and gold mining to the
south.3 During the 1970s the Peruvian government offered blanket tax-exemption
for individuals and companies to exploit gold in Madre de Dios as international
prices precipitously climbed in response to the oil crisis and floating international
exchange rates when gold moved from a currency standard to a global tradable
commodity. 4 The state-run Banco Minero (Miner Bank) assisted in developing
the region using grubstake loans to encourage gold exploration and by purchasing
gold at prices that followed global market rates that rose until 1980. Migration
in the region increased by over 40 percent during this period and coincided with
record high gold prices.5 The lull period from 1981 to 2000 or the ‘bear market’
in gold did not reduce migration to Madre de Dios, which was viewed as a
region of opportunity for Andean peasants affected by a severe drought in
southern Peru. Mining activities rapidly increased as the international price of
gold climbed from economic growth in India and China at the turn of the
twenty-first century, high U.S. national debt that had been growing since
2001, and the global economic recession that began in 2008. The Transoceanic
Highway, a multinational infrastructural development project,6 was completed

3

Cesar Mosquera, Mary Luz Chávez, Victor Hugo Pachas, and Paola Moschella, Estudio
Diagnostico De La Actividad Minera Artesanal En Madre De Dios (Lima, Peru:
Cooperación, Caritas, Conservation International, 2009).
4
Gold prices in the 1970s surged from $38 per ounce to $455 after U.S. unilaterally pulled out
of Bretton Woods and world moved from a fixed to flexible exchange rate system. This marked
the end of the gold standard and the beginning of the gold trade.
Anna Asheshov, The Gold in the River: A Journey in the Jungles of Peru (Hodder and
Stoughton, 1975).
David Hammes and Douglas Wills, "Black Gold: The End of Bretton Woods and the Oil Price
Shocks of the 1970s," Available at SSRN 388283 (2003).
5
Jesús Guillén-Marroquín, "Child Labour in Peru: Gold Panning in Madre De Dios," in
Combating Child Labour (Geneva: Ilo, 1988).
6
The highway connects Brazilian and Peruvian traffic circuits and Atlantic and Pacific
seaports and is part of the Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South
America (IIRSA), a multinational effort to integrate resource rich areas in Amazonia such
as the MAP frontier (an acronym for Madre de Dios in Peru, Acre in Brazil, and Pando
in Bolivia) into greater chains of commerce and development plans (Southworth et al.
2011). This transnational trade route between the two coasts stretches across Amazonia and
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Figure 2. A view of the Transoceanic Highway on the way to the mining corridor.

during the global recession and enabled migrant workers to access Madre de Dios
mining areas from the neighboring Andean departments of Cusco and Puno (fig.
2).
Gold was the best performing asset in the first decade of the twenty-first
century as investors and central banks sought a safe financial haven in a volatile
world market.7 While gold profits soared on Wall Street during the global
recession (reaching a record high of around $1900 per ounce), the precious alloy
incurred myriad consequences for environments and peoples in extractive
enclaves across the globe. The intensification of mining caused a tripling rate of
deforestation8 (also see Swanson et al. 2011) and a surge of human rights
issues and labor abuses in Madre de Dios, such as de facto slavery through debt

snakes through the Andes, enabling greater mobility for migrants from the highlands in
Cusco, Puno, and elsewhere to access the mining labor market in Madre de Dios.
7
"Could Certain Commodities Etfs Yield a Potential Gold Mine for Investors," Forbes, 2014.
Shahriar Shafiee and Erkan Topal, "An Overview of Global Gold Market and Gold Price
Forecasting," Resources Policy 35, no. 3 (2010): 178-89.
8
Gregory P. Asner, William Llactayo, Raul Tupayachi, and Ernesto Ráez Luna, "Elevated Rates
of Gold Mining in the Amazon Revealed through High-Resolution Monitoring,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, no. 46 (2013): 18454-59.
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peonage (Verité 2013), human trafficking and child prostitution,9 and exposure to
unhealthy levels of mercury in soils, waterways, and aquatic food supplies.10
An estimated 50 thousand miners in Madre de Dios produced an annual 18 tons of
gold worth $800 million during the peak of the boom ( Ar t h u r 2 0 12 ) and
gold revenue surpassed cocaine, usurping its place as the most profitable illicit
export commodity.
Meanwhile, the value of exported gold material rises the farther away it
moves from the dredges in Madre de Dios as it exchanges from the hands of
laborers to buyers and ultimately reaches industrialized economies. Gold is used
in destination countries as a money commodity to protect national currencies and
grow capital investments (e.g. in bullions, ETFs, futures trading, etc.), to
articulate elevated socioeconomic status (e.g. high luster ornaments, dentistry,
and jewelry), and to conduct electricity in solid-state electronic devices (e.g.
small cellular phones and computer technologies). Understanding these
interconnected processes reveals how the costs and risks of the global gold trade
are unevenly distributed so that profits are privatized and externalized while the
costs to human health and environments are socialized and localized in Madre de
Dios.
Embodied Labor
My first argument about unequal exchange is that pollution from the global gold
trade is embodied in the local population in Madre de Dios. Embodied labor in
the Marxian sense refers to how human time and energy produce commodities.
To further develop this concept from the perspective of medical anthropology,
embodied labor can also denote how commodities are produced by human
vitality, which can be measured by the embodied effects of labor on health.
Embodiment constitutes a powerful analytical tool to explore biosocial
relationships and understand processes by which people biologically absorb the
social and material world.11 Krieger’s (2001) work shows how increased risk of
9

Instituto de Estudios Internacionales (IDEI), "La Trata De Personas Con Fines De Explotación
Laboral: El Caso De La Minería Aurífera Y La Tala," IDEI y OIM, de la Pontificia
Universidad Católica del Perú (2009).
"Risk Analysis of Indicators of Forced Labor and Human Trafficking in Illegal Gold Mining in
Peru," Verité (2013).
10
Katy Ashe, "Elevated Mercury Concentrations in Humans of Madre De Dios, Peru," PloS one 7,
no. 3 (2012): e33305.
Sarah E. Diringer, Beth J. Feingold, Ernesto J. Ortiz, John A. Gallis, Julio M. Araújo-Flores, Axel
Berky, William K.Y. Pan, and Heileen Hsu-Kim, "River Transport of Mercury from Artisanal and
Small-Scale Gold Mining and Risks for Dietary Mercury Exposure in Madre De Dios, Peru,"
Environmental Science: Processes & Impacts (2015).
11
Nancy Krieger, "Theories for Social Epidemiology in the 21st Century: An Ecosocial
Perspective," International Journal of Epidemiology 30, no. 4 (2001): 668-77.
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hypertension in African Americans is the physical embodiment of material and
socio-political factors, such as occupational and residential segregation,
discrimination, and exposure to toxic substances. From this perspective,
illnesses are often “biological expressions of social relations” in which physical
afflictions are signs of social inequality.12 Paul Farmer’s (1999) penetrating
analysis reveals how significant differences in morbidity and mortality rates in
Haiti from HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, and other preventative diseases “track
along social fault lines.” Moreover, it demonstrates that both local and global
forces of inequality determine why some people are predisposed to illness (due
to political economic factors rather than physiological ones) while others are
safeguarded from risk. These linkages between labor, embodiment, and inequality
call for an analysis that should “inscribe this relationship into a broader historical
and sociocultural framework.”13 Embodiment theory enables us to see how local

Figure 3. A small child helps her mother wash clothes for miners on the banks of the Madre
de Dios River in the mining corridor, where Ribereño communities are exposed to exceedingly
high levels of mercury.
Thomas J. Csordas, Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self.
Vol. 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Byron Good, Medicine, Rationality and Experience: An Anthropological Perspective (Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
12
Nancy Krieger, "Theories for Social Epidemiology in the 21st Century: An Ecosocial
Perspective," International journal of epidemiology 30, no. 4 (2001): 668-77.
Sarah Horton and Judith C. Barker, "Stigmatized Biologies," Medical Anthropology Quarterly 24,
no. 2 (2010): 199-219.
13
Vinh-Kim Nguyen and Karine Peschard, "Anthropology, Inequality, and Disease: A Review,"
Annual Review of Anthropology (2003): 447-74.
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communities in Madre de Dios pay the price for global gold profits with their
bodies. Mercury, which is used to extract gold flakes from slurries of sand, mud,
and stone, is subsequently discarded, re-deposited, and metabolized across
ecosystems.14 Mercury recycles across trophic levels and bioaccumulates,
ultimately reaching human populations through inhalation of mercury vapors
created during processing amalgams (i.e. the separation of mercury from gold) or
consumption of methylmercury-contaminated fish.15 Ashe (2012) found that
fish consumption in Madre de Dios was the most predictive indicator of
elevated mercury levels in humans. Mercury levels were also found to be
higher among men than women (likely because men constitute the majority of
the labor force in gold mining) and for people whose residence locations were
within mining zones (see fig. 3). In the first study to identify increasing mercury
contamination and food web accumulation over a large geographical range
where artisanal mining is widespread, Dilinger et al. (2015) discovered that
communities located hundreds of kilometers downstream from artisanal and
small-scale gold mining operations are at risk of dietary mercury exposure that
exceeds safe limits. They found that over one-third of carnivorous fish had limits
of mercury that surpassed international standards. Moreover, their study reveals
that populations that do not participate in gold mining also bear the consequences
of its toxicity.
My ethnographic fieldwork with miners also sheds light on negative
health outcomes due to exposure to various pollutants and other deleterious
conditions of labor. For example, during interviews most miners described
enduring illnesses as a common consequence of working in the mines, including
maladies from consuming food prepared with water contaminated by sewage, heat
stroke and other effects from day-long exposure to powerful tropical UV rays, and
insect borne diseases like dengue, malaria, and leishmaniasis. Mining also takes a
toll on the body through the physical stress of working 24-hour shifts (depending

14

Ronald Eisler, "Mercury Hazards to Fish, Wildlife, and Invertebrates: A Synoptic Review,"
Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, Laurel, MD (1987).
Marcello M. Veiga, Jennifer Hinton, and Cameron Lilly, "Mercury in the Amazon: A
Comprehensive Review with Special Emphasis on Bioaccumulation and Bioindicators,"
Mercury in the Amazon: A Comprehensive Review with Special Emphasis on
Bioaccumulation and Bioindicators (1999): 19-39.
15
Ellen E. Yard, Jane Horton, Joshua G. Schier, Kathleen Caldwell, Carlos Sanchez, Lauren
Lewis, and Carmen Gastaňaga, "Mercury Exposure among Artisanal Gold Miners in
Madre De Dios, Peru: A Cross-Sectional Study," Journal of Medical Toxicology 8, no. 4
(2012): 441-48.
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Figure 4. A prostibar (prostitution bar) in a remote riverine pueblo along the Madre de Dios
River.

on the type of semi-mechanized mining method) which are often followed by
alcohol binging and prostitution, the latter of which may lead to increased risk of
contracting sexually transmitted infections.16
Prostitution has surged in Madre de Dios due to the gold boom and a
staggering 2000 adolescent girls and women are working at any given time in the
400 prostibares (prostitute bars, see fig. 4) in the region.17 Young girls from
the Andes are often recruited through deceptive tactics under the guise that they
will work in well-paying jobs as restaurant servers in small riverine pueblos near
mining camps or as temporary gold miners.18 Through the pernicious effects of
debt peonage, children are sequestered in workplaces as slaves and their wages
are gouged to pay debts amassed from the exorbitant prices of their meager food
provisions and bunking arrangements. Young girls cannot make enough money
to survive by earning only ~30 U.S. cents per beer they sell at the cantina and
prostitution is often the only means to remunerate debts and escape servitude.
16

The number of HIV cases in Madre de Dios is ten times national average. In 2010,
regional average was 31.6 while national average was 3.4 per 100,000 inhabitants. Areas
with highest rate of HIV are located in the mining corridor, including Laberinto, Colorado,
and Mazuko (see Andina 2013).
17
"La Mafia De La Trata De Mujeres En Madre De Dios," La Republica (2013).
18
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Figure 5. Families in the regional capital city of Puerto Maldonado congregate at the
cemetery during Día de todos los Santos (All Saint’s Day), during which they celebrate their
deceased loved ones by consuming their favorite foods and drinks, dancing to music in
their honor, and lighting candles at their graves. Countless people in Madre de Dios have
died while toiling in the mines.

During fieldwork I occasionally heard the terms “charapita” (little turtle),
“peladita” (little stripped thing), and “jovencita” (young sweet girl, the
diminutive suffix ‘cita’ denotes affection) in reference to highly desired child
prostitutes who work along the river in the pueblos where miners stock up on
supplies, imbibe between shifts of work, and seek the service of prostitutes. The
trafficking and exploitation of the female body and molestation of adolescent
girls are the perverse effects (and local embodiment) of the global gold trade on
local and migrant communities in Madre de Dios.
In a discussion about consumption habits among isolated male extractivist
work groups, Wilk (2007a; 2007b) contends that binge drinking and repetitive
sexual interactions with prostitutes anesthetize the extractivist’s lifestyle of
isolated labor in extreme physical environments, which is “built around a rhythm
of hard work alternating with release” (ibid; also see Clark 1993 on a discussion
about binge consumption and sex among gold miners in Papua New Guinea).
This alternating cadence of excessive work followed by binge consumption fueled
by addiction form part of the ‘engine’ of labor that ‘drives’ gold mining in Madre
de Dios, and alcohol and female bodies comprise the ‘fuel’ that further motivates
extractive labor.
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Human life also fuels the machine of capital accumulation from gold
mining in Madre de Dios and most miners I interviewed have witnessed
multiple deaths while working in the mines. The most common danger is when
the oyos (large pit craters) cave in and entomb workers, but other risks include
falling into the rapids, drowning in the river, injuries from machinery
malfunction, and strangulation from hoses connected to pumps that extract
river sediment while working underwater. Many obreros (laborers) work
overnight shifts and depend on stimulants to prevent drowsiness. Miners chew
coca leaves, smoke cigarettes, or drink rum, coffee, or energy drinks to remain
alert, but embodied labor, but also disembodied labor as profits are subsidized
by the cheap price of life in Madre de Dios. Profits and economic recovery in
part due to gold investments during the global recession have occurred at the
expense of illness, addiction, and death (fig. 5). This linchpin between affliction
and inequality reveals that gold commodities depend on unequal exchange and
asymmetrical distribution of profits and risks among stakeholders of the global
gold trade.
Embodied Land
My second argument about unequal exchange is that pollution and other
consequences from the global gold trade are embodied locally in the land.
Synthesizing World Systems theory and ecological economics,19 we can
understand commodities like gold to also contain “embodied land” or an
“ecological footprint” in addition to embodied labor (see Hornborg 2009;
Hornborg et al. 2007).20 The anthropogenic effects of gold production on the
19

Samir Amin and Brian Pearce, "Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of
Peripheral Capitalism" (1974).
Stephen G. Bunker, Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the
Failure of the Modern State (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1967).
Howard T. Odum, "Self-Organization, Transformity, and Information," Science, no. 242 (1988):
1132-39.
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California Press, 2010).
20
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Journal of Comparative Sociology 50, no. 3-4 (2009): 237-62.
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Figure 6. Aerial view of La Pampa, a significantly deforested mining area in the Madre de
Dios region

Earth can be measured as the “embodied land” of gold commodities. These
phenomena can be understood from synthesizing the perspectives of
thermodynamics and economics (first pioneered by Georgescu-Roegen 1971)
which reveals that economic production increases total entropy, or material and
energetic disorder. An important question remains unaddressed: where is
entropy from booming gold production distributed and what does this
distribution of “disorder” and environmental load displacement tell us about
global trade?
Trade between nations at different levels of technological development
tends to be unequal in terms of distribution of energy (commodities, capital) and
entropy (material disorder, e.g. waste, pollution, etc.; see Hornborg 2009). From
this perspective, extractive enclaves in Amazonia are at a disadvantage in what
Bunker (1985) calls an “uneven flow of energy and matter” in which central
powers appropriate profits to control the hinterlands. The entropy of gold
production in Madre de Dios is localized and manifested by deforestation,
desertification, loss of habitats, mercury pollution, and the release of other
contaminants into ecosystems (fig. 6, 7) while profits and other benefits
generated from its production flow centrifugally to distant locales.
The tripling rate of deforestation in Madre de Dios is significantly
correlated with dramatically rising gold prices in the New York Stock
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Exchange;21 however, this correlation should be the point of departure, rather
than the final word, to compel questions about what this asymmetrical
relationship means. Deforestation and mercury pollution are part of what
Martinez-Alier (2002:70) calls “ecological distribution conflicts,” or the
unequal distribution of environmental degradation. Hornborg (2009:242)
contends that our “cosmology” of neo-classical economics and faith in market
prices “train us to think that market transactions are by definition fair and
equal” but when considering other measurements such as energy, labor,
materials, hectares of land, and environmental degradation, world trade is highly
unequal.
During narrative elicitations miners described an ideal time prior to the
gold boom of the twenty-first century during which “beaches sparkled with gold
flakes” and “boats went downriver, packed with Coke bottles filled with gold.”
Now it is difficult to find gold on the beaches and river levels are high during
the rainy season so many operations move deeper into the forest to extract gold.
Larger mining operations use bulldozers and tractors to remove the top layer of
soil and to dig large pit craters or oyos, which dramatically alter forest structures
and riverine ecosystems. “We had no idea there was so much gold under the soil,”
said a former artisanal miner who witnessed the countryside where he once
panned gold with only three other miners turn into a desert wasteland of hundreds
of machines, migrants from the Andes, and widespread pollution.
When I worked in artisanal mining there was a large aguajal [palm
swamp] where we panned gold around what is now kilometer 119—
but this was before the [Transoceanic] highway was paved. It took
all day to get there… we arrived at 4 p.m. and started working the next
morning. We used to hunt peccary, monkeys…there was so much food
back then. I returned six years later after the machines arrived… now
it is completely plundered… a desert with craters where machines
have sucked out all the gold. They now call it La Pampa.
-Former artisanal miner
Local residents in Puerto Maldonado, the capital city of the Madre de Dios
region, nostalgically remember their hometown when it was a small pueblo
where residents could leave their front doors open and children could safely ride
their bicycles down the main streets without concern. But rapid development from
the booming gold industry has upended local lives. Crime has escalated in recent
21

Gregory P. Asner, William Llactayo, Raul Tupayachi, and Ernesto Ráez Luna, "Elevated Rates
of Gold Mining in the Amazon Revealed through High-Resolution Monitoring,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, no. 46 (2013): 18454-59.

13 disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory

years and is usually cited in interviews with residents when asked about the
greatest changes they have seen in the city during their lifetimes. “Carreteristas”
(lit. ‘Highwayers’) ride on motorcycles and snatch purses and backpacks from
pedestrians and people on the back of motorcycle taxis. “Choros” (slang for
‘thiefs’) frequently assault residents in certain barrios (neighborhoods) of
town. Denizens of Madre de Dios also complain about the inflated price of goods
when compared to other parts of Peru where gold mining is not the
predominant economic activity. Some locals who describe themselves as “neto”
(native) from the region lament growing disappearance of local foodways, as
local dishes such as tacacho con cecina (jerk pork with plantain balls) or
patarashca con yuca (fish cooked in banana leaves, served with boiled manioc)
are less common while Andean dishes such as rocoto relleno con pastel de papas
y tallarín al horno (stuffed peppers, potato cake, and baked noodles) and carnero
asado (roasted lamb) are frequently found written on the daily chalkboard
menus on the streets of town. The socio-cultural outcomes of the gold boom have
been afforded very little attention.

Figure 7. Artisanal miners clearing vegetation to expand beaches along the Madre de Dios
River
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Fetishism and Mystification
My third argument about unequal exchange is that mining machinery (and their
local operators, the miners) are fetishized so that unequal global trade is
bewildering. Marx was concerned with processes by which unequal relations of
social exchange are obscured (mystification), especially through attribution of
autonomous agency or productivity to certain objects and “things” (fetishization).
Miners and their machines comprise the culpable agent for the consequences of
embodied labor and land previously outlined (e.g. deforestation, slavery,
pollution, and so forth), while simultaneously detracting our eyes from the
broader machinations of capital accumulation and the seemingly sacrosanct
organization of the global economy.
Although scholarly articles, gray literature, and mainstream media
acknowledge a correlation between global gold prices and the consequences of
gold mining in Madre de Dios, most publications continue to vilify local miners
and portray them as principle agents of chaos— as if deforestation, mercury
pollution, and labor problems in Western Amazonia are inherent problems in the
region rather than particular local responses to broader forces and opportunities.
Sidney Mintz (1977) similarly observed that the study of slavery in the
Caribbean was also frequently understood as a result of ‘internal consequences’
in the region. This atomistic view, Mintz argues, compels one to analyze such
cases as detached from the global economy as if they generate “their own internal

Figure 8. A miner working on a draga (barge) on the Madre de Dios River
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dynamic without respect to their position in wider fields of forces”.22
Most literature describes fiebre de oro (gold fever) in Madre de Dios as
resulting from commercial interests running amok in what Yu et al. (2010) call
“low-governance areas,” where state enforcement of regulations and laws is
absent.23 Thus, miners and their absent government are considered the culpable
forces of destruction and exploitation. But how is it that the peasant who migrated
to Amazonia to escape destitution and who now works 24-hour shifts operating
mining machinery for a meager short-term wage has come to represent unfettered
capitalism rather than the multi-millionaire investment banker on Wall Street
who profits most from deforestation, pollution, prostitution, slavery, illness, and
death in Madre de Dios?

Figure 9. A draga (barge) mines for gold on the Madre de Dios River before they were
banned in 2011. The draga completely mechanizes the process of alluvial gold mining.

This scapegoating is part of the process of mystification, which
entails obfuscating capitalist production, veiling unequal social dynamics, and
treating them as if they were natural and inevitable. The belief in market prices
and advancements in technology are part of what Hornborg (2001) calls machine
fetishism, in which machine technology (i.e. notions of development and
progress) mystifies social relations and conceals unequal material exchanges.

22
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Figure10. Andean migrants working in artisanal mining on a riverbank

Miners in Madre de Dios represent environmental destruction because they are
the most immediate, visible appendage of the global machinery of extraction and
capital accumulation.24
However, miners and other people in Madre de Dios also have their own
perspective and fetishization of the machine. The phrase “antes de las machinas”
(before the machines) is a common chronological distinction people often make
during ethnographic interviews that refers to the pre-boom era when miners
worked manually with pans, shovels, and wheelbarrows (locally called
‘cholobomba’ method, see fig. 10) instead of semi-mechanized or fully
mechanized mining machinery (see fig. 8, 9). This distinction can also be
moralistic, as machines represent greater environmental destruction, but also
excessive profiteering while artisanal mining refers to a time when workers only
mined for subsistence. “I worked only to eat” and “I worked to survive, not to
profit” are moral distinctions many miners have made during interviews.
Mystification also works to reduce complex interregional processes
related to structural inequality, migration, and mining. Most miners in Madre de
Dios are impoverished migrants from the Andes (fig. 10, 11). Global gold prices
and poverty in the Andes are often given as reasons for the mass exodus from the
Andes in recent decades. However, these “push” and “pull” factors superimpose
the laws of supply and demand onto complex human situations and have
24
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Figure 11. Where the Andes and Amazon meet, biogeographically, economically, and
culturally

dominated migration theory for half a century.25 Migrants choose to move for a
complexity of reasons, such as an individual’s social role in the household
and community, their local traditions, geography, and belief that migration
will lead to economic well-being (Cohen 2004).26 Treating migrants as
passive responders to global market demands mystifies the political economic
processes that created the conditions that enabled the gold rush.
These processes include neoliberal reforms prescribed by the IMF, which
cut social services and effectively perpetuate poverty under the guise of
remedying it. Treating migrants as passive responders also mystifies class-based,
racially-drawn land reforms in the Andes that favored large landholders over
smallholders, a political culture of centralismo (centralism, rooted in New
Spain’s colonial regime) in which Lima extracts wealth from the
countryside. Centralismo perpetuates underdevelopment, marginalization, and
impecuniousness of la provincia (e.g. peripheral areas of Peru) and creates
geographies of vulnerability where people depend on coca production,
human/narco/arms trafficking, logging, artisanal mining, and other informal
25
26
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markets for survival. Peru’s Centralismo policies promote extractive activities
through internal colonialism.27 Under conditions of economic development,
regions compete against one another for scarce institutional support, creating
cultural divisions, or “internal colonies” as the state increasingly becomes the
redistribution broker.28 At a structural level, unequal exchange is institutionalized
through a political system that privileges a minority of wealthy people at the
cost of the poor majority.29
Concluding Reflections
If indeed “fetishes are symbols that have become masters of their authors”
(Hornborg 2001:482), then the way gold miners and the machines they operate in
Madre de Dios have been ideologically represented encourages the atomistic way
we think about and compartmentalize profits and consequences of global trade.
This theoretical photo essay disabuses such rationale. The Marxian concepts of
unequal exchange, embodied labor, embodied land, fetishization, and
mystification help to understand how opulence and capital accumulation in
economic centers of the world occur at the expense of lives and environments in
the hinterlands. Through fieldwork photography it is possible to visualize how
consequences of gold mining are localized and socialized, which serves to
contrast from the more visible view of gold in which benefits are
globalized and privatized through the New York Commodity Exchange and the
several intermediary hands across which gold is exchanged. Interestingly, after I
inquired about local gold prices during interviews, some miners reversed the
question and asked me, “How much is a gram of gold in your country, a lot
27
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more?” to demonstrate awareness of unequal exchange in the global gold trade.
While many people in Madre de Dios intuitively understand this relationship to
be unequal, mystification conceals the inimical impacts on peoples and
environments that are produced and perpetuated by global trade.
Problems from gold mining in Madre de Dios cannot be reduced to binary
distinctions of good and evil or perpetrators and victims; such reifications
continue to mystify these issues rather than to help us critically think about
them. Moreover, miners in Madre de Dios are not passive responders— they have
agency, motives and ambitions. Many miners are aware of mercury
contamination, but some are skeptical and do not trust data on its deleterious
effects from NGOs or government institutions, which are sometimes
suspected to be colluding to thwart local livelihoods. Mistrust of the government
must be understood historically, considering that Andean communities were
persecuted during Peru’s civil war and many continue to suffer from centralismo
policies. Thus, history, power, culture, health, and environment are inseparable
issues and we must examine their linkages to further shed light on the realities of
global trade.

Figure 12: Small-scale “cholobomba” operation on a riverbank
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Race vs. Class: Is the Market Colorblind?
DAVID LUKE
University Of Kentucky
Introduction
For over forty years, sociologists and social scientists have debated the nature of
inequality. Indeed, going back to Karl Marx and his contemporaries, the debates
on the significance of race and class have been perpetual. Marxists often
contended that class superseded race, gender, and other divisions in importance,
but instead, those divisions were utilized by capitalists to preserve economic
advantage and better exploit the proletariats. Race theorists like Michael Omi and
Howard Winant attempted to shift focus back on race, noting that race was still a
fundamental aspect of our social organization and had significance on its own,
beyond class.1 As time has gone on, racism has changed forms, and many scholars
acknowledge the new racism as what Eduardo Bonilla-Silva has termed
“colorblind racism”.2 His concept of abstract liberalism, one of colorblind
racism’s four fundamental frames, explains that people oppose race-based social
policy by using justifications grounded in the principles of liberalism in an
abstract manner.3 For example, people often oppose affirmative action on the
grounds that they favor equal opportunity.4 The underlying assumption here is the
common belief that the market is colorblind, therefore without race-conscious
policies, we will achieve the ever-elusive “fairness”. Unfortunately, numerous
studies indicate that pervasive labor market discrimination continues, suggesting
that colorblindness will likely perpetuate and even increase racial inequality.5
This is not necessarily an issue of individual prejudice, but research indicates that
white privilege is preserved not simply by whites with antipathy towards
1
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members of other groups, but whites whose social network connections lead them
to provide references and job leads disproportionately to other whites while they
profess colorblindness and perpetuate white privilege in employment.6 Two Ivy
League professors and former presidents of the American Sociological
Association, William Julius Wilson and Douglas Massey (along with Nancy
Denton), engaged in a spirited debate that many perceived as an extension of the
race vs. class debate. This debate was, however, somewhat mischaracterized, as
neither scholar denied the significance of race. In fact, both of their arguments in
combination, along with subsequent research on the racial wealth gap present a
strong case for race-based policy to address the current racial inequality,
particularly between black and white Americans, that plagues U.S. society today.
Indeed, the market is not colorblind; historical policies have created an
environment in which the status quo operation of the market perpetuates racial
inequality. As a result, because the market is not colorblind, neither should be the
policies that address the inequality created by the market.
Race or Class: The Old False Dichotomy
William Julius Wilson stirred up a great deal of controversy in his 1978 book, The
Declining Significance of Race. Much of this controversy seemed to be
attributable more to the title of the book than its actual substantive arguments.
Nonetheless, Wilson’s book is a classic in sociology and racial inequality, and
brought renewed scholarly attention to black/white inequality. In the book,
Wilson’s primary claim is that the life chances for individual African Americans
and their access to privilege and power are more largely impacted by economic
class position than by their race.7 Wilson claimed that since the overt racism of
the early 20th century had dissipated, many traditional racial barriers for African
Americans had also declined, and class took primacy.8 This idea has been
contested by some theorists, who note the emergence of a “new racism” in the
post-Civil Rights era characterized as being covert and subtle.9 Wilson explained
his argument by looking at U.S. history as split into three periods, (1)
preindustrial – characterized by racial caste oppression and a plantation economy;
(2) industrial – characterized by racial oppression, class conflict, and industrial
expansion; and (3) modern industrial – characterized by the gradual transition
6
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from racial inequalities to class inequalities.10 Essentially, Wilson focused on how
economic arrangements, systems of production, and polity constrained the
interactions of different racial groups and limited their access to rewards and
privileges.11 He argued that the Marxist theories and the split labor market theory
both serve well to explain inequality in preindustrial and industrial economies,
where capitalists and higher-paid members of the working class (respectively)
intentionally generated racial stratification, but failed to explain the situation in
modern industrial times.12 Wilson saw the problem for black Americans at that
time as the government’s inability to deal with barriers created by structural
changes in the economy related to technological and economic revolutions; he did
not believe race was the primary barrier, as equal opportunity and affirmative
action programs helped to deal with racial obstacles.13 Recent scholarship has
pointed out that in addition to technology, skill mismatches, global
financialization, and outsourcing/offshoring also contribute to structural
unemployment, and African Americans historically have seen higher
unemployment rates than whites.14 While denying race’s primary importance,
Wilson noted that affirmative action had helped to contribute to growing class
inequality and divisions within the black community, and that the exit of the black
middle class from communities with underclass residents resulted in a loss of
resources for societal organization, advocacy, social movements, and the social
buffer they provide during economic woes.15 Finally, racial conflicts, Wilson
noted, had not disappeared, but had been reduced, and conflicts were based more
on class.16
In 1987, Wilson focused his attention on the problems of the black urban
underclass in his book The Truly Disadvantaged. He began by noting a lack of
research on racial issues since the controversial Moynihan Report, and the
subsequent dominance of a conservative culture-of-poverty perspective inspired
by Oscar Lewis.17 In the wake of antipoverty and antidiscrimination legislation,
but with persisting racial and class inequality, liberals seemed to avoid the
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conversation altogether.18 In the book, Wilson argued that historic discrimination
played a much larger role than contemporary discrimination, and in addition, that
black migration to urban centers and high fertility rates resulted in a lower
average age, which depressed wages relative to whites and artificially increased
the wage gap often attributed to race.19 He noted spatial mismatch, the shift of
jobs from urban areas to the suburbs, as one economic factor that contributed to
the creation of the black urban underclass.20 Wilson introduced the concept of the
Male Marriageable Pool Index (MMPI), stating that the pool of “marriageable”
males (same race, similar age, employed) was lower for African American
women, resulting in more single female-headed households and lower
socioeconomic status.21
The error from Wilson’s perspective was that race-based policies were
seen as the solution to racial inequality for all classes, but this was not the case;
while advantaged members of the black community saw significant gains from
1970-1987, the “truly disadvantaged” members of the underclass saw their
conditions worsen.22 Additionally problematic, Wilson noted that original civil
rights movement goals of equality of opportunity were consistent with traditional
“American values” like freedom of choice, but the goals changed to preferential
treatment for minority groups.23 Research has provided evidence that this may
contain some truth, as the opposition to affirmative action of some individuals is
because it violates the ideal of fairness.24 This also explains how Bonilla-Silva’s
concept of abstract liberalism works now to justify race-neutral policies.25
Deviating from the race-conscious position, Wilson pushed for equality of life
chances, calling for a long-term universal program to create job and mobility
opportunities without generating the resentment short-term, targeted affirmative
redistribution programs like affirmative action tend to generate.26 Wilson noted
that poverty rates were tied closely to a country’s general economic standing and
forcefully advocated for incorporating antipoverty legislation in general economic
18
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policy (Wilson 1987). While advocating for universalist policies, Wilson
espoused the need for a “hidden agenda” including race-targeted policies,
explaining it as follows:
“The hidden agenda for liberal policymakers is to improve the life chances
of truly disadvantaged groups such as the ghetto underclass by
emphasizing programs to which the more advantaged groups of all races
and class backgrounds can positively relate (Wilson 1987:155).”
So in this “hidden agenda”, Wilson left the door open to include some race-based
policy as long as the major programs that received more focused attention were
universal programs, which would garner much more support.27
In 1993, Massey & Denton published their classic book, American
Apartheid. They emphasized what they believed to be a severely overlooked
factor in the making of urban underclass communities: racial residential
segregation.28 In fact, directly addressing their position with regard to The Truly
Disadvantaged, they noted a basic agreement with Wilson’s argument that the
structural transformation of the economy worked against the economic situation
of the urban underclass, but argued that without residential segregation, the
deleterious impact of the economic transformation would have been substantially
lessened.29 While mentioning spatial mismatch in his discussion of urban poverty
and structural changes to the economy, Wilson did not explicitly identify
residential segregation as a causal factor. Additionally, Massey & Denton were
critical of Wilson’s treatment of the black middle class in The Truly
Disadvantaged.30 They argued that while Wilson blamed the black middle class
for exiting underclass neighborhoods and thereby harming the underclass and
contributing to the concentration of poverty, he missed the point that concentrated
poverty was created by residential segregation limiting and black housing options
and would have happened regardless of middle-class outmigration.31 Their effort
in the book was to bring residential segregation back into the conversation, and
recognize it as a key structural factor that caused enduring black poverty in urban
ghettos in the U.S.32
The case was laid out by first presenting a history, noting very little
residential segregation in 1900, but a tremendous increase during the great
27
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migration of the early 20th century.33 The great migration coincided with the
creation of the urban ghetto and a rise in white supremacist ideology and violence
in the North.34 Violence (or the threat of violence) soon became a method of
enforcing residential segregation, along with restrictive covenants of
neighborhood associations, and if all else failed, white flight.35 The result of the
nefarious practices that helped keep African Americans contained in the ghetto
was a gradation where the most poor individuals were highly concentrated and the
wealth expanded outward.36 Southern whites used Jim Crow to enforce residential
segregation until 1916, but residential segregation still persisted at higher levels in
the North.37 By the time of World War II, northern ghettos were established as
Black and white flight ensured in the 50s and 60s that segregation persevered.38
Redlining and the administration of Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans
helped to ensure this as well, later contributing to the tremendous racial wealth
gap by prohibiting blacks from buying houses that would ultimately be good
financial investments.39
Massey & Denton noted that evidence suggests African American
segregation is not a result of self-segregation, as surveys indicate a desire among
blacks for integrated neighborhoods; conversely, such desire is reflected in
principle, but not in practice among white Americans (Massey & Denton 1993).
They noted widespread discrimination in housing still being practiced, even since
the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 (and effective removal of residential
segregation from public policy discourse).40
The impact of residential segregation is staggering. Higher levels of
poverty concentration among African Americans and lower levels among whites
is one result.41 Black poverty in segregated cities leads to an increase in the level
of abandoned buildings to a tipping point level of disinvestment that would not
occur in integrated cities.42 Commercial institutions shut down if they cannot be
supported by locals in urban ghettos; crime increases as a result of urban poverty
that, in high concentration, has a greater impact than it would in an integrated
33
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community.43 Poor African Americans are incredibly socially isolated and rarely
leave their neighborhoods until adulthood, resulting in the development of a
unique dialect that increases barriers to employment; oppositional, sometimes
violent culture is also often a result.44 Significantly, there is a major wealth
component to systemic residential segregation, as many African Americans live in
undervalued neighborhoods and, if they choose to purchase homes, often see a
lower return on investment than whites.45
The big policy recommendation from Massey & Denton’s perspective was
systematic enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, which is currently only enforced
through individual complaints and verification by “testers” hired for local fair
housing councils.46 They argued that Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
could take the lead on fair housing enforcement through increased funding for
local fair housing organizations, establishment of a permanent testing program
with a special unit dedicated to large-scale housing audits in search of patterns of
discrimination, added staff under the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and
Equal Opportunity to evaluate lending data and look for patterns in rejection rates
among minorities, a “more vigorous” promotion of desegregation under the
affirmative mandate of the Fair Housing Act, and prompt judicial action and
timely relief in enforcing the act.47 Essentially, they were calling for more
regulation in the housing market.
Racial Inequality in Markets
While since the 1960s racial income inequality has shrunk to some degree, racial
wealth inequality, often ignored in the conversation, remains.48 Black wealth has
indeed grown during that time, but it has simultaneously fallen further behind
white wealth (meaning, it has grown at a slower pace).49 Wealth differs from
income in that wealth constitutes what people own, whereas income is received in
exchange for work, retirement, or social welfare.50 Looking at wealth adds
information to the racial inequality conversation, because while the income gap
appears to be closing somewhat, in 2007, the median white family held assets
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worth more than 15 times that of the median African American family.51 Those in
the “class” side of the race/class debate often focus more attention on income,
occupation, and educational attainment, thus missing what information wealth
provides.52
Oliver & Shapiro utilize three concepts to highlight the way wealth
accumulation varies by race, and specifically the black-white racial wealth gap.53
First, they refer to the racialization of state policy, highlighting the role of the
state in hindering the capacity of many African Americans to accumulate wealth
starting in slavery and proceeding thereafter.54 Specifically, they note government
promotion of home ownership, retirement, education, pensions, homesteading,
land acquisition, and asset accumulation excluding poor people, and blacks in
particular.55 This fits directly with Massey & Denton, who looked at the role of
the state in creating a segregated underclass community.56 The promise of “40
acres and a mule” was left unfulfilled as overt discrimination by bankers,
exclusive social security policies that left domestic and agricultural workers
ineligible, and the practices of redlining by the Home Owners Loan Corporation
(HOLC), Veterans Affairs (VA), and FHA loan administration kept blacks from
wealth accumulation opportunities.57 Importantly, the racist housing practices and
loan administration ensured that white American investment in homes in the
suburbs generated substantially greater returns than Black home investment; this
is crucial as the home is often the biggest financial asset of many middle-class
families.58 Additionally, white flight and the fear that a black population of over
20% in a neighborhood would drive property values down became a self-fulfilling
prophecy, and with all these obstacles to home ownership, black families often
ended up renting at higher rates than whites; renting is typically more expensive
than home ownership overall.59 With that in mind, any monthly cost-savings is
important for lower- and middle-income families in order to save money for
higher education for children. The cost of renting, thus, partly contributes to
51
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making higher education a more difficult proposition, and lower levels of
education severely limit options for higher-paying occupations.
Second, Oliver & Shapiro highlight the “economic detour” of black
businesses caused by restrictions from participation in the open market up until
the mid 20th century.60 These restrictions effectively closed off another avenue
for wealth generation. They note that African American businesses were often
allowed to cater to black customers but prohibited from breaking into the
“mainstream” (i.e. white American) market; as a result, they served clients who
had similarly restricted income and could not provide the same level of support
for their entrepreneurial endeavors.61 If black businesses began to grow to be able
to compete with white-owned businesses, intimidation and violence were
sometimes used to keep them “in their place”.62 While Wilson notes the
geographic shift of jobs to suburban areas and the spatial mismatch for inner city
residents as contributing to the dire economic position of the underclass, he does
not touch explicitly on the wealth aspect or discuss black business in great
detail.63
Third and finally, Oliver & Shapiro refer to wealth as the “sedimentation
of racial inequality”. They look at wealth as the cumulative impact of a history of
poor schooling, segregation, and low wages.64 From slavery to Jim Crow to the
present day (perpetuated by inheritance or lack thereof), racial inequality’s
sedimentation is visible through wealth inequality.65 In this case, both Massey &
Denton and Wilson did not directly touch this point. While Massey & Denton’s
policy recommendations pertained only to the race-focused issue of residential
segregation, Wilson’s universalist policies dealt with class-inequality, but neither
tackled the sedimentation of racial inequality.66 This is where Dalton Conley’s
suggestion of class-based affirmative action (which fits well with Wilson) and a
wealth/property component in the form of reparations would be more
appropriate.67 Unfortunately, I suspect Wilson would consider reparations too
noticeable to be effectively included on any “hidden agenda”.68 However, a
reparations policy that directly ties back to the numerous historical wealthgenerating policies that benefited whites and excluded people of color (and
especially African Americans) has a strong empirical and moral basis.
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With the recent foreclosure crisis, residential segregation was identified as
a causal factor, and African American communities were targeted for subprime
mortgages and felt greater wealth loss in this process.69 Wells Fargo reached a
$175 settlement with an NAACP lawsuit after the great recession that alleged
within the organization “ghetto loans” for “mud people” were higher interest
subprime loans targeted at African American clients.70 In fact, although many
African Americans have made advances into the middle class, the black middle
class still differs from the white middle class in that a pillar of wealth supports
whites and gives them more stability in times of economic downturn.71 Wealth
begets wealth, because more wealth often means the capacity to make investments
for retirement, children’s education, etc. In this way, inheritance perpetuates and
accentuates wealth inequality and violates the deeply-held American principle of
equality of opportunity. Curiously, discussions of the inherent fairness of the
market rarely involve discussions of the inherent unfairness of inheritance.
A Pew Research Center analysis of 2009 government data revealed
median white household wealth is on average have 20 times that of African
Americans and 18 times that of Latino’s; this has major ramifications, including a
substantial impact on education.72 Entry into higher education is made more
manageable through long-term savings by parents or guardians of potential
students, but it is not the only education that matters.73 The reproduction of racial
and class inequality can be viewed through the lens of education quite
effectively.74 Progress in educational equality was made in the wake of the Civil
Rights Movement, but much of that was reversed during the Reagan
administration in the 1980s.75 In fact, segregation in general declined from 19661980, but only sex segregation continued to decline after 1980; the decline in
racial segregation did not continue.76 The educational differentials can be traced
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closely to socioeconomic differences between blacks and whites in a number of
ways.77 Housing can be an issue here: neighborhood socioeconomic status is
closely associated with academic performance, and social capital from peer and
neighborhood influences and environmental hazards (violence, crime, etc.) all
play a factor in predicting academic performance.78 This academic performance
subsequently impacts educational and career aspirations, as well as possibilities
for higher education.
Race and Colorblindness in Labor and Education
In the labor market, governmental policy intrudes and intervenes (however weak
the intervention is) in the form of “affirmative action”. William Julius Wilson
made a clear critique of how these programs operate and who they help.79 Wilson
has been highly critical, noting that affirmative action has failed the underclass
and only helps highly qualified minorities, increasing their demand in the labor
market while decreasing the demand of less-qualified workers due to cost, he
argues.80 While Wilson referred mainly to affirmative action at work, affirmative
action in university admissions and financial aid fit well into his argument as well.
While need-based, racially targeted financial aid can theoretically assist in lifting
lower-income minorities into universities they would otherwise not attend,
affirmative action in higher education tends to primarily help those African
Americans who are already in better financial situations. This is why Wilson
advocated for universalist policies and the “rising tide” to lift all the boats, and
then believes through his “hidden agenda” of race-based policy, this would help
overcome discrimination.81 His comprehensive policy recommendations help
address the racial and class barriers for lower-income African Americans.
Wilson’s writing has generated its share of controversy, and as he has
published new editions of many of his classic texts, he has also clarified his
(sometimes modified) positions. In a 2012 article in the Du Bois Review, Wilson
elucidates his position on affirmative action and specifically addresses the new
colorblind class-based alternatives that are often proposed.82 Wilson claims that
two factors drive the overwhelming public opposition to race-based policy, a
racial factor and the “heavy reliance on individualistic explanations of social
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behavior and social outcomes in this country.”83 Class-based affirmative action
addresses the racial factor, he notes.84 While people argue class-based policies
will disproportionately benefit people of color (who are disproportionately poor),
Wilson contends that by considering the traditional aptitude tests where African
Americans often score poorly and other similar measures, class-based policies
would systemically reduce opportunities for African Americans.85 The problem,
he argues, is that these measures where blacks perform overwhelmingly worse is
due to the cumulative effects of “having one’s life chances limited by race.”86
Residential segregation, poor schools, and the fact that this is common experience
among multiple generations (such that parents of young African Americans also
had their life chances restricted in a similar way) contribute to these cumulative
effects. Black people of all social classes would be negatively impacted by classbased affirmative action, but the poor would see the worst results.87
Wilson instead advocates for what he terms “affirmative opportunity”
programs involving “flexible and merit-based criteria.”88 He shows evidence that
the public would generally be more supportive of targeted programs, but are leery
of the idea of hard quotas (which are not legal under affirmative action) and
unqualified individuals being hired or accepted for college admissions.89 Wilson
recommends race be considered among a constellation of factors, standardized
tests be given less weight, and that criteria become more flexible.90 As an
example, he notes that the University of Michigan Law School uses this type of
flexible criteria in admissions; rather than reserving spots for people of color, the
school considers race in conjunction with numerous other factors to make
decisions.91 The idea of flexibility can raise legitimate concerns which Wilson
does not address in his brief article. Flexibility brings more discretion to the hiring
or admissions processes, opening the door for the negative impacts of pervasive
implicit bias favoring whites and working against African Americans and other
people of color.92 One result of affirmative action early-on was more
standardization of hiring processes for many organizations, formalized job
descriptions, and other measures to remove discretion and make hiring processes
83
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“objective”.93 As Wilson’s critique of the “objective” criteria is strong, it becomes
important that admissions and hiring decisions are made by a diverse committee,
or a committee that will not fall into the trap of individualistic explanations for
social behavior that he identified.94
While people argue for colorblind policies instead of affirmative action,
which some perceive as colorblind racism, the Texas Top 10% law provides one
case to illustrate the effectiveness of class-based affirmative action.95 In the wake
of legislation banning racial preferences in higher education in Texas, a plan
known as the Texas Top 10 was implemented, which mandated that individuals in
the top ten percent of their high school class would be accepted to any state
university in Texas. The results of this plan were mixed:
"Since one out of ten public high schools in Texas enrolls 90–100 percent
minority students, some minority students must be guaranteed acceptance
to college under the Texas percent plan. However, the percent plan
negatively impacts the probability of admission to the best public colleges
in Texas for students outside of the top ten percent of their high school
class."96
This new program, and the end of affirmative action, reduced the
percentage of Black and Hispanic students in Texas who chose to apply to
college.97 If minority students who were not in the top ten percent of their class
would have applied to college under affirmative action, the reduction in Black and
Hispanic applicants under the top ten rule is rational, since minority students who
are not in the top ten do not see their college admissions as likely under the new
rules. Additionally, financial aid is still a factor, and one study showed that the
Texas Top 10 plan was only effective when admissions offers were followed-up
by financial aid awards.98
The Texas Top 10 program was effective in some ways – although in the
first two years of the plan (1998-1999), admission rates for every minority group
except Asians declined, after the second year those rates rebounded to 1996 levels
- the last time race-sensitive criteria was used.99 In this way it was a success and
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class rank, rather than standardized test scores, could be used in college
admissions and, some scholars argue, achieve results similar to affirmative
action.100 Still, extrapolating the results of Texas is dangerous, as Texas is a
unique state with a large residentially segregated minority population.101
Residential segregation and the resulting school segregation is important
in that in academically struggling and low-resource schools, the highest academic
achievers still have a chance to go to college. In this way, if schools are
completely segregated, the result will be proportions of students accepted to
universities in Texas that are exactly proportionate to the population numbers.
However, qualitative differences in schools merit consideration. College-going
traditions of schools are important, so for poorer schools that do not offer
advanced placement courses and are not geared toward college preparation, their
students are less likely to know about the top ten rule and how it works, or how to
work it to their advantage.102 In fact, although top decile students are more likely
than others to know their class rank, even this knowledge has racial disparities
and Black and Hispanic high school students are less likely to know their class
rank and whether or not they are in the top ten accurately.103 Additionally
problematic for Texas due to the large Latino population is the fact that Hispanic
seniors in the top ten of their classes are less likely than comparable white
students to know much about the admission guarantee; this is due in part for many
of these students to their parents’ lack of proficiency in English and racially
segregated social networks.104 So while no system is perfect, and some contest the
effectiveness of the Texas Top 10 plan,105 it is an alternative to affirmative action
that has promoted diversity in higher education more than having no program at
all. This does not, however, mean class-based affirmative action is the most
effective for remedying racial inequality. In fact, although UCLA law school’s
class-based affirmative action increased the socioeconomic diversity of the
student body, they saw a dramatic decline in the enrollment of blacks and
American Indian students – the racial diversity at the law school suffered.106
Class-based affirmative action is better than nothing, but does not address racial
inequality as well as race-based policy.
With some of the valid criticisms of affirmative action noted, what other
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race-based policies might be the most effective? Some have made strong and
convincing cases for reparations.107 While residential options for African
American have been systematically reduced through policy, the income and
wealth gap have also contributed to difficulty in integrating neighborhoods.108
Wealth inequality is a tremendous barrier for people of color – particularly
African Americans. A strong policy for addressing economic inequality might
involve a calculated effort to compensate those who have been prohibited
historically from benefitting from government policies that helped build the white
middle class.109 The results of neglect from these policies could be calculated and
a one-time payment given to families whose wealth is depressed due to
discriminatory government practices. The cost of this would likely be small in
comparison to the social costs that wealth inequality incurs on society, and would
be substantially less than recent government bailouts for large corporations.110
While it may be difficult to hide, including reparations in a “hidden agenda”
would be crucial for addressing racial inequality.
Conclusion
“The Market” is often invoked in the same way as a deity; as an all-knowing, allpowerful, perfectly just force. As a result, markets are believed to hold the values,
especially in the United States, that many hold dear. Equality and fairness are two
of those values. Some have argued that debates over affirmative action and racebased social policies are “shell” debates that in essence concern the “core” issues
of liberty and justice.111 Opponents of race-based policy might argue against this
perspective, instead arguing that the market is inherently fair and just.
Colorblindness could, in principle, be considered a fair idea; but
colorblind policies should not be implemented in a society where rewards, life
chances, and opportunities are distributed disproportionately based on one’s color.
In order to deal with racial inequality adequately, race must be considered. As
outlined above, a number of government policies and programs in recent U.S.
history have been designed, color-blind or otherwise, to benefit white Americans
disproportionately. The result is persistent racial inequality between whites and
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African Americans specifically in almost every major area including wealth,
educational attainment, and most measures of health. In addition, research
indicates the continuing significance of race and racial discrimination; historical
and contemporary racism both factor into the racial inequality rampant today. The
market is clearly not colorblind, and there is sufficient justification for broadscale, race-based social policy. In fact, more aggressive race-based policy is
necessary to compensate for contemporary discrimination, amend for past
discrimination, and for race-neutral policies to ever truly be fair in the future.
From its inception, affirmative action was vaguely defined and opposed by the
majority; the result was a relatively weak policy that, although it provided
opportunities for advancement, fell far short of complete elimination racial
inequality (Dobbin 2009; Skrentny 1996).112 Instead, a more aggressive racebased policy, grounded in the research summarized above and the wealth of other
research on racial inequality, is needed to achieve fairness in the market. The
unearned reputation of a colorblind, fair market is a lie, and colorblind policies
are not sufficient in a market that, the overwhelming majority of evidence
indicates, is substantially impacted by race.
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Challenging Dominant Market Theories in Five Ways 1
THOMAS E. JANOSKI
University of Kentucky
Introduction
In the halls of American policy making, neo-classical economists have long had
the politician’s ear, and this has intensified with the rise of neo-liberalism as a
political movement. Marion Fourcade and colleagues even title a recent paper
“The Superiority of Economists”.2 And neo-liberalism seeks to replace many state
functions with free market solutions such as privatizing the post office and
chartering the public schools. Economists’ arguments about markets vary in three
ways: (a) positive claims that free markets are more efficient and rational, (b)
normative claims that free markets should be more rational or efficient but fail to
be so due to interest groups and politics, or irrational consumers or producers, and
(c) interference claims that the state prevents free markets.3 The public tends to
accept these arguments in boom times, but in crisis these arguments of perfect
markets (or imperfect markets but it is the best that we can do) have encountered
a crescendo of criticism. Scholars in anthropology, sociology, geography and
even parts of psychology have argued against the efficiency, rationality and
uncritical use of market theory. This paper will consider five such arguments
against the exaggerations and misconceptions of free markets, while still
maintaining that markets can be useful if they are regulated and/or altered in a
number of ways. These challenges are not so much normative arguments that
markets should behave in different ways. Rather they are arguments that markets
actually do operate in a variety of ways and that we should recognize the reality
of markets (i.e., their good and bad sides) and then more accurately attempt to
alter or control that reality.
This article will first review why many social scientists are dissatisfied
1
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with an overreliance on markets, and a conceptualization of markets being
efficient, fair and rational. This will focus especially on marginal utility – the
dominant economic mechanism when it comes to explaining efficient and rational
markets. The challenge to markets is then widened in a number of ways to include
crucial explanations as to why and how markets get constructed, especially their
mechanisms. It presents five types of arguments critical of markets: (1) the
Marxian approach to markets and then later in the paper, their view of crises
along with the Hyman Minsky approach of increasing cyclical pressure to take
risks, (2) the rise of Karl Polanyi’s view that markets are fragile and that they
need to be embedded in society and the state; (3) a coalition of organizational
scholars including Neil Fligstein see organizations of various types as creating a
‘conception of control’ whereby the market is shaped by their elite interests; (4) a
more complex decision-making approach starting with Max Weber’s view of
social action being based on rationalities, traditions and emotions, which is then
combined with Edward Fischer’s cultural approach to prices, quality, and the
environment; and (5) a macro-application of social exchange theory to bargaining
power in the market. But one caveat must be stated at the beginning. This paper
does not provide evidence on the workability of these five approaches, but rather
sets the scope and range of each of these market critiques. In essence, each theory
questions either rationality or efficiency, and a number of the theories question
the outright goals of economic market theories in terms of fairness and economic
growth.
Dissatisfaction with an Overemphasis of the Virtues of Markets:
Neo-classical economics developed primarily out of the micro-economic
marginalist school developed by Alfred Marshall (1979), Léon Walras (1984),
Vilfredo Pareto (1906), Arthur Pigou (1920), and Carl Menger (1950) around the
turn of the 19th into the 20th century.4 Marginal utility becomes the driving force
of investment and wages as owners pay wages only in proportion to the utility that
is added to their production, and investment is only made when marginal utility is
of a high order. Marginalist economics is highly amenable to mathematical
specification and it propelled economics as a field into micro- or firm-level focus
on supply and demand. The moral philosophy approach of Adam Smith is
somewhat of an embarrassment to these marginalists.5 Smith only used ‘the
4
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invisible hand’ metaphor twice in The Wealth of Nations,6 and proposed more of
a symbolic interactionist view with empathy and concern for others as how
markets and firms are tamed in the economic field.7 Smith even contradicts the
theory of comparative advantage with ‘absolute advantage.’ But marginalist
economics takes the little-used metaphor of the invisible hand and drops much of
the rest of Smith. Marginalism was so successful that it made macro-economics
passé. Keynesian economics in the 1930s was a reinvigoration of macroeconomics, and it largely opposed to the marginalists’ overlooking phenomena at
the institutional, nation-state and even global level.8 But market rationality and
efficiency largely rest on the principles developed by accentuating the importance
of firms and consumers following the dictates of rationality in pursuit of
“marginal utility.”
There are three main issues that social scientists contest about a
neoclassical view of markets: inequality, instability, and residualization or
overreach.9 First, many social scientists view the market as causing inequality and
that it requires major efforts to make the economy and society anywhere near
being legitimate or just. This is a major position of citizenship theory from T. H.
Marshall to Bryan Turner.10 The market makes inequality and the social welfare
state mitigates this by creating or restoring equality.11 The market and citizenship,
especially social rights and the welfare state, are almost in a dialectical
relationship in maintaining somewhat of a socially just society. It’s almost a yin
and yang of destructive inequality and restorative equality. When encountering
fairness and inequality, the marginalists have a soft and a hard answer. The soft
argument sees fairness as coming in terms of everyone getting their best bargain
in the market, and that the market then equilibrates to satisfy everyone’s’ needs.
This theory peaked in the 1990s up until 2008 in the form of the efficient market
hypothesis. While there were strong and weak forms of this theory, its strong
version stated that financial markets reflect a vast amount of public and even
insider data, and thus, markets accurately reflect the equilibrium prices of firm
6
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stock and to a certain degree the strategies that they are following. Eugene Fama
(1965, 1970) was most associated with this theory and received a Nobel Prize for
his theory.12 However, this concept of fairness does not do well in the face of
poverty and underdevelopment, and it looked especially bad in the aftermath of
the 2008 Great Recession. The hard argument indicates that human beings own
property and they profit from their expert and skillful use of that property. If
others do not have the skills or industriousness of the wealthy, then it is their own
fault. This answer is not satisfactory to critics, but it has the merit of being more
in accord with empirical results (i.e., it does not pretend to be equitable). In effect,
this comes down to equality of opportunity without regard to the results.
Second, the economics term ‘externality’ describes a great deal of what
other social sciences disciplines (anthropology, geography, sociology and political
science) are about. Theorists often refer to this as a “residual category” or a large
amount social action that a theory claims no expertise over. Obviously, these
other social sciences view this residualization of society as a huge gap in
economic theories, especially when those theories are claimed to hold the key to
how life and government should be conducted. Third, markets are prone to cycles,
shocks, recessions and depressions. If the market is so efficient, why do these
types of events occur? But markets are often not efficient and lead to large
amounts of waste both human and environmental. Economists often refer to these
issues as ‘adjustments,’ but they are often quite devastating to society. I will have
more to say on this later.
One distraction should be mentioned concerning economic debates. In the
1930s, John Maynard Keynes developed what became known as Keynesian
economics in The General Theory of Employment and Money.13 In economic
discourse over the last 80 years, economists have had intensely divisive debates
over Keynesian versus monetary economic solutions most often embodied by
Milton Friedman and now, the neo-liberals and supply-side economists.14 Keynes
said that the government should intervene in the economy with strong countercyclical spending patterns in order to avert a recession or depression, and he is
most currently represented by Paul Krugman.15 Many economists credit US,
12
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German and Swedish counter-cyclical spending during the depression as a major
force to end that crisis. However, Keynes is more or less implying that the
government is not otherwise heavily implicated in the market and economics as a
whole. Keynesian economics is not exactly a critique of markets, but rather an
economic fix to repair markets when they are in trouble. It is important not to get
side-tracked by the sturm und drang of the economists’ intense debate. In other
words, Keynes is more of a corrective rather than a direct critique of markets even
though government intervention does parallel some critiques. But those more
critical positions go further to say that the government is there through thick and
thin, not just as a tool of intervention. In other words, the government being there
is not just to suddenly increase spending, but to also set the ground rules of
markets functioning at all (not unlike Marx’s social relations of production).
There are many other dissatisfactions concerning the more specific aspects
of neo-classical views of markets, but these three issues – inequality, externalities
and crises – are the major problems that social scientists see. The next sections
represent various social scientific challenges to markets, and their specific
dissatisfactions with markets.
Unfair Exchange and the Labor Theory of Value
Karl Marx was generally anti-market in the sense that he theorized that values in
markets represented both exchange value and use-value. Markets were highly
problematic since they relied on exchange values that were determined in ways
that benefitted the owner classes at the expense of the working class. The working
classes would prefer to have their needs met by products and food based on “usevalue,” but the capitalist system would not provide prices for goods and food at
this level. Instead they relied on “exchange values” that are determined by the
demand and supply.16 As such, the system was unjust and embodies much
exploitation. His market-based solution (as opposed to his political solution of
revolution) relied on the labor theory of value to switch the tables on the owners
of capital to say that their extraction of surplus value should not be allowed
because it should be justly distributed to the workers themselves. In fact, the labor
theory of value states that all value is produced by labor and thus belongs to labor.
This revamping or destruction of markets would be ruled by the principle of
“from each according to their ability to each according to their need.” This
solution largely calls for the destruction or withering away of markets. I will
return to Marx later in this paper on the topic of crises. The next challenges to
16
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markets focus on keeping markets, but controlling their harsh logics of
exploitation.
Embeddedness and the Fragility of Free Markets
Karl Polanyi developed a theory of markets in the mid-1940s based on his
historical examination of markets in Britain during the industrial revolution and
beyond. He is referred to in a variety of ways as an economic historian, economic
anthropologist, political economist, historical sociologist and social philosopher.
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi argues that “there is nothing natural about
laissez-faire”,17 and that free markets only existed in Britain for a very short
period of time (roughly 1852 to 1873 after the repeal of the Corn Laws went into
effect). However, when totally free markets held sway, they proved to be so
disruptive and unworkable that the British economy needed to be substantially
controlled by the state and sometimes civil society. Societies need the economy to
be embedded into society and culture through various types of changes in social
mores, institutional structures, and state regulation. After this was done, the
British state stabilized the economy’s unfettered markets, and despite crises of
financial panics, recessions and depressions, generally moved in a more and more
prosperous direction. But Polanyi did not recommend this roly-poly and often
exploitative survival mechanism. He was often seen as providing a foundation for
an economic democracy movement that have particular resonance in the Social
Democratic Party in Germany and various social movements.
Polanyi is now seen as one of the major theorists of the economy being
‘embedded’ in society and the institutional structuring of markets and society in
general. His approach has largely led to the rise of economic sociology and
anthropology that emphasizes alternatives to free markets. Polanyi went on to
apply these principles to ancient economies such as Pre-Columbian America and
ancient Mesopotamia, although its utility to the study of ancient societies in
general has been questioned. He goes back to Greek philosophy of Aristotle to
make the distinction between chrematistics and oikonomia. Chrematistics is the
production of goods or services for the purposes of creating wealth to enhance
one’s own status and power in society. Oikonomia is producing goods and
services to create wealth that serves the needs of society and distributive justice.
This parallels Marx’s concepts of exchange and use value.18 It is odd that modern
day economics and Wall Street looks to chrematistics more than Oikonomia.19 He
then indicates that no action is purely economic since it is a Lebensweg (way of
17

Karl Polanyi and Harry W. Pearson. Livelihood of Man (Waltham, MA: Academic Press, 1977),
139.
18
Karl Marx, "Capital, Volume III" (Harmondsworth: Penguin/New Left Review, 1992).
19
Matthew Watson, Foundations of International Political Economy (New York: PalgraveMacMillan, 2005), 28-29.

49 disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory

life) whereby humans lead a morally-guided way of life. Hence, “no action can be
purely economic”.20 And when they are treated as such, we have reached an
artificiality of economistic reification.
Polanyi’s theories eventually became the foundation for anthropological,
political and sociological schools looking at controls for the market and the
economic democracy movement. I have not covered his mechanisms of exchange
in this section, but will return to Polanyi in the section on decision-making below.
An organization furthering his views exists at McGill University in Montreal.
Fred Block and Margaret Somers, and Richard Swedberg are scholars now
working in this tradition.21 A version of this embeddedness approach is taken by
social network analysis, which shows how specific connections between people
and organizations combine to make different types of decisions in markets. In a
sense, the invisible hand is a fiction as these kinds of economic decisions are
made through social networks of decision-makers in highly embedded institutions
that cannot operate with a sense of automaticity. These social network approaches
can be seen with the work of Harrison White, Ronald Burt, Mark Granovetter, and
many others.22
Organizational Conceptions of Control of Markets
Economic sociologists and geographers have frequently insisted that markets are
controlled by firms and elites, which also have strong influence on the state.
These firms and elites represent market lumpiness with a bounded organization
that can protect segments of managers and employees from supply and demand.
In Neil Fligstein’s approach to markets has developed in an institutional way
somewhat similar to Polanyi but more specifically focused on what corporations
do and how corporations can persuade governments and ultimately societies to
view market mechanisms. This presents firm action in coalitions in a more active
and instrumental way than typically endorsed by market theorists. In The
20
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Architecture of Markets and other works, Fligstein examines how corporations
view market strategies in order to increase their power or survive in fluctuating
circumstances. Fligstein and McAdams recent book extends this approach to
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of fields.23
One focus of his approach is to look at how stakeholder value theories had
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s with a focus on all of the people affected by
corporations deserved a hearing in how corporate power was used. For instance,
customers, workers, shareholders, communities, governments, and the public in
general, and other constituencies have a ‘stake’ in corporate actions. Fligstein is
not presenting a normative view that stakeholder value theory was correct, but
rather looks at how corporations and capitalists renegotiated their “conception of
control” of how the market would operate.
Much of this renegotiation occurred during the oil crisis when Jimmy
Carter was US president in the late 1970s, and corporate profits had gone into a
nose dive due to the oil crises and youth rebellion, but even more threatening was
the Nixon and Carter discussions of wage and price controls during highly
inflationary times. Since the corporations still had considerable power, the
negotiation was rather implicit until the final product later presented itself to these
various groups. The solution aided by principal-agent theory in economics saw
these larger social movements as a “stake” in the heart of capitalism, so they
created a new theory based on a more focused agenda. Corporations and their
CEOs were agents of stockholders and they needed to be doing what shareholders
wanted – make large profits.
As a result, corporations changed their focus to “shareholder value theory”
with considerable outsourcing and then off-shoring. They focused on keeping
their nose to the grindstone of higher profits, increasing the price of their stock on
Wall Street, and paying dividends to stockholders. This approach rewarded CEOs
with higher wages and stock options in order to align CEO decisions with
shareholder’s interests in their economic returns. The side effect of this was to
increase corporate salaries to astronomical levels and largely decrease worker
wages through outsourcing. The logic of outsourcing was to have work done by
corporations with subcontractors who would not share in the good fortune of
corporate profits. The overall theory based on this shift from stakeholder
approaches to shareholder value theory is that firms socially construct the shape
and functioning of markets through this conception of control. These conceptions
may change over time and need to be examined by scholars. One underrecognized aspect of stockholder value theory is that atomistic markets making
decisions on their own do not really exist. Instead, large and bulky players, such
as corporations and stock market exchanges shape and control markets. Compared
23
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to Polanyi who focused more on state institutions, Fligstein is adding an elite
control theory into the mix negotiated by private firms and investment bankers.
Actual Mechanisms of Markets: Sociological and Anthropological Views
Embeddedness is a more contextual theory with little presence of a mechanism,
and the conception of control provides some aspects of mechanism but not one
that really talks about how markets actually work on a daily basis. A fourth
approach combines a sociological view of decision-making using Max Weber’s
theory of social action with its counterbalancing influence of culture, with a more
specific anthropological view based on complex forms of exchange relying on the
economist Amartya Sen and anthropologist Edward Fisher’s approach to prices,
quality, and the environment. The following discussion will take Weber first, and
then go to Sen and Fischer.
Max Weber accepted much of the political economy approach of Karl
Marx in terms of class but largely rejected his view of markets.24 His later work
focused much more on the culture of the rise of capitalism with the Protestant
Ethic. If we only relied on the cultural argument, we would be simply adding to
Polanyi’s approach. But what is of more interest is his general theory of social
action. Weber viewed social action as being based on four types of rationality,
tradition and emotion. Weber interrogates rationality to find procedural, practical,
theoretical and substantive rationalities. Herbert Simon as a neo-Weberian
considerably softened rationality with satisficing under conditions of limited
decision-making powers. Weber’s practical rationality was the application of
these principles to the level of practical life where Simon’s more limited searches
may apply. But in a different way, Weber also presented theoretical and
substantive rationality. For instance, Pope Francis largely follows the theoretical
rationality of the Catholic Church’s principles about the economy in caring for the
poor and not producing so many poor people in the first place. This is based on a
certain element of sharing and to some degree caring for a community. There are
many elements to the theory of Catholicism, but those having to do with
economic equality are more important than profit maximization. There are many
other secular forms of theoretical rationality involved with political party
ideologies, environmental movements, and cosmopolitan value theories. Social
democratic parties do not follow market maximization principles and have a
social market theory that embraces caring for the less fortunate in society. And
substantive rationality may have less of a grand theory, but it is more or less the
theory of fitting into the culture of your community in whatever way you might
conceive of it.
24
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Culture makes its more direct entry into decision-making with “tradition”
as a basis of social action. People do things the way they have done them in the
past. To neo-classical economists, this makes people economic dopes because
they are being irrational. But building on Herbert Simon’s theory of decisionmaking overload, we cannot spend time everyday evaluating the procedural
rationality of every action we take (e.g., is brushing your teeth rational and if it is
should you brush five times a day to prevent tooth decay). We all largely live in
fairly large entities called societies (admittedly the boundaries and belonging may
be contested) that give us designs for living that we do not need to contest every
day with maximizing logic. Many of these actions involve emotion, and families
and communities involve a certain amount of love and caring. And interactions
within and without may also involve hate and mistrust, but these emotions also
bind us to traditions of various sorts of culture. But most cultures are constructed
to create a certain amount of well-being for their members. Economists largely
ignore religions that largely promote the well-being of their members and more
secular or even cosmopolitan concerns for the well-being for outsiders.
Within economics, there are infrequent mentions of emotions with Keynes
concept of “animal spirits.” Though neoclassical economics have not taken up the
concept of emotions and the field of economics in general avoids it, George
Akerlof and Robert Schiller refer to animal spirits as the “noneconomic and
irrational” aspects of social life that propel markets.25 These two Nobel Prize
winners present five types of animal spirits or emotional aspects of economic
action. The first is confidence by investors or consumers that provide the ups and
downs of markets. Confidence can be very unstable and unpredictable, and it is
prone to the “irrational exuberance” of a rising bull market to the almost
“paranoid gloom” of bear market crashes.26 Rather than listening to economics,
market commentators and prognosticators ride on the emotional confidence of
investors in supporting a rising market or consumer confidence causing a rise in
sales and a resulting surge in stock prices. A second type of animal spirit is
fairness, which is mostly dominated by efficiency in the economics literature. But
when the economist Albert Rees was dealing with administrative problems in his
many different posts, he had to deal with “fairness” conceptions and beliefs of
many groups.27 And labor (not to mention sociology, anthropology, psychology,
and geography) in general constantly brings up fairness as a major concern that
negotiating groups have concerning wages and working conditions.
A third aspect of animal spirits concerns corruption, immorality, or
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cheating in general. Akerlof and Schiller28 point to the many manipulations that
market investors and firms may engage in ranging from outright scams of many
Ponzi schemes that never really intend to be money making ventures to the actual
murder and thuggery of gangster capitalism present in the new markets in Russia
and elsewhere. Neoclassical economists sometimes view this as opportunism, but
much of it slides from the grey areas of legal interpretations into blatant robbery,
murder and “offers one cannot refuse.” And an opposite force sometimes comes
to meet this is immorality with religion sometimes backed up by laws to the
extent that they can be seen as legitimate and enforceable. A fourth type of
animal spirits is “money illusion” which is more of a cognitive issue. This is
when decisions over time are affected by nominal money values rather than the
real wages or costs of goods and services.29 One can see this in long-term
contracts that focus on current rates and ignore longer term costs over time. All
contracts should have cost-of-living adjustments and we should live in a world of
adjustments based on real income; however, this is rarely the case. Offering the
nominal amount of money in the short-term bargains reigns supreme as people
don’t make real money adjustments.
Finally, Akerlof and Shiller refer to story-telling or narrativity, which is
the clever and skillful packaging of bundles of emotions into plots with some
twists that capture people’s imaginations and believable explanations of events,
both in the past but more importantly about what will happen in the future.30
Regression equations are the stock and trade of economists, but they make lousy
stories. In order to move people’s emotions, they need a more compelling tale
with elements of the previous discussion – confidence, fairness, immorality, and
illusion – in order to motivate them will some sort of orchestrated effervescence
of emotions. Needless to say, this is not in the stock and trade of econometrics.
Akerlof and Shiller do not plum the depth of human emotion, but as economists
they uniquely point to many emotions that are directly involved in market
processes. But their turn to ‘animal spirits’ only came about in the face of a major
crisis and they are still ignored by most neo-classical economists.31
Beyond emotions and tradition, Weber did have an overriding concern
with one type of rationality that promotes maximization and also human suffering
-- bureaucracy, the rise of capitalism, and even science with new discoveries.
Doesn’t this mean that the machine of rationality is taking over society? While
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Weber was very troubled by this vision of an “iron-cage” of rationality, neoclassical economists should not take heart that Weber is supporting them because
in fact he is criticizing their world view. In order get our humanity back, we have
to rebalance our decision-making to embrace theoretical rationality based on more
fundamental values than unfettered growth, and cultural values of wellfunctioning traditions and positive human emotions. While this may be putting
words in Weber’s mouth, he in effect is saying “neo-classical economist, heal
thyself.”
Amartya Sen and Edward Fischer take Weber’s theory a bit further in
terms of markets. The first step is that economic decisions are not only made
about prices and profits, but they are also made concerning quality of the product
(implying quality of life) and the values that these products tend to create. One
may make economic decisions based on the price of the product, the quality of the
product, and the values or justice that they engender to an increasingly global
community. Fischer argues that the order of these components of decision-making
may be reversed with the values coming first, the quality coming second, and the
prices coming last. This is certainly turning this decision-making process on its
head.
Fischer gives the examples of buying eggs in Germany and fair trade
coffee from Guatemala. In highly industrialized Germany, eggs are graded into
four categories: organic and free range, free-range, cage-free, and caged. To the
human eye, the eggs largely look alike. In Hannover 60% of consumers buy the
organic or free-range eggs at 4 to 5 times the cost, and in Germany as a whole,
30% of people buy the same product. Why would maximizing rational people
spend more on something when the product is not larger or does not particularly
taste any different? The reason is that the decisions are based on values that
indicate that chickens should be treated in a less horrid way than caged birds
given artificial growth hormones. Another reason is that these people belong to
communities (religious, political, or otherwise) that hold each other to social
norms that constrain their actions (social pressures may exist that make one less
respected if they are seen buying caged eggs). A similar logic applies to human
producers. Why would people buy ‘fair trade’ coffee from Guatemala when it
costs 30% to 60% more than free market coffee. A first reason is that they are
expressing values that Guatemalan coffee growers should be able to make a
decent living growing their crops and not be subject to dictates of demand and
supply in a world market. The domestic living-wage movement expresses a
similar concern. A more social reason may be that they support the family and
community values of Guatemalan communities and don’t want to see them
supplanted by profit-seeking corporate values. Emotions and theoretical
rationality are involved with these decisions such as doing the right thing or
seeking solidarity with others.
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This then returns to Karl Polanyi’s discussion of the forms of exchange
that put a little bit more interactional meat on Weber’s decision-making bones.
Polanyi sees labor in social interaction as being based on four principles:
reciprocity, competition, joy of work, and social approbation or social pressure.32
Markets are mostly involved with competition to get the lowest price or highest
quality for the price, but reciprocity, working for craftsmanship, and social
pressure put the transaction into a complex social web where people know each
other and have to respect the ebb and flow of their own ties to others. Much of
Polanyi’s work is based on the anthropological work of Bronislaw Malinowski,
Raymond Firth, and Richard Thurnwald.33 In my own work, I develop this in
terms of restricted exchange between strangers or competitors and generalized
exchange between friends and within families.34 Generalized exchange can be
further put forth as bonding social capital or exchanges that take place for the
benefit of the neighborhood, kin group, or for the community in general.
Exchange theory has developed these concepts even further with experimental
research.35
Economists may argue that this may be a limited market segment of world
production. But beyond reciprocity within families and communities, one finds
that more affluent citizens may make these more moral decisions where values
predominate over profit, and in the advanced industrialized world, there are many
people who can afford to make these decisions. Fischer argues that there are more
of them in Germany than in many other advanced industrialized countries. And
other institutions such as worker representation on corporate boards, works
councils elected by workers within firms, and strong welfare states accompany
these Polanyian type institutions. While economists may argue that people will
not make these decisions if they are poor, what explains affluent investment
bankers in pursuing maximum profits just for their reputation as a player on the
street? Using Polanyi, these chrematistic processes (sometimes called ‘pissing
matches’ in the vernacular) involve people who are affluent and could certainly
afford to consider buying expensive eggs and fair trade coffee. What kind of
rationality keeps them in what often becomes an exploitative game of maximizing
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profits for a life style that they hardly need? What kind of culture breeds this kind
of behavior, where in the end, money does not buy happiness but rather simply
increments in a rather dubious reputation.36
But there is another element that may not involve affluence but rather
destruction. The environmental issue of global warming threatens the planet
according to most natural scientists. Can the world restrain the short-term focus of
global capitalism in order to take a long-term agenda to save the planet? The
emotion here is long-term fear rather than feeling good in helping poor people in
another country. Where is the self-correcting market mechanism within capitalism
to counter this problem? Some consumers may make similar decisions to buy
hybrid cars, avoid coal-based energy production, and limit carbon dioxide
production. The issue here is not so much affluence allowing it, but is rather the
long-term survival of society. Jared Diamond in his book on how societies decide
to collapse or adapt made the argument that Norse farmers who colonized
Greenland produced and ate dairy cattle until they could not produce enough, but
refused to catch and eat the abundant fish in the nearby ocean.37 Looking at this
from afar we might ridicule the beef maximizing culture as short-sighted and even
ridiculous. Will people in the future look at our high energy consuming culture
based on oil and coal in the same way?
Bargaining Power Mechanisms in Markets:
Going back to the world of competing strangers, market theory needs a more
ubiquitous mechanism for market behavior that does not have to rely on economic
equilibrium. This can be found in a micro-interactionist theory called social
exchange theory. Karen Cook and Eric Rice (2001: 715) indicate that a “marriage
of exchange theory and economic sociology” is “promising.” This approach
establishes a basic market mechanism that shows that nearly all market
transactions are negotiated in terms of unequal power. Social exchange theory is a
modified product of rational choice theory. It was started with George Homans
and Peter Blau, but found its most important developments with Richard Emerson
and Karen Cook.38 They developed the basic idea that power is based on
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dependence.
More specifically the power of Albert is based on Jim’s dependence on
Albert, and Jim’s power is based on Albert’s dependence on Jim. And the overall
power relationship can be based on comparing these two dependencies.
Dependence itself is based on having fewer alternatives than other people, and
these alternatives are based on the probability of success in obtaining resources
that you value. While they use many equations to express this, the more or less
bottom line is that a powerful person has more valued alternatives of a relatively
high probability of success than a less powerful person who has fewer alternatives
and lower probabilities of success. This gets elaborated with formal equations:
1. PAlbert = 1 / Alternatives of Jim
2. PJim = 1 / Alternatives of Albert
3. Net Power of Albert = PAlbert - PJim
The inequality of bargaining power is laid out in figure 1 where everyone does not
have the same power. High income people have many more alternatives than low
income people because they control more resources.39 This theory is made more
realistic with the application of expected value to the relationship. Alternatives
have a probability of occurring and they have a certain outcome in terms of
value.40 So any alternative can be evaluated by multiplying the probability of its
occurrence times the value of the outcome (i.e., an expected value). So one’s
overall power situation is the sum of their alternatives weighted by their
probability and values. It is clear that higher income people have higher
probabilities of gaining higher value outcomes than lower income people.
This micro-logic was pushed further into the macro-world by Samuel
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Bacharach and Edward Lawler in two books about bargaining in organizations
and nation-states.41 A simple example might be that a broker who has many
houses to sell has more alternatives than a buyer who may have looked at only a
few houses. Dependence may be further exacerbated by the buyer “has to have
this house” since it is close to relatives, a local park, or their work. The most
frequent example is the unfair bargaining position of an individual employee
seeking work from a large corporation. Under conditions of high unemployment
the worker has little power since the firm has so many alternatives.
This type of theory is then plugged into every market exchange with the
recognition that both restricted and generalized exchanges may occur (as
discussed in the previous section). The power relationships are then as follows for
high income person and a low income person.
Vlow)

Σ Alternatives high (Phigh * Vhigh) > Σ Alternatives low (Plow *

In figure 2, these bargaining power relationships are diagrammed. Given that the
alternatives’ values and probabilities are equal, the high income person has twice
as much bargaining power than the low income person. In figure 2, the situation
of an employer who has many choices and an employee who has only one is
portrayed.
Σ Alternativesc (Pc * Vc) > Σ Alternativese (Pe * Ve)
In this case, the corporation (c) has five times the bargaining power of the
employee (e) given that the alternatives are of equal value. And when more
information is available on the alternatives’ probability and value, the bargaining
power differences are even more accurate.42
While there may be a few market exchanges where bargaining power is
equal, the vast majority of exchanges are conducted between the powerful and the
less powerful and the very weak.43 For example, consider the mortgage officers
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(who themselves are representing major investment and commercial banking
interests) offer a low income couple entry into the housing market that they would
not otherwise be able to afford (a frequent occurrence before the collapse of the
mortgage market and the 2008 Great Recession). The mortgage officer has many
alternatives to using that money represented by the loan, but the low income
couple now has a chance to buy a house which previously was only a dream.
Their loan with relatively low payments comes with a balloon payment after 3 to
5 years. Clearly, the mortgage banker has more bargaining power in this situation.
There are two elements involved, one of which some economists have dealt with,
and another that they have not. The first is information asymmetry. Joseph
Stiglitz, George Ackerlof and others have worked on this principle which
basically indicates that the bank knows more about this loan and the couple’s
ability to pay than the low income couple knows. More specifically they know
that it will be very difficult for the couple to make the balloon payment 3 or 5
years. If the couple cannot make the payment, the bank takes back the house and
sells it to someone else, and the young couple loses what they have paid into the
house. But the second part of the bargaining mechanism is that the couple have
few alternatives of any value, and the mortgage banker has many (at least until the
housing market collapses on the widespread use of these kinds of predatory
practices).
The final step in this part of establishing a social mechanism of markets is
the replacement of marginal utility with bargaining power in each market
transaction. Marginal utility states that economic incentives to invest are ruled by
the additional increment of exchange value (i.e., profits but it can also be revenue)
that one may obtain by engaging in a transaction. Thus, when these increments of
marginal utility are high enough, investment is encouraged, and when they are
low or negative, investment is withdrawn. However, this theory is a little too
simple. It is basically establishing that a decider has a need, much like
functionalist theory. It tells you very little about the terms of the exchange. One
could argue that the extent of the marginal utility influences ones desire to stay in
the transaction and gain more in the bargain, but that would directly fly in the face
of low income couple’s rather suboptimal bargains. Poor people do not get more
in their bargains (see the “poor pay more” literature on inner city food stores).
One could reverse the relationship and say that the more marginal utility that you
place on a particular bargain, the weaker your bargaining position. However, this
plays into a social dependence theory of bargaining power, a theory that marginal
utility seeks to avoid. The marginalists see the automatic balancing of marginal
utilities in a market as a rather smooth process, not one laden by dependencies
and power relationships. However, the social bargaining power approach places
the unequal bargaining power of the two parties at center stage as a replacement
for the marginalist’s mechanism for market functioning. Thus, power dependency
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constitutes a clear market mechanism of exchange at the micro-level.
Market Failure and Economic Crisis
At this point, I would like to return to Marx and others to discuss market failure.
Within the economics literature, market failure has a very specific meaning. It
refers to areas of life where markets do not work, and governments or other
cooperative civil society organizations should step in to provide goods and
services. In a sense, the market does not solve collective action problems, and the
state or a civil societal community needs to step up and provide the collective
good (e.g., roads, sewage systems, water supply, and even social welfare
payments for those who are more or less discarded by the market). But outside
economics, market failure most often refers to where the market is supposed to be
doing its job, especially financial markets. Major recessions and depressions often
connected to the banking and stock trading systems throw thousands and even
sometimes millions of people out of work, bankrupt various corporations and
governments, and cause a great deal of social havoc and suffering. This is the
market failure that most non-economists are concerned about.
Marx has had the harshest criticism of the capitalist market system. He
said it as prone to failure as the business cycle deepens and crisis leads to great
suffering along with exploitation. There are two major ways that Marx explains
crisis. One is through the lower and lower wage payments that firms provide
when competing in cutthroat markets.44 As workers receive lower wages, they
cannot buy the products that they need and buy the goods that keep the capitalist
system growing. Marx then tied this immiseration thesis with a theory of the
declining rate of profit, which is much more oriented toward firms.45 This decline
affects how organizations act and investors put their money, which are also
declining since they get dividends and other revenue from stock purchases or
lending money to firms. Marx was not totally clear about the declining rate of
profit in the third volume of capital because he referred to it as “a tendency”
rather than a clearly stated law. However, whatever the source, Marxian theory
has always maintained that there is a strong sense of crisis attached to the
capitalist system and that its most important parts emerge from the exploitation of
workers.
While crisis theories are quite useful when there is actually a crisis, when
times are good for the economy, crisis theory fades from view. Despite and also
because of exploitation, capitalist economies have had sustained periods of
economic growth. Joseph Schumpeter has often linked this to the entrepreneurial
approach of ‘creative destruction’ whereby industries grow through their own life
44
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cycle, and as they decline, new industries based on recently developed
technologies take their place.46 Consequently, although there is decline, it is
always superseded by the growth of new products, technologies and firms
employing large number of workers. Crises come about when there is a
technological lull in producing new industries or when consumers or investors are
hesitant to embrace new technologies.47 This leads to a more or less standard
theory of business cycles from which recovery is lamentably slow but somewhat
inevitable.48
However, there are recessions and depressions that are more intense than
others. They are so slow that the short-run business cycle seems to move into a
long-run decline. And Keynes is famous for his dictum that “in the long-run, we
are all dead.” This is where Hyman Minsky’s theory is particularly useful. He
puts forward three stages or types of financing that affect stock markets,
investment banks, and other investment venues: hedge, speculative and Ponzi
finance.49 In hedge financing, investors are relatively conservative. They expect
the cash flow from their loans or investments to be “more than sufficient” to meet
their commitments in the future. In other words, prudent investment is hedged by
dependable firms using their money and repaying it within an expected period of
time. In speculative-financing, banks expect cash receipts to be less than their
commitments in the static short-term, but they expect additional growth
opportunities that will increase the value of their investments and their revenues
in the dynamic medium-term. So compared to hedge-financing, they are taking a
risk that economic growth will occur to pay for the somewhat risky bets they are
taking. In Ponzi-financing stage, banks and financiers make investments where
not only is the return of interest or repayments rather insecure, but their own
investments are borrowed to make those loans. In a sense, they are taking a
double risk. This process can fit well with a the political business cycle theory of
Michaƚ Kalecki where ruling politicians can reinforce these processes or initiate
them through inflationary spending.50
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Cycles come about in moving from hedge financing to the other two
stages. The banks or financiers increasingly expect to make a killing in a major
growth industry. They are driven to these other two stages by three factors. First,
hedge financing is generating low but steady profits. But they see other firms
making more money. The success of others makes the hedge-fund firms’ low
profits look like failure. As a result, investors may move from the hedge-fund
bank to riskier banks, causing a diminution in capital of the hedge-fund firm.
Second, these next steps are based on expectations of large profits, and a certain
amount of greed enters into the picture as their investors are always looking for
higher returns. These expectations of profits double back to reinforce the
optimism that future transactions are a sure thing to score future profits. And
third, once they enter the speculative stage and are not covering debts, they need
to “double down” with more risk believing that a bigger gain in Ponzi finance will
bail them out of their debt-burdened predicament.
While the business cycle has ups and downs with product and industrial
life cycles, financial cycles operate with their own logic to push financiers to
more risky alternatives and sometimes disastrous consequences. Mainstream
economic thought on business cycles include growth spurts (as with automobiles
or computers) and a boom may last for a decade rather than the usual 3 or 4 years.
Speculative and Ponzi financing will take off during these periods and it may be
difficult to differentiate between legitimate growth, delusional expectations, and
outright frauds (e.g., Bernard Madoff massive investment pyramid scheme). Once
a sufficient percentage of banks and investors have reached the Ponzi finance
stage, it is only a matter of time before the bubble bursts and the economy
tumbles down in the stock market and then affecting nearly all firms and workers.
Massive government intervention is then necessary to reflate the economy and get
the labor force back to work. These periods are especially painful. Minsky’s point
is that because of the pressures to move to more profits either through greed or
through rear guard actions to keep ones investors in the face of other apparent
profit makers, the cycle is largely inevitable. The severity of cycles will vary, but
they will continue to appear. One of the major difficulties is to differentiate
between “legitimate high growth in the future” and “bubbles” that are
manufactured by what Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan referred to as
“irrational exuberance,” which he warned about but then became subject to
himself. A major problem of these latter two stages is that fraud or unwarranted
exuberance need not be an actual pyramid scheme, but may simply be
encouraging investors to pursue a good investment that everyone else will get in
on. In the 2008 great recession it involved mortgage bankers encouraging
customers with little bargaining power to take loans with balloon payments they
regulation of markets.
Michael Kalecki, "Last Phase in the Transformation of Capitalism" (1972).
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could never make. It involved investment banks and brokers encouraging clients
to buy stocks or funds that they knew were “dogs” destined to decline.
After such crises, there is a call for government or industry regulation.
This tends to be short-lived in most cases, though the Glass-Steagal Act remained
in effect from the 1930s to the 1990s. In the current crisis, the Dodd-Frank Law to
curtail these problematic financial misdeeds garners immediate attention, but as
time passes conservative governments backed by the financial industry whittle
away at regulation with the argument that they are preventing economic growth, a
goal that all politicians want in one way or another. As Carmen Reinhart and
Kenneth Rogoff say in their masterful study of eight centuries of major crises:
“This time it is different.” 51 There are plenty of investors, firms, and banks that
argue that we are on the edge of a major boom and that only a fool would not
jump in. And so in actuality, the fools jump.
Conclusion
This article makes no claim about ranking or synthesizing these theories. These
are the five main challenges to market rationality and efficiency that now exist in
the social and behavioral sciences. Various parts of all of them could be
synthesized into a larger theory, but that work remains to be done in future work.
In this conclusion, I will indicate how these theories are compatible or
contradictory, and what possibilities may exist about synthesizing them into a
more comprehensive theory.
These challenges are pitched at different levels. Polanyi points to the state
as the constructor and regulator of markets that keep the system going. Fligstein
points to the role of firms in using a ‘conception of control’ to come up with new
ways of making markets function given the constraints that the state may impose.
Weber, cultural sociologists, and economic anthropologists point to how decisionmaking mechanisms may work together to combine rationality, tradition and
emotions into different types of value configurations that may rank quality, justice
and price in different sorts of ways. The bargaining power theory points to the
precise inequalities that may be present in market relationships operating under
competitive rationalities so that inequality is always created and recreated rather
than whisked away by claims of efficiency. And with crises, Marx, Schumpeter,
and Minsky point to the inevitability and actual mechanisms of predictable
economic conflagrations. Polanyi and Marx are more macro than Schumpeter and
Minsky on crisis. Fligstein operates more at the mezzo-level in his approach. And
the cultural decision-making and bargaining theories point to a micro-approach
that pinpoints mechanisms of inequality, but also of cultural constructions of
51
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traditions that may balance efficiency and justice, or not.
Each one of these challenges poses different sorts of power issues.52 First,
labor markets mitigate against workers when there are few alternatives as during
high unemployment. This is ‘marketplace bargaining power’ based on tight labor
markets. Second, labor’s position in the production process can give workers
‘workplace bargaining power’ with leverage over capitalists, resulting in the
power to strike and raise wages or improve working conditions. Labor law has a
lot to do with strengthening or weakening this power. Third, ‘associational power’
in terms of unions (UAW) or interest groups (NOW or the NAACP) can lead to
coalitions and growing political power. And fourth, ‘informational power’ can
come from open access to information and the evening of information (lessening
of asymmetrical information) in bargaining situations. State regulatory power can
have a lot to do with the power of corporations and other private firms. Future
work would need to flesh out these powers in terms of policy, as this paper has
focused on the theoretical challenges currently being faced by unruly markets.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to synthesize this into a more general
theory. But social scientists are working in the fields of economic and cultural
sociology, and economic anthropology to create a more complete theory of what
we might call “social markets” for the future. The policy implications of this
approach will definitely challenge the oft claimed queen of the social sciences –
neo-classical economics.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Bargaining Power between High and Low Income Persons
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and the value of the alternative (value).
Figure 2: Bargaining Power between a Corporation and a Worker
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4 poems
JOHN F. SHERRY, JR.
University of Notre Dame
robbing peter
they argue for hours, carping over coupons
and rebates dated just before the mortgage,
dunning letters littering a tabled shimmed
with inserts from the weekly shopper,
red ink seeping from each column of the checkbook,
cracked plastic cover scuffed and scored,
hiding scrimp and kiting, debt demanding
more than might be wrung from turnip, spun from flax,
until, imagination lapsed, they withdraw, spent.
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holy days
i spent the solstice wintering in the aisles
of wal-mart,
rounding endcaps spruced with plastic pine and balsam.
intending just to browse
i stopped to forage,
dissolving class allegiance
in the crass commercial call of christmas.
i plucked a random ornament,
orphaned in a ransacked bin,
a solitary santa,
foot poised on an unhoused chimney
as if stepping to a bar rail,
about to down another
sooty shaft.
emblazoned on the bauble’s base
the middle kingdom origin of its making
a fortune cookie oracle:
all gifts return to china, from whence they mostly come.
ibought the ikon,
wrapped it as a present
and gave it secretly, and with a guilty thrill,
to some unknown friend.
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retail benediction
it happens to you, i know.
you trade up your truck,
upsize your cell,
amp your flatscreen
and before you’ve fled the sales floor,
beyond the thousand yard stare,
cool hand clasp,
one-stroke-arm-pump-practiced-smile,
between catch and release,
invoice and invocation,
the merchant coven blessing is conferred:
“CONGRATULATIONS.”
do you marvel
at this mercantile hosanna,
feel unworthy pride,
or simply cringe?
“let us give thanks
together to the gods”
the incantatory literal
intent, the prophet motive
of its chanted cant
a tribal affirmation of
our primal tie to goods,
exalted, exchanged, expunged.
your having is affirming,
each buy a milestone,
a millstone,
the tournament of value
your most holy call,
dog’s breakfast of champions,
stronger than dirt,
possession, enthusiasm,
one and the same,
a sacrificial goad compels belief:
the owned now owner
and the owner owned.

4 poems 74

trickster at howe and helmcken
a palsied puffing on a scavenged butt,
erratic jangling of a few cupped coins,
parked outside starbucks in a battered wheel chair,
cardboard caption like a pillory post
(or signboard from an old morality play,
perseverance perhaps, or faith)
proclaiming diabetes,
nodding to another nomad
wheeling trash-bagged treasure
in a borrowed shopping cart,
observing caffeinated customers
like belugas in a seaworld window,
like ahab sans the spanish ounce,
and all the while two ravens
tap dance on an almost empty avenue,
hopping on and off the curb,
they skip a pas de deux about
a smear of maybe burger maybe fries
pounded to pemmican and pressed
into coldpatched pavement.
the smaller, finally shamed to flight,
the larger with a bolus gleaned from tar
takes up a vigil on the curb

A Town Without a Market
SAAKSHI JOSHI
University of Delhi
The intense heat has made the waters recede a little, exposing the ruins of
a few submerged villages. They hide again once the rains arrive, but I envy their
time in the sun and the air.
A silhouette appears in the sun. I squint at it through stagnant reservoir
water as I sit here on the silt at the bottom of the lake. It is a human standing near
the dam, observing the trail of recent landslides on the mountain slopes. Another
one appears next to it and points at the center of the dam reservoir, somewhere
above me.
“You see this area, around a hundred meters from the landslide? This is
where the rivers converged before the dam.” The sounds are a little distorted,
traveling through muddy waters to reach me. “This is where the market was,
surrounded by the town. We all miss that market. It was the heart of our
community.”
I gaze at my friend and companion, the town, resting tiredly beside me
beneath these decaying waters, the mountains our sentinels. We both hear the
same sounds and are engulfed in a similar bittersweet nostalgia. They say a new
town has been built in my companion’s name, with a new market which is but a
single, narrow road. We indulge in a sad laugh. As if giving a new place an old
name makes it the same place. As if some cement and bricks can easily be called
home. As if a bunch of shops opened along a stretch of road can suddenly
transform into a market.
Hello there! I am the town market. Or was. Which town, which market,
you ask. As tragedies grow more universal and more towns gather stories
underwater, does it even matter? I can be any market and this can be any town
and this might be your story- already happened, happening, or waiting to happen.
“You would never believe how crowded the market used to be! When I
was a kid, I would come home only to keep my bag and change my clothes. Then
off I would go, to meet my friends at the market.”
This makes me smile. They are talking about me, again.
“All the shopkeepers knew us. Some of them were either mine or my
friends’ relatives. The market was a part of our daily lives. Just like the school
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playground. As kids it was a gathering place, during the teen years it was the
place to sight your crush and attempt a blushed conversation. ”
Those were some halcyon days alright; when I was up there. Now I am
here, dissolved. Bereft of air and breath, but alive nonetheless.
Nobody asked me if I had wanted a dam. And nobody bothered telling me
the unsure future. For a long time, many human years I suppose, I only heard
people trying to avoid talking about it. Their deliberate silences resonated with
my mute witnessing.
Those chatterbox radios in the shops started it all. They were the initial
source of information about a dam being built. These humans laughed it off, as if
brushing aside a bad joke. They would gather around those radio sounds, over
some chai and snacks, mocking even the faintest possibilities of water engulfing
them. Then there were times they discussed the dynamite blasting for the dam
between coughs, as the entire town lay covered in clouds of dust and smoke.
Eventually I transformed into a gathering place for chants, slogans and
protests. Increasingly the shops remained more shut than open. The people came,
not to linger at the shops, but to sit on the road. Their faces stern and stony.
Chanting, shouting, crying. For us, for the unbridled river, for the wise mountains,
for a hopeful world. I also started discerning some new humans. They looked out
of place, the way they spoke, the way they walked. They felt different and
temporary. The way they toured me, or their interactions with the river. Later I
would recognize these new ones painting large ‘X’ on shops, putting locks on the
shutters, transforming the familial waters into an alien entity.
And how can I forget the mayhem following the violent shaking of the
earth on a nearby mountain! Blasts for another dam had caused it, leading to
many deaths. It triggered panic here, I remember that well. The humans collected
fiercely to oppose the dam here, to protect their lives. To save our lives. Who
would have thought death would follow here. Not human, but of a social kind.
Just before my drowning, I would see some of the new humans herding
the last known human figures away. Then the dam tunnels shut down and the
waters rose. The inception of a deathly decay.
I wonder if they never believed the dam would be built, or if their
performances were a denial of the impending inevitable.
A human throat clears itself above me.
“The market comes up in almost all the conversations I have with people
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here. It definitely was integral to your lives.”
“You see, you are from the city,” responds the other voice, a familiar
baritone. “Your markets are more detached and impersonal. That is how the new
market is turning out to be. We smile when we meet, but that warmth is lacking.
We talk but don’t really converse. Our old market cannot be recreated. It
provided for everything we needed. Look around now, what do you see? Now
people have become more scattered and withdrawn. We are becoming strangers,
if we haven’t already.”
I look up to follow winged creatures against the blue sky. These flying
shadows can see so much more than I do. What sense do they make of what they
see below? Against the giant mountains these soaring solitary beings give me a
sense of uselessness. I wish to know what they see and how they interpret it. Each
day when I hear the people, I want to see what they see now.
Do they see me as they walk through the new roads?
Do they still see the familiar bends, potholes, and street corners?
What about that old banyan tree the humans revered?
Or the ghosts some of them encountered each night?
Do people still carry out processions through the new market?
Do they still gather around the radios with chai to share the daily gossip
and debate politics?
Does the new market have all the shops – open and covered, as I did?
Are the dogs still being lazy near the carts? Are the shopkeepers feeding
them?
Do people still loiter around after their purchase?
How does the weather feel on the slope?
Or the water from this reservoir which imprisons me?
Do the humans think of me as much as I think of them?
I want to think they do. Their conversations make me hopeful. Neither the
town nor I wish to be forgotten. It scares us, this thought.
“There used to be a bridge connecting the town to the surrounding
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villages. Every morning, people from the villages would come to the market to sell
their farm produce. They shared camaraderie with the townsfolk. People knew
who was from where, about their families. The market wasn’t just a place to earn
money. It provided for the poor. The sellers would give something or the other to
them free of cost. Nobody would go hungry. People looked out for one another.”
I can’t shut myself away from this eavesdropping. The way these humans
talk turns me to water. I don’t want to be just a topic of nostalgic conversation; I
want to be an active participant.
I want to join in, to tell them how daily lives were shaped around me when I would open or close, when I would be crowded or deserted. I was the heart
of everything, I was secure comfort.
Lovers have chanced upon one another walking through me; I have been a
haven for stolen glances in the rambling crowds. For the elderly I was a bridge to
meet their friends, to once again be those young girls and boys. To me the
children would come with their grandparents and walk around. I was a
playground for youngsters, a rest stop for weary travelers. For daughters who
were married away, I was the vessel of maiden memories. For the villagers from
nearby areas, I was a second home. I was the last stretch through which the dead
would pass before they transformed to ashes.
I was also a reliable broadcaster. Any news (or gossip) that had to be
spread just needed to be said here once. Rest assured it would travel to and reach
the entire town population in no time.
I was the medium through which news about the dam spread. I was the
center of the panic about an uncertain future, the stream through which the
humans marched and chanted their slogans about saving their sacred river.
I was also a space where human divides would blur significantly; where
the poor could take away food without money, where people would return to you
your dropped bag.
And I was also a witness to my own demolition and subsequent ending by
humans- some known, many unknown.
My own death from the land is etched deep within me. I remember it well,
and sometimes I remember it over and over again. When the first wave of water
had touched me, I had felt a coldness quite different from the one during
monsoons or winters. I heard cries, human cries, worse than the screeching of the
radio sets on bad days. I also saw humans dragging humans away. On boats. The
water spread its lair on my territory, gradually turning it into a stranger. I was a
host about to be destroyed by a parasite. That final day when that huge, huge rush
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of water ate me up, I was an unarmed soldier, deserted by its battalion, facing a
firing squad. No last minute changes happened, no secret notes to halt the
execution. There were many bystanders, and it was over in a flash.
As that terrible memory erupts again, I turn to the town for solace. I try
observing it in its entirety. I try making sense of myself, relative to my confidante.
In one of the town ruins, what was once a temple is now a story of a few
remaining stones. I can see the contours of terrace farms, a faded green. I see
empty houses with hollowed doors and windows, like gaping eyes and mouths,
weeds growing where people thrived. The dam reservoir casts shadows upon us,
blue-grey and cold.
Lying here now, with nothing but the town and the past as anchors, I erode
into worldly oblivion, few bits each day.
(The baritone breaks in again).
“The new market… it is lifeless. People just sit around idly, play cards,
sleep in the sun, or wait in their empty shops. Or we talk about how our lives have
turned out after all those years of protestations and compromise. It is so much
more difficult for villagers to reach the market. We have to travel more since the
bridges were blown to make way for the dam and the roads.”
(A damp pause).
“I wish I could show you what I am saying. So that you don’t think I am
making it all up only for your interview.”
“No, I understand” says the other, lighter voice. “Please, continue”.
“What are we left with? The dam led to such a large scale uprooting and
displacement. Many people have been re-located to distant regions. There is no
business to speak of. You have seen how deserted the new market remains. The
town is limp. I see more birds in the sky than people on the roads. The bus stand
is always deserted. Nobody wants to come here anymore. Many of us are thinking
about heading to the plains. This is the future the dam gave us.”
I can only listen and ache as I hear this. Human whispers, thousands of
them I have heard till now. Small words, big words, stretched words, murmurs,
howling words. How good it all was, until it happened. Something they called
‘development’. The people are still confused about what they were promised and
what they received. And what they lost.
I hold onto those spoken words which linger long after they have been
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said and persist with my existential crisis at the bottom of a reservoir. I muse
about a weather when I was pleasantly warm and full, when the river sang to me
from the sides. I talk of days when people were mostly satisfied with what was
there - families, long walks under the moonlight, laughter which echoed, sorrow
that was shared, mountains and rivers that were worshipped, grandchildren who
held their grandparents’ hands, money which had not yet blinded anyone…
That was the town with the market. That was me.

Two Poems on the Hong Kong Democracy Movement
JENNY BANH
University of California - Riverside
These are two poems about the Hong Kong Democracy Movement.
World’s Youngest Democracy Protester
Dark skies cover toxic twirling air
Mardi Gras light on Post 1980’s student protester
Beijing lies and Taiwan furrows
Generic Police sweeping with batons behind eyeless masks
Hong Kong people have dry eyes
7-year-old cries, Why can’t Hong Kongers have Democracy?
Lights are dancing, Umbrella students are chanting,
Democracy Now! Democracy in Hong Kong!
Strangers from different shores watch
Hong Kong people have dry eyes
Ransomed by Old Ben
Punched by the Great Wall
Subjugated by the Rising Sun
Molested by international Capitalists
Hong Kong people have dry eyes
Hong Kong Feast
Let me invite you to a feast
Hong Kong people are so tasty and preseasoned
Barbary Lion devours their soul-hearts for Opium and Tea
Koi fish munch on bound hands and feet
Bald Eagles swoop for a meatier cut, bringing a Mickey Mouse
Giant Panda, the most eager to gorge, sucks the head off first
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The Next Time the World Goes Downhill: America and the 1983 Ethiopian
Famine
BETHANY SHARPE
University of Kentucky
Introduction
On December 10, 1985, Ronald Reagan signed a proclamation establishing a
Human Rights Day in the United States. During the ceremony, he said that
“America has, since its founding, been a refuge for those suffering under the yoke
of oppression.” As if to further persuade his audience of the importance of this
refuge in contemporary world politics, Reagan described governments throughout
the world that, according to him, stood in antipathy to U.S. liberal-democratic
values. He wrote of Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. He also wrote of
Ethiopia. He said, in particular reference to Ethiopia, that this was a “Marxist
government that used famine to punish large segments of its own
population…And the people and governments of the democracies have responded
generously to those pleas with tangible evidence of our concern.”1 Although the
famine began in 1983 with counter-insurgency strategies instituted by Ethiopian
leader Chairman Mengistu in the Northern regions of the country, two years
passed before attention in the United States focused on the great humanitarian
emergency taking place within that country.2 The increased attention culminated
in the great LiveAid and Band Aid concerts and “We are the world” recording
which garnered over sixty million dollars intended for African famine relief.3 The
songs, resulting concerts, and the outcry about famine conditions proved much
more than a straightforward relief effort. The humanitarian aid, referred to as
“tangible evidence of our concern” by Reagan, were as much about articulating a
specific vision of a future world as it was about providing immediate relief to
broken and vulnerable bodies so far away.
This paper argues that the vision of a future world articulated by media,
government, and aid groups coalesced around the transformation of Ethiopian
famine victims from “unenlightened” peoples into world citizens that would act as
torchbearers of liberal values, attitudes, and behaviors.4 In short, relief efforts
1
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acted as a beacon of hope for a unified world that conformed to these liberal
principles. The management of the aid effort through the consumption of media
images and the public’s purchasing power remained critical to that
transformation. In the moment of humanitarian crisis that was the Ethiopian
famine, the three varied forces of media, private non-profits, and government
commingled to entrench a specific liberal understanding of the future world order
that recognized individual choice, goal-tending, and personal accountability as the
necessary ingredients to promote global progress.5 Ultimately, this world of
thriving competition would render disasters like the famine obsolete. As media
images and documentaries depicted the glaring reality of death in the refugee
camps, relief efforts invited the public to participate in the emergency through
purchasing power, and the humanitarian response generated specific claims on
those receiving aid. The specific nature of this invitation allowed Americans to
use the famine as an opportunity to remake and redefine visions of progress
abroad.
In addition, this paper will discuss the conservative Cold War ideology
that underpinned much of the future world vision that these three groups shared.
The Cold War discourse used by all three groups to discuss the famine relied on a
specific narrative in which communist and socialist countries subordinated the
freedoms and liberties of the individual to the state which resulted in tyrannical
rule. Just as importantly, such Cold War discourse framed liberal democracies
like the United States as heroes who could, should, and would intervene on behalf
of oppressed people. Indeed, Cold War ideas acted as an influential motivator for
the public and media to pursue humanitarian aid. Even as both groups seemingly
viewed the emergency as one which highlighted the basic equality of all humanity
and rushed to meet the basic needs of man, it was Cold War politics that moved to
the media, the U.S. government, and the public to act.6
Africa Redux: Media images and the need for aid
Media coverage of the famine surged in the fall of 1984 after American news
stations picked up footage shot by the BBC of a refugee camp in Korem, Ethiopia.
English reporter Michael Buerk first broke the story of the famine when he found
his way into the camp in October and began reporting on the huge numbers of
people traveling to the area in search of food. As he described the scene as one of
a “biblical famine…now in the twentieth century,” cameras panned out to show
and enlightened agricultural policies.” December 26, 1984, NARA RECORD GROUP 286. The
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thousands of bodies covered in blankets huddled next to each other. At other
moments, the camera panned in to show close-ups of children crying, fear written
across their faces. In other scenes, viewers saw mothers holding tiny babies in an
attempt to breast-feed even though no milk remained in mothers’ malnourished
bodies. The cameras highlighted the acute frustration of the babies as they cried
out at the lack of milk. Within the same scene, fathers walked through the crowds
carrying the shrouded, tiny bodies of babies that had died, seemingly from lack of
food.7 Graphic images stunned audiences by showing starving Ethiopians literally
dying in front of the camera.8
As Fassin suggests in his theorization of humanitarianism, observers of the
famine engaged with suffering at a distance, they did so only in highly qualified
ways within well-defined and rigid boundaries. Media renderings of Ethiopians
as a monolithic bloc of suffering allowed the reader to create their own narrative
about the event and attach their own assumptions about the photos and images
they saw, including the understanding of Ethiopia as a nation of innocent,
dependent, and helpless children.9 A smaller photo inserted next to the burial
preparation photo in the Life article, reinforced this theme as it showed a man
gently placing his recently deceased four year-old daughter on a blanket.10 Like
the burial photo of the woman discussed above, the central point of concern is the
death of the child and the inability of the parent to prevent such an end. Readers
only learn very briefly the age and name of the daughter, but no more which
facilitated a connection to the images based on the imagining of a shared pain.
The limited textual context given about the victims allowed observers to
rely on their own understandings of the world to make sense of the images.11 In
this way, they disengaged with the full context of the victims’ lives, ignoring the
complexity and historicity of the political situation facing the victims, by relying
on their own understandings of the pain the victims faced.12 Little mention was
made, for instance, of the continuous warfare that had been raging since at least
the early 1960s between the Ethiopian government and its provinces in the north
7
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and the south.13 With little or no individualization of the people photographed, the
consumption of media images about the famine invested the reader with a
significant amount of assumptive power over what constituted an appropriate
famine victim. These assumptions would eventually inform the kind of
purchasing decisions consumers made in the emergency, by inviting them to
anchor these images with their own narratives of the famine.
One of the most visible and cogent narratives used to make sense of the
famine centered on the Cold War. The Life article highlighted the distinct Cold
War discourse Americans incorporated in their reports of the famine. Speculation
over how and why the Ethiopian government pursued certain food and emergency
policies throughout the crisis served as an acknowledgement of deeper ideological
forces at work and exposed how many Americans engaged with the political
elements of the crisis. Images of innocent famine victims suffering at the hands
of an evil Marxist-Lenninist regime deployed a simplified political schema to
interpret the crisis: the Ethiopian people, often viewed as childlike and innocent,
suffered at the hands of the communists and American responsibility mandated
that efforts be made to save them.14 References to this simplified understanding
abounded. One article, for example, argued that before any progress could be
made in the crisis, American leaders needed to recognize the root cause of the
famine issue as a political consequence of a communist regime. The author
admonished that before the US rush headlong into a relief effort they must
recognize that “adverse weather conditions set the stage for Ethiopia’s disaster,
but it is the political priorities of Ethiopia’s dictator, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu
Haile Mariam, that have crippled Ethiopian agriculture and reduced its ability to
cope with the drought.”15
The constant heralding of American progress contained distinct
paternalistic threads and acted as at least one guide marker in America’s
relationships and interactions with the world.16 Carmen Martinez Novo discusses
paternalism as a subtler version of racism. In this form of racism dominant groups
use discourses “that have discriminatory effects” which are “constructed as
manifestations of love” for those who have been deemed different, childlike, and
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not equal.17 In the famine, racism coded as benevolent guidance shaped ideas of
what did and did not constituted progress, infused media reports of the crisis, and
acted as a litmus test of how Ethiopians responded to the emergency. News
reports about daily life in the refugee camps gave readers a glimpse into Ethiopian
lives and created comparisons between the “progress” of an American way of life
and other more “primitive” cultures. Such comparisons tended to reveal the
outcomes of “primitive” cultures as tragic and backward. In the Life article, for
example, a graphic photograph shows a famine victim lying on her side on a bare
floor covered by a blanket. Next to her legs is a newborn baby still attached by the
umbilical cord. A MSF midwife tells the reporter that although there is an
obstetrics table available to the Ethiopian women, most “prefer to squat on a
swatch of black plastic on the floor.” Embedded within this comment is the
suggestion that Ethiopian women chose to remain outside any of the obstetrics
technology that facilitates “positive outcomes.”
Such a decision privileged Ethiopian women’s own understanding of the
birthing process and the body’s ability to perform in that process over Western
constructs of childbirth. The aid worker does goes on to say, “I knew this method
of having babies was possible but I never saw it before…Now I think: Why not?
It’s more natural.”18 However, this particular photo of a natural childbirth is
placed next to photos of women delousing each other upon entrance to the camps
and amidst other photos of starving bodies. Implied is the subtle suggestion that
the preferred natural mode of childbirth, and the attending natural lifestyle, incurs
substantial risks because it eschews the authoritative knowledge of medicine and
technology that manages saving lives that is presented in popular culture
references like movies and television shows.19 Here, “natural” stands in for
“primitive.” In this particular scenario it becomes natural for aid workers, mostly
Western, to step in and guide Ethiopian women in this emergency towards a more
perfect understanding of how progress in areas like medicine can ease areas of
their lives like childbirth.
Utilizing a paternalistic discourse generated images and descriptions of
Ethiopian famine victims as unable to meet their most basic needs and valorized
the Western aid workers who acted on their behalf. According to the article, in
many ways the aid workers of MSF, or Medicine San Frontiers, became the only
conduit to survival. One photo underscores this with the image of a white, female
17
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aid worker from MSF walking steadily ahead of a gaggle of children in her
charge. She is quoted as saying after meeting with the RRC that, “I was really fed
up after the meeting with the RRC…I wanted to leave. But if I can still help a few
people, there is a reason to stay.” Rooted within this statement is hierarchy of
power overlaid on a sense of need; the famine victims need her to stay because
only she, or other aid workers like her, have the capacity to defend the victims
from the Mengistu’s Marxist government. Another paragraph references Benedict
Clement, a physician in the children’s ward, who is “lovingly called Mother by
her patients.”20 In this case, Clemente is providing information, expertise, and
care for her charges in a way that other Ethiopians cannot– not even their own
mothers. Clement fulfills a filial role by acting as a mother defending her
children, who happen to be Ethiopians of all ages. In still another description,
readers are told that in the face of huge numbers of refugees coming into the
camp, “six doctors, ten nurses and a midwife face the wall-to-wall crush with a
kind of determined cheerfulness.”21 Readers, working from a strong heritage of
stereotypes about Africa, are given the sense that the huge numbers of poor,
pitiful victims are incapable of fending off the effects of Mengistu’s government
on their own.22 Like children, they needed stronger, wiser adults to protect and
defend them.
Cold War and paternalistic discourse shaped the reception of the famine
by American audiences and interjected a specific formulation of the outcome of
the relief effort that surged forward. However, turning to traditional ideological
explanations allowed followers of the emergency to work around the ambivalence
surrounding the famine. Ideological explanations helped mask the racial
underpinnings of famine representations because aid efforts were described as a
way to guide and redirect childlike famine victims. Ethiopians and their nation
had to be saved, but in emerging from the crisis they had to be a different kind of
Ethiopian. Not only did their bodies require nourishment and sustenance, but they
also needed to learn the behavioral principles of independence and choicemaking. Just as American children had to be instilled with core tenets of
liberalism that focused on independence and choice-making in order to forge a
life of prosperity, so, too did the figurative children of Ethiopia. As the
ideological vision of Ethiopia as a stronger, more liberal people and nation took
shape, Americans began placing greater claims on the relief effort and recipients
of aid as a means to ensure that vision came to fruition.
20
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Seen in this light, viewers understood in the famine a dire need for
outsiders to step in and act as defenders and provisioners of aid. In this story, the
aid workers and volunteers take center stage as their actions are described as
“heroic” and elevated to an almost celebrity-like status. The plight of the famine
victims becomes secondary to the bravery of the volunteers working on their
behalf and suggests that without the vision of the aid workers miserable
conditions will remain the status-quo. One grant submitted to the USAID
explicitly speaks to the dire state of affairs in Africa that could potentially hamper
even the efficiency of American aid workers if not carefully addressed. The
group AfriCare, a development organization that had been working in Africa
since the 1970s, developed a grant project to place U.S. medical teams in the
camp sites as a means to provide emergency medical assistance. Writing in lineitem justifications for a grant proposal submitted to USAID, the author noted that
for those individuals volunteering to serve on the aid mission team, “the living
conditions in the areas of Ethiopia in which they will be working…will involve
major hardships for these individuals.”23 The grant went on to conclude that, “One
has to actually visit the areas in question to have an idea of the emotional drain on
the individuals faced with trying to maintain health services for the thousands of
people facing starvation and living in conditions of absolute miser. In order to
alleviate the strain on the volunteer personnel, AfriCare believes it is necessary to
include some time during the period for the volunteers to get away from their
depressing environment.”24 Ultimately, the author of the grant expects the cost of
doing aid work in Africa to exact a high toll, but it is the expectation of a fruitful
return that pushes the aid effort forward.
Making cents: the problem of aid and the future of Ethiopia
The first visual images and text of the famine stunned many Americans into
action and relied on a well-known narrative to do so; the images created a story
which cast the famine victims as apolitical pawns of a communist government
that would undertake any lengths to strip people of freedom. Here, the association
between children, innocence, and lack of political acumen played a central role in
justifying the need for American donors to invest in the crisis with aid dollars,
technology, and time. Colleen Williams, a concerned citizen, underscored this
connection when she wrote to Vice President Bush that “my personal opinion on
all this is I feel it was the Ethiopian government’s fault …. and I feel the
Ethiopian people shouldn’t have to suffer for this.”25
Dramatically increasing media attention on the crisis, highlighting
23
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victims’ innocence, and emphasizing them as apolitical pawns in a communist
game had two consequences. First, increased media attention triggered an
emotional response from American viewers and prompted huge numbers of
individuals to contribute to the Ethiopian aid effort.26 This effort coalesced into a
world-wide care community in which amounts of money flowed from both large
and small aid and relief groups into the aid effort in numbers never before seen.27
Second, as this compassion collective grew, a loosely structured community
developed and placed greater claims on the recipients of aid. They demanded
Ethiopians transform their values and behaviors into usable, workable traits that
would prevent such a tragedy from happening again. In this way, aid providers
circumscribed the images of adult Africans as innocent children and informed the
means through which individual and group donors approached aid efforts.
Donations and relief efforts became as much about providing dollars as about
grooming the “children” of Africa into responsible adults.
The care community consisted of disparate segments that ranged from
children, to businesses, to schools. Though the donations and offers of aid began
as isolated, individual occasions to end suffering, eventually a loosely formed
community formed around famine relief. Simplifying the political and historical
context of the situation, media images of the disaster fostered a sense of urgency,
and for a brief moment opened a window of imagined equality based on the
vulnerability of broken and weakened bodies.28 Pulled by emotion and working
under the vision of equality, people rallied to the aid effort. Many thousands of
ordinary Americans called into relief centers asking how they could help and
offering to donate money.29
It wasn’t just adults that thought they could make a difference. In May of
1985, the Los Angeles Unified School District spent two weeks pitting schools
against each other to see which one would wind up on top as the number one
fundraiser for money for Ethiopian famine victims. They aimed to raise $250,000
for needed supplies in the country. The ultimate goal of the campaign was to
“help stop the dying and instill in students a sense of caring for the plight of
others.”30 The strategies various schools employed to raise money were wide26
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ranging. Some presided over auctions, others held dances, and others had foreignfood sales, a riff on the usual bake sales common to school functions. Students did
manage to reach their fundraising goal. One school alone, Birmingham High
School, presented a check to the school board for $8,018.18.31 One school council
member said of the reason for so much student involvement, “I think maybe kids
are coming out of their apathy…..People are becoming aware of the world again.
But it seems like it’s the ‘in’ thing to be concerned about.”
With a growing community involved in the famine and as more people
entered into this community, expectations grew around the outcome of donation
relief. Coalescing around a set identity and experience of caring for others, media
recognition of this group effort imbued large and small donors with a sense of
power over where their money went and how it was spent. Alluding to a
disagreement between Ethiopia and the United States over the extent of aid in
relation to the proportion of famine, media headlines cited relief officials
declaring that Ethiopia was “biting the hand the feeds it.”32 Such sentiments were
embedded within a hierarchy of power relations between nation-states and jarred
with the rhetoric of Americans giving aid freely to any in need.33 Individual
donors, for example, clamored for a visible return on the money they donated and
still felt disappointment years later when Ethiopia faced the prospect of another
devastating famine in 2004. During the relief effort of 2004, one radio caller
“expressed irritation and outrage that Ethiopia was still in crisis fifteen years later
after she had donated money to the Band-Aid appeal in the mid-1980s. What had
happened to all the money, she demanded. And why couldn’t Ethiopia look after
itself? The programmer presenter asked whether she would be donating money to
the relief effort this time. ‘Certainly not,’ she replied.”34 The sense of monetary
accountability pervaded reports of the relief effort so thoroughly that one report
cautioned against too much expectation. He discussed the difficulty of
administering aid in famine-stricken areas and wrote that donors “must deal with
one of the world’s least attractive governments. But this can be done without
illusion and with an honest reckoning to Americans who contributed so much to
Ethiopian relief.”35
Public understanding of the famine soon coupled monetary accountability
with ideological accountability. Heeding a certain call meant that many in the
United States, and other countries, understood this humanitarian disaster as an
31
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opportunity for ordinary Americans to collectively remake conditions in the world
which precipitated suffering and deprivation. Popular culture magazines provided
a simple answer to frustrations with conditions like those in Ethiopia that allowed
famines to take place. One reader summed up this sentiment when they wrote in
to the editor that, “The next time someone tells me the world is going downhill,
I’ll just remember what 43 of the biggest names in in music did to make it better.
It took USA for Africa to make me realize that I, too, can help!.”36
Other facets of the emergency soon emerged that contributed to donor
expectations, including anxieties about race. As the aid campaign took form
through direct relief programming and development activities, deeply political
assumptions about dependency, aid, and race in the domestic context informed the
creation of those initiatives taking place at the international level. Domestically,
race framed an on-going debate concerning the abuse of government sponsored
programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).37 Although
by the time of the Ethiopian famine “racial science had long been discredited
among scientists and physical anthropologists,” many Americans still continued
to use racial categorization as a way to explain contemporary political contexts.38
Images and a discourse of African-American mothers on welfare and abusing the
program flourished.39 As a result, stereotypes of African-Americans as lazy and
dependent took root, and the role of welfare remained heatedly debated in the
creation of a productive citizenry.40
The Ethiopian famine magnified the discourse around dependency and aid,
and placing the conversation in the international arena heightened an awareness of
what was at stake with aid. With current domestic aid debates acting as the
backdrop, many donors feared that aid could sap the industriousness and vitality
of Ethiopia’s future. Instead, what would emerge was a nation dependent on other
nations – a macrocosm of what was happening with aid in the United States. To
avoid this fate, many American donors made greater ideological claims on the
recipients of aid during the famine based on fears that a proliferation of
unmanaged aid would create a world that discouraged the full manifestation of a
thriving, liberal atmosphere and the attending freedoms, privileges, and rights.
As discussions around aid need and delivery progressed, issues over
dependent behavior emerged as the core site for individual and national
36

“Letters to the Editor,” Life Magazine, April 1985.
Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle For Civil Rights in the North
(New York: Random House, 2008): 394-396, 519-521, 524-529.
38
Melani McAllister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, & US Interests in the Middle East since
1945 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005): 148.
39
Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle For Civil Rights in the North
(New York: Random House, 2008): 394-396, 519-521, 524-529.
40
Ibid.
37

America and the 1984-1986 Ethiopian Famine 92

transformation and created fertile ground for donors to make claims on aid
recipients. A post-famine Ethiopia had to include people who were diligent, hardworking, and able to fully contribute to the success of the nation through labor. In
June 1985, a month before the largest fundraising event of the famine campaign
took place with the dual concerts, Gerry Salole voiced concerns that the massive
amount of aid destined for Ethiopia opened the possibility of sabotaging that
nation’s future by engraining a sense of entitlement in famine victims’ perception
of their circumstances. Salole, the field director for Save the Children, implied
that receiving such a large amount of aid in such a short time period would
cultivate a sense of dependency.41 He elaborated on these fears when he stated,
“We need to try to understand what happens to people who are getting something
for nothing… This has to be creating bizarre ideas about those who are providing
the relief and generally what the world is like.” In articulating uneasiness with the
relationship between aid and its recipients, Salole raised questions about the
management and end-result of aid. He suggested that if aid continued unabated
without some kind of investment or repayment from the victim, the victim would
first, develop a misconception about how the world functioned and the place of
progressive, advanced nations within that structure, and second, be stripped of any
desire to develop skills needed to participate in that world. In this case, unless
carefully supervised, aid efforts would produce the opposite of productive
citizens.
As Salole raised concerns among the public through news reports, other
private aid groups took their concerns directly to USAID officials. Some pushedd
for a solution to the famine that would span a greater timeline beyond money
earmarked for only a short period of time within the 1985 fiscal year. Interaction,
the large umbrella organization of over 100 private volunteer agencies, did just
that. In a letter to the chairman of the committee that introduced HR 100 and HR
606, the President of the organization, Peter J. Davies, wrote that the group
commended the legislation which “would provide both higher levels of funding
and a broader range of assistance, including assistance for recovery and
rehabilitation. It is our strongly held view that assistance for recovery and
rehabilitation is just as important as emergency aid. Indeed, unless we make the
extra efforts now to assist African countries in such undertakings as
redevelopment of water resources and rehabilitation and improvement of
agricultural production, we risk increasing their dependence on food aid handouts
instead of encouraging greater self-reliance.”42
If the public and private agencies concerns overlapped about the
destructive tendency of food aid to foster dependence and entitlement thereby
displacing the values of responsibility, self-reliance, and hard-work, government
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workers within the USAID also remained sensitive to these anxieties. Indeed,
documents circulating in the department since April 1984 revealed that USAID
continued to struggle with the same questions that the public and private aid
groups held over the future of aid and relief. A speech entitled “Disasters: Acts
of God or Acts of Man?”, delivered to the World Affairs Council of Northern
California on April 5, 1984 made its way to the desks of USAID officials. The
speech resonated with workers and made clear arguments that answered many
questions about the meaning of aid assistance. A hand written note at the top of
the speech claimed, “Excellent speech, should be read by everyone in our
business.”43 The initials JM followed the comment.44
The speech opens with a vignette about a disastrous earthquake that struck
Lisbon in 1755. After discussing the reaction to the disaster by the public, to the
author asks audience members to whether “natural disasters – floods, droughts,
famines, hurricanes, tsunamis and the like as well as earthquakes – are Acts of
God or acts of man.”45 In a few simple sentences he forces his audience to
consider that “when disasters happen in the Third World, and droughts and
famines seem to be on the increase in Latin America, Asia and Africa, do we react
properly? Is disaster relief part of the solution – or part of the problem?”46 After
surveying a range of disasters, including the contemporaneous famine in Ethiopia,
for his audience, the speaker begins an analysis of the responses to these
emergencies. He concludes that “one of the myths about disasters is that after an
earthquake or a flood, or during a famine, people sit around in numbed
helplessness waiting for helicopters to fly in with blankets and food. The truth is
almost exactly the opposite: it is the delivery of food and blankets which causes
this dependence and inactivity.”47 The sentiments voiced in this speech which
circulated through USAID offices, echoed the same concerns about the
consequences of aid that started surfacing in the media. For many, aid represented
a fine line: too little and America would be shirking its duty to help heal the world
and change its course, too much and America contributed to the further
degeneration of individual potential. Misdirected aid risked dangerous
consequences.
Without properly managing aid, famine victims risked becoming
dependent on others for survival and in that process faced regressing into acts of
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dishonesty and idleness. Taking seriously the consequences on Ethiopia’s future,
aid donors, workers, and officials set out to ensure that a future of idle, dependent
Ethiopians did not occur. They did this by building new cultural expectations
around work habits in carefully managed aid distribution centers.48 Salole
proposed an unofficial solution to the dilemma of dependence by encouraging
food recipients to actively participate in the relief effort by contributing their
labor. He noted that a form of this plan was currently in place in certain areas near
food camps where volunteers built and repaired the dirt roads that Save the
Children’s trucks used. Meanwhile, other aid recipients used their donkeys to
transport food to remote villages. Salole summed up the effort by saying “They’re
not being paid in money or food, they’re doing it as volunteers. That way they
become participants in, rather than objects of the relief effort.” Most importantly,
Salole concluded that “people who work for what they receive are less likely to
come away with the impression that free food is something to which they have
permanently become entitled.”49 For Salole, current aid operations represented a
danger to the larger world structure by enabling dependency. He stated, that in its
current form, “Relief means you can come in and say, ‘Here’s the food, take it.’”
For Salole and other donors like him, relief operations needed a major
readjustment in order to create a new, world that tamped down on dependent
behaviors that exacerbated, or even caused, emergency situations.
Although some media reports did applaud the resiliency of Ethiopian men,
women, and children, it was clear that aid experts felt they needed to properly
manage and channel inner resources like resiliency as a means to guard against
dependency. Without direct supervision and management of aid, officials like
Salole wondered “whether aid provided over a long period may not stifle the
initiative of the recipient” and render them incompetent for a future that required
productivity and industry for survival.50 In part, such a view stemmed from the
juxtaposition of camps, described as a location of progress, technology, and
comfort, and Ethiopian terrain, described as a Biblical backwater.51 Survivors
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spent time in camps that were outfitted with “large water-proof tents, street lights,
generators, a hospital, free, hot food and guards at the gate” and which were seen
as “a functioning town with far more amenities than its inhabitants have ever
known before or are likely to know again.” Observers noted that leaving “such an
environment can be traumatic.” Such a line of reasoning reinforced concerns
about dependency and expressed wonder at the apparent willingness of survivors
to remain in a place of comfort that they did not contribute to making.52 Even as
aid workers on the ground and in the urgency of the operation developed makeshift and ad-hoc aid revisions, like Salole’s labor contribution program, the
USAID also worked to re-make conditions in the camps that would alter and
modify certain behaviors. The kind of aid projects chosen for US funding, hinged
on the kinds of goals and aims they articulated in their grant applications. Many
of those chosen targeted the very anxieties over aid-dependency and the
production of liberal citizens that concerned government employees like Julius
Marks.
Remaking the World: Grant-making, claim-making, and the future of
Ethiopia
In spite of Reagan’s staunch reputation as a Cold War warrior, during this period
his public stance towards the larger Cold War conflict edged towards an
appearance of rapprochement as he sought to balance the demands of anti-Soviet
fervor and peace brokers within his administration.53 With more public emphasis
on returning to warmer relations and promises to avoid military conflicts, White
House officials also focused on alternatives to further their vision of a free-market
world order while appearing as the broker of a rapprochement with the Soviets.54
Publicly, in the spirit of the olive branch, they took care to rebuild cultural
relations and work together on science matters like space initiatives.55 Behind the
scenes, however, less conspicuous means offered a way for Reagan to assuage the
concerns of staunch Cold War warriors who feared that Soviet strength would
outpace the capabilities of the US.56 Officials found one such conduit in the form
of emergency aid grants and immediate relief projects that worked to rebuild
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Ethiopia in the image of a liberal state. The 1984-1985 famine functioned as an
important space to implement such projects. Acting on the impulses of public
concern, spurred in large part by media images of the famine, the US government
officially sanctioned and funded private, non-profit programs whose project aims
tied neatly with a neoliberal vision of the future. While on the surface, non-profits
and the US government often appeared at odds, with one favoring liberal agendas
and the other favoring a conservative course, their aims dovetailed neatly because
of the ways each worked in relation to neoliberalism. Reagan’s overt policies and
actions to create a state and world that favored individual property rights, the rule
of law, and institutions of free markets and free trade were supplemented by many
NGOs more subtle measures to shape individual characteristics that would
flourish in such a world.57
In order for the world Reagan and his officials envisioned to survive,
reformers needed to do more than simply forestall dependency. Famine victims
had to learn new skills and attitudes, such as increasing productivity, shoring up
self-reliance, and goal tending, to equip them for the coming liberal oriented
world. Thus, the White House had a special interest in partnering with groups that
encouraged and helped bring about these behaviors in famine victims. If aid
workers on the ground improvised with the behavior transforming programs they
implemented, like Salole’s volunteer contribution program, the White House
agencies like the USAID directed a more methodical and sustainable campaign to
achieve similar results. Three USAID funded projects in particular highlight
White House interest in transformative aid: the CRS health-nutrition surveillance
program, the tent cities of Nathan Abbie, and the well-drilling campaign of
AfriCare.
Because of the vast amount of work that would need to go into the
transformation of Ethiopia as a result of its underdevelopment, how recipients
used the aid they received developed into a source of contention between donors
and victims. In particular, the use and abuse of food-rations became an important
site for transformation. Many donors and media viewers who contributed to the
campaign understood the relief camps and feeding centers as a microcosm of the
progress of the Western world.58 In detailing camp life, reporters focused on the
victims’ desire to remain in the camps in order to take advantage of technology
and progress. Some of these stories emphasized the lengths that aid recipients
went to in order to remain in the camp and be spared the “trauma” of returning to
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a life without Western amenities. In particular, reporters seized on Ethiopian
mothers that “nutritionally sabotaged” their children – a condition in which
reportedly mothers kept at least one of their children in a malnourished state so
that her family would not be turned away from the camps.59 While Ethiopian
mothers may have understood this particular use of food as a survival mechanism
for her entire family, aid workers equated it to thievery and manipulation of the
aid system.60 The message sent by news reporters and aid workers throughout the
famine concluded that a future Ethiopia, which included technology and
amenities, entailed cultivating behaviors of honesty, responsibility, and
accountability in famine victims. Like aid disputes taking place in the United
States, there was no room in Ethiopia’s future for mothers who used their children
to take advantage of the system.
A USAID funded Catholic Relief Services project, the Nutritional
Surveillance program, worked to transform behaviors deemed deceptive by
closely managing and shaping individual norms. This program focused on
mothers and children. As children and mothers received their food rations,
program managers also gave them nutrition training. The program closely tracked
and monitored participants through weigh-ins. It was expected that participants
would apply their nutritional training towards the rations they received and thus
experience a weight-gain in malnourished children. An important component of
this program centered on the ideas of community sharing in Ethiopian culture.
According to the grant authors, many of the destitute adults receiving food aid
intended for children took the ration and shared it amongst other family and
possibly community members. To ensure that the ration intended for the children
went undivided, the program monitored the weight of each child enrolled in the
program and provided extra rations to other adults.
Dividing the use of rations, thus preventing the sense of communal
sharing, spoke to the differences in how aid providers and famine victims
understood tragedy or celebration. Preventing sharing of rations emphasized the
individual experience of suffering and foreclosed the communal experience of
tragedy. Accordingly, as NGOs elevated the individual experience of suffering,
they also foregrounded and privileged the individual basis for overcoming
adversity and challenge. Seen in this light, the feeding program helped condition
participants for the rigors of the modern, neoliberal world. Success in this new
world required that individuals understand the importance of self-reliance and
individualism. Participating in the nutrition program allowed Ethiopian mothers
and children the means to gain this crucial experience.
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The second proposed project, the drilling of wells, managed to elevate
efficiency and goal-orientation as the key aspect of survival in the post-famine
Ethiopia. In December 1984 USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
commissioned a report on the state of water accessibility and cleanliness near the
displacement camps. As the numbers of displaced persons swelled the relief
centers, camp resources failed to grow accordingly. Water access proved a
growing concern as only a limited number of water wells throughout the camps
had to sustain thousands of campers. In the Bhati Camp, because water access
was insufficient people soon began using nearby river water even though it was
contaminated. Camp authorities deployed fifty-three external “sanitation guards”
to keep people away from the river bed.
Unable to utilize the river and only having access to a few water pumps
meant that 300 to 400 people had to wait for water on a daily basis. In their
investigation of the camps, the project managers noted the response of the camp
doctor towards these conditions, “The doctor did not seem concerned about the
300 to 400 people waiting for water. He agreed that it would be better if they had
more water but thought the waiting was beneficial to the people as it gave them a
goal, something to do, in the very act of waiting they thought they were working
for their water.”61 For the report preparers, the use of time played an important
role in how they interpreted camp life. The doctor understood waiting as an action
that gave hope, or a moment of meaning, in a life overshadowed by death. The
report preparers on the other hand, understood waiting in a much different light.62
Waiting for water represented a passive use of time when the urgency of the
situation required much more active measures. Time was a crucial ingredient in
saving lives and the idea of hundreds of people using time to wait, rather than act,
violated western norms of efficiency and goal orientation – if the goal of camp
life was survival, then campers needed to be doing more than simply waiting
passively to receive water. Building multiple and permanent well sites served as a
way to save lives by providing access to clean water. But it also served as an
important example of aid donors’ understanding of how to use time. Establishing
multiple well sites subverted the camp doctor’s understanding of what marked a
productive goal. Rather than simply waiting in line, displaced persons in the camp
could actively shape their own destiny by more efficiently using time.63
In addition to developing specific liberal behaviors such as individual
accountability (through the nutrition program) and teaching habits that were
crucial to a liberal work-ethic like managing time more efficiently (through the
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well-project), USAID funded projects also worked to foster the importance of
choice-making in everyday life circumstances, a habit that many felt was missing
under Marxist rule. Although many Western viewers internalized the victims as
child-like in their lack of political acumen, an expectation arose that such an
apolitical state was only temporary. With appropriate training and opportunities,
victims could take control of their future through the kinds of choices that they
made. In this way famine victims would grow into responsible beings and
political adults. In ascribing choice-making, or a lack there-of, as an important
feature of the crises, Western media and relief projects pointed to the role of
Mengistu’s government in the creation and sustainment of the famine through the
ways in which they stripped Ethiopians of their right to make choices about where
and how they lived.
Doubts loomed over Mengistu’s intentions to end the famine. Reports
suggested that his aid program and the use of the Ethiopian Relief and
Rehabilitation Committee served as a rouse for squelching the rebels who lived
primarily in famine-stricken areas. Megnistu’s resettlement program served as an
important focal point for these doubts. Resettlement efforts began in earnest in
October 1984 by Ethiopian officials as an attempt to stem the death toll by
moving people from drought stricken Northern provinces in Tigrea and Eritrea to
more fertile lands in the South near the Kishe province.64 Mengistu officials
described the program as completely voluntary and one administrator stated that
he was “surprised by the large outpouring of volunteers” and claiming that there
was “no problem” getting people to relocate.”65 Mengistu initiated resettlement in
order to actively solve the hunger problem.66 When describing the plan to
Western donors, he insisted that those that resettled did so voluntarily. Many in
the Reagan administration refused to believe the resettlement program was
anything other than an attempt to institute forcible collectivization on the peasant
population. Some international aid groups fed this suspicion when they
questioned the tactics used to recruit volunteers to the resettlement areas in
Southern Ethiopia.67 One Red Cross official stated that “we don’t know the
degree to which they are being forced and we don’t know the risks to which
they’ll be exposed.”68 Statements from those who had been resettled appeared to
corroborate these doubts as one peasant “complained that they would need
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bulldozers to clear rocks and trees and tractors to turn the hard virgin soil.”69 Such
comments drew readers’ attention towards the possibility that not all of the
resettlers moved of their own accord. Newspaper and television characterizations
of the government painted a picture of Ethiopian officials working to strip
individuals of essential liberties such as freedom of movement.
Public questions over Megnistu’s motivations came as a boon to U.S.
officials who knew of the famine conditions in Ethiopia long before the breaking
coverage of Buerke’s news documentary, but were reluctant to do anything to
ameliorate the situation.70 At least two years prior to the sweeping news stories of
famine in Africa, Reagan officials opted not to provide aid to a communist
government.71 They reasoned that providing funds to Mengistu’s leadership
would only help the burgeoning leftist country realize national socialistic goals.72
The increased numbers of letters sent into USAID reminding those officials that
“something must be done, current efforts were to be commended, but they were
not enough,” made it clear that a reckoning was about to take place.73 A press
release from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, co-sponsor of the African Famine,
Relief, and Recovery Act of 1985, summed up this response when he wrote that,
“The continuing drought that has afflicted eight African nations in the past decade
has put at risk an estimated 10 million human beings. Since October 1, 1984 the
United States has shipped an estimated 700,000 metric tons of emergency food to
famine-stricken regions of Africa. This is a good start, but it is not enough.”74
Official U.S. policy could no longer ignore circumstances in Ethiopia hoping that
widespread disease and death would topple Mengistu. Acting against the
backdrop of the public’s outcry USAID reworked official policy to their benefit.
If they were to help a communist nation, it would be on their ideological terms.
Luckily for them, it appeared as though the public was on board, and even set the
pace, for those terms. In this way, as the US became a leader in providing aid to
Ethiopia, they were also able to fulfill policy goals through their collaboration
with non-profit aid groups.75
Reagan officials did this by placing non-negotiable conditions on
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emergency aid delivered by the US.76 One of these non-negotiable conditions was
the location and placement of aid. Throughout the famine, the White House
insisted USAID only provide aid to non-resettlement areas.77 One important
example of this policy manifested in the creation of tent-cities. Israeli activistphilanthropist Abie Nathan, working through the American Jewish Committee,
submitted a grant to build an emergency tent city. His intended plan was to build a
safe, sanitary city to act as a relief center for famine victims. Victims arriving in
the cities would find tents to live in and relief to help end hunger. Wary at first,
the US soon described the tent-city as an acceptable plan and if funded it would
“be money well spent.”78 They supported the grant under condition of strict
controls to where Abbie built the cities. Any site had to receive US approval
before any construction could take place. Approved areas meant any land that was
not part of Mengistu’s resettlement schemes that had caused such consternation in
Western media reports. Many of these landed in famine stricken areas that also
happened to be controlled by Ethiopian groups rebelling against Mengistu’s
leadership.
Funding tent cities in rebel controlled areas helped politicize the
emergency and reinforced questions about Mengistu’s resettlement scheme and
the nature of a communist government in its relationship to citizens’ rights.
Although the tent cities served as a means of relief, they also served as an
important contrast to the assumed forced resettlement scheme of Mengistu and
became emblematic of the importance of choice-making in individual life. In US
funded tent-cities famine victims had the choice of where, when, and how to seek
aid. They could go as far or as near their homes as they liked. This served as an
important foil to reports about the lack of choice-making in resettled areas.
Newspapers reported the resettled areas as places where victims were told when
and where they had to report. In addition, journalists portrayed resettled areas as
also affecting the daily lives of every other Ethiopian who did not face starvation;
taking away choice from one group entailed denying choice for other groups.
Journalist Clifford May reported on compulsory activity when he wrote of the
“thousands of Ethiopian college students and teachers” who were “ordered to
spend the summer working with famine victims” who had been resettled in the
south and west of the country. One student stated of his assignment, “I don’t
know anything about plowing or building tukuls (traditional thatched huts used by
Ethiopian peasants.”79
Also reported in the article were concerns about what resettlement meant
for the future of Ethiopian famine victims. One aid official stated that the
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resettlement scheme had been poorly designed and that “those being resettled
have little chance to become self-sufficient soon.”80 The victims’ passage into
adulthood and beyond the famine crisis depended, in part, on their ability to make
decisions free from government interference, and the tent cities represented an
oasis in a land dominated by government interference. In this way, tent cities
allowed the US government to emphasize the importance of giving individuals the
freedom to make choices that could and would lead to health and happiness in
life. In keeping famine victims out of resettlement areas, the US worked to
undermine Mengistu’s policies and served as a way to keep the act of choicemaking a relevant point of concern in the eyes of American donors.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the undercurrent of doubt about the aid campaign and the ensuing
work to save bodies firmly rested on understanding aid as a transaction. Media
interpretations of the crisis opened space for Westerners to place claims on the
victims by re-casting Ethiopians in pejorative, childlike caricatures reminiscent of
early depictions of Africans and African-Americans. The larger Cold-War
background further simplified the situation for many Americans. In stripping the
famine of its political complexity and suggesting that Africa needed saving from
the evils of communist leaders, donors imbued the famine with an ideological use;
providing money to Ethiopian famine victims transformed them into tools to save
the world from Communists and allowed donors to regenerate Ethiopian values
and behaviors appropriate to a world free from socialism. As development and
relief merged, the kinds of programs chosen as recipients of federal dollars reveal
how the means to save bodies were also intended to transform those bodies into a
new neoliberal citizen at the conclusion of the famine. The public played a key
role in pushing the Reagan administration into creating preemptive relief and aid
policies by relying heavily on non-profit groups which resulted in closer
relationships between private non-profit groups and US aid agencies. This newly
cemented relationship provided alternative means for the United States to pursue
Cold War policies amidst the evolving relationship between the United States and
the Soviet Union.81 This changed relationship allowed the US to cede much of its
authority in managing many future human rights and humanitarian crises to
private groups.
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Six Poems
JAMES A. WREN
San Jose State University
“Then, Not as We Were?”
Confronting a world where birds might no longer sing,
Where the wind is flagged, tired,
And the veil of darkness begins to weigh heavily upon us,
I give myself freely to slumber.
And as I do so
The harsh, the unjust, the discordant
Melt away the cacophony, leaving in its place
Residues, a single melody that all might enjoin.
As we comprehend our place in our world,
Accept,
Embrace lovingly our own responsibilities and actions
--spreading our wings for the very first time
so that we might escape the excuse of “then”
Only now are we able to cross the vast distances.
However long such a journey might take,
No matter the direction it might take us
Away from a world of inequity
--where the poorest
the loneliest and used up
all who find themselves lost or worse,
invisible to the unaffected eyes of other times, other places—
There remains an omnipresent music,
A song we learn as we bathe in the warmth of all we share,
Our humanity
Our breaking of stones and barriers alike
As we till the harden ground into a silken ash.
For if this song, once heard, goes without heed,
If we fail to raise our voices in unison
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--doing as we have for centuries before, and
spending our every waking moment,
caught in the trap, a frivolous exercise of
stringing,
removing and
restringing again
our own instruments—
Then only silence and stagnation remain.
Better that our lyrics rise from the depths of shared truth
--that infinite healing lies in the repeated refrains of
the natural world-As we grow together,
--in the awkward pauses initialy or overflowing leisure that follows-Sitting quietly, face to face,
As we begin to sway to a greater song called life.
Singing of life,
Simple and straight
--a reed flute, now filled with music—
One after another might leave the security of the darkest corners
Leave their doors ajar,
Their mouths agape and
Their eyes opened wide, ranging freely perhaps for the very first time
And we drink with a newfound joy
Forgetting our self, only to relocate,
Our reflections against the eyes of all others.
Knowing, striving, understanding
As we live, we can do so without fear,
Our heads held high in
A new world,
Global and all-encompassing
Its people no longer broken up, like shards of
A once-stain glass window,
Fragments of narrowly-conceived domestic walls.
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Still, we must not forget
An earlier gloom, a foreboding, forbidden darkness
That permeated the very corners of our being and
Dared challenge the skies to hold dominion.
As my eyes survey all that was
All that could be, let our hearts recall the bitterness of old,
Wailing in unison with the force of the unsettling winds:
Do you not hear?
Not feel that electric thrill passing through the air
Alongside the notes of once-unspoken melodies,
Floating
Shore to shore
And beyond.
Or is it the “snap” we hear?
The voice of that trap
Its door shut, closed and tight. . .
Or worse, newer shrieks still heard among a few
Lamenting the discomforts of our world,
Recognizing, accepting
Our role
Our responsibility
Our‘bility to initiate change
Even as we see the pinchers pan in,
Close-up,
And the doors begin to shut, fast and tight.
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Exhibition at a New York Gallery
Tu ne cede malis sed contra audentior ito
Raku Sculpture (ca. 11 September)
Cranes circle overhead
Elemental glaze
Anguished faces of recent events

Exposing self-doubt
The ineffable pink
A single lotus blossom

Stripped bare
Another child cries, drown out
Rumors soaked in rain

Humanity kowtowing
Bamboo sprouts
Against the horizon

Slowly dredged from the sulphur
Pits of arms and hell
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Douched in bilge water

The ancient art of raku masters
Resurrected, resilient
. . .among the ashes
Broken wishbones and charred carrion
Prey

Seattle’s Red Square (an installation)
A pristine fall gathering at first sight
No more than ten people
Swatches of red, edged white and black
Ribbons

Without words
Hands intertwined
Human circles
Formed by a
Few
The dozens, many
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Friends among strangers, straggling
Silence and crashing waves repeat
Cawing of sea gulls swooping in overhead
Wiping a
Way for the tears
Overwhelming roars
A commercial jetliner passes from sight
In aerie unison
Heads snap nervous
Beseeching

A sky in the wake of calm
No peace
No hints of healing

Not yet

Relief from a world and
Uncertain promises, the terror
Knowing
We saw
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What remained

Awakened forever

A Visitation (performance art)
Voluble matrons
Apathetic daughters in tow
Over deeper waters

Seizing

Women anointing
Promises of an infinite birth
Jerked out from under
Death and birthing abdication
Shaking the stars
For none and
To no avail
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Threnody, Too
(To Astraea and Taylor)
Drive-in gospel
Had me waiting
Several days I
Now feel so sad—
A bad cold, every
Thing went
Through, sudden-like
And a boy loved
Very much,
Carrying me
Across sky and
Hospital,
Totally in
His hug,
Warm holds
Tighter I fight
Strength in his
Arms, feeling me
Worthies him
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Self my all life
Spilled, spending
His arms
Him, no, never
I worry
None and all,
Thinking I died,
Understanding every
Nothingness, cold
Feverish, sudden
Like clear
Feverish
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Jakarta Daydreams
(To Tjan and Ibeng)

parking the car
in the basement boom-box
bombed echoes, he do not know what
is going on, a bit confuse when
we see us get round windows
finding out
happening all around

offices operate with castrated precision
as usual, the
traffic, open
at one side/
--long queue stick-people stuck in drive—
slowly passing
by your embassy

so, yesterday
in Jakarta, a bom explodes
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our office
a few hundred feet, metered away

white
big
clouds-like
mushroomed with heads and ears
heated by sounds like
closed thunder, our building shaking like
having an earthquake seizure
horrible, how many people
dyed batik and some even injured
peace of humans
scattering around
these places, cars
motorcycles burn
fenced ruins
leaning on diplomatic shadows
windows, the glass surrounding
the buildings mostly destroy
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one, friends
hurt, peace because he worked to close. the windows
and our private TV stations used that
holes shot more cameras into/
confounded embassy

why people deal
kill in
words traded, centered
Bali-bailed J. W. Marriot
Australian-sheeped businesses
what next
looking I think
for windows and widows
and winded,
won in sluggish singsongs
now
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Recognitions and Revitalizations
In a world returned,
Reinvigorated,
Where everyone is deemed vital, important
Old arguments cease to wield power,
For the very words themselves convey little meaning,
Having died out before springing from the tips of wagging tongues.
As one joins with the many,
New melodies break forth, and
Differences fade, eventual disappear
--like stains bleached in sunlight.
As the oldest of tricks gives way and are lost forever,
A splendid synergy of voices prevail,
And a redoubtable new order is rendered in splendor.
Only then with a new morning come
Darkness will vanish
And music universal
--like crystal-clear rains
breaking through the cloud cover,
pouring forth an endless stream of vitality—
And we shall not know what is upon us, or
What it is.
--only that is not ours but remains an integral part of us,
a perfect sweetness to off-set the bitter of earlier times.
A sense of charity in sharing reborn
Rises within the depths of our being,
And the world is created anew.
Pulled into an awesome whirlpool of
New beginnings and much-welcomed endings,
Might we revel in a newfound circularity of which we are,
One and all,
Vital.
In pleasure or in pain,
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I can no longer stand to the side,
Hide in the shadows for fear of
Shrinking as I
Relinquish my old ways.
Bear witness now, as
I plunge, head-first, into far deeper waters than I have ever tread
--into a life, some may someday judge, well-lived.
And as I do so,
From the depths of evening silence,
Stars begin to smile, then laugh uproariously
As they whisper among themselves in unbroken perfection.
As our individual trysts promote a marvelously complex harmony,
Our songs swaddle the world as we might now conceive it
In blanketed sleep, restorative
--a sleep that leads to further enlightenment
Even as it gingerly nudges us deeper and deeper,
And the ineffable pink of lotus petals begin to droop.
With sunlight, morning gives way to the ripple of birds in song
The lotus pushes through the murk and gloom
To rise again.
Even the butterflies stretch their diaphanous sails
Upon seas of light
As the perfumed jasmine and lilies, likewise, rise up on a crest of waves.
As the penetrating rays of light shatter golden with every cloud,
As rainbows scatter their treasure in profusion,
We find ourselves armored
--secure with the strength never to disown or deny another
nor bend in submission to the insolent might of injustice.
A tremendous joy possesses our hearts,
As seeds of hope become sprouts worthy of nourishing our soul,
As buds of potential blossom, giving way to individual gifts of beauty,
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As the fragrance of ripening flowers spread far and wide,
Reminding all of a renewed fruitfulness and abundance
That make for the brilliant texture of the fabric of our being.
Lingering overhead,
The air grows heavy with such perfumes
--and with the sweet presence of
promises kept and renewed in union.
As old wounds heal,
We finally accept our rightful positions, together,
at once and
as one.
As we strive to make this, our world, a better place
I hear muttered from the shadows:
Is this a promise
fulfilled for one and all,
Now and forevermore.

122 disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory

Uninsured
Hysterical laughing, lunging up and down in bed, even the planks in the floor give
way and my legs again squeeze closed, tight performing a dance meant to fool
only old men to shriek not in ecstasy but lamentations echoed against four chilled
childless walls with screams of blood--worse of murder--erect themselves, but
ever so supple to the touch, only now supported by my two swollen hands limp
and hiding the conveniences of unpeeled masks that whisper mockery, hold down
my shame. No going back. Only retreats to the streets where pedicures and
pedestrians tram no notice, seen drunk I despair down alleyways, stumbling into
highways sideways meant for sleep and another day urged my head beneath a
pillow of dizzying rings setting my ass afire sobbing before my eyes sunk deep
into my head wide-opened newspapers transfixed crucifixions burnishing against
storefront windows widow the hunting haunting portraits sprinkled of spectres
injuring my insults, parsed without progression, direction overwhelming, viewing
myself and vying for my attentions confused fashions and the lights survived
chaotic intentions in hysterical laughing, lunging …

Capitalism and “Blithedale”: Exploring Hawthorne’s Response to
19th Century American Capitalism
KYLE G. PHILLIPS
Berea College

Introduction
On April 8, 1843, renowned American novelist Nathaniel Hawthorne sat
before his private journal, penning his recollections of Brook Farm, the
Massachusetts utopian community experiment in which he had participated for
some months. The community, a bold experiment in communal living, was
started just two years preceding Hawthorne’s journal writing by Unitarian
minister George Ripley as part of the growing Transcendentalist movement.
Intensely dissatisfied with an increasingly urban and, arguably, morally depraved
lifestyle, Hawthorne had opted almost two years preceding the night he wrote in
his journal to join Brook Farm, located in West Roxbury, Massachusetts.
Hawthorne arrived at the community on April 12, 1841, choosing to depart about
a year afterwards. The experiment, conceived out of a spirit of general
disenchantment with the city, had ultimately proven to be an utter financial and
social failure, and yet, Hawthorne felt that the experiment in which he had
participated needed to be recorded, writing in his diary that night that, “We talked
of Brook Farm, and the singular moral aspects which it presents, and the great
desirability that its progress and developments be observed and its history
written”.1
This wish for a public narrative of Brook Farm came to fruition some nine
years after Hawthorne recorded it in his journal, when his oftentimes overlooked
novel, The Blithedale Romance was published in Great Britain and the United
States. Recognized as being a loosely-fictionalized version of Brook Farm and the
occurrences of its participants, it remains one of the most consequential pieces of
literature in its attempts to understand and conceptualize the dramatic rise of the
city in the nineteenth century United States. Hawthorne skillfully uses the text
community to mirror his own experiences at Brook Farm, and in so doing, offers
an unparalleled account of societal, reformative answers to the supposed moral
transgressions of the city.
Essentially, as a result of the unprecedented rise in urbanism, the U.S.
public was left struggling with vastly altered lifestyles and grappling with how the
new, urbanized environment would come to redefine their perceptions of pure,
1
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moral living. Many argued that the city was a place fundamentally void of the
strong morals and ethics that defined rural life, a place where profit and
commercialism reigned supreme over human decency, with the dollar superseding
the fair, ethical treatment of other people. Others pointed to prostitution and the
supposed sexual immorality of the urban environment in their indictments of the
city.
This paper, then, seeks to explore the problem of popularly-circulated
notions of immorality in the city, focusing specifically on prostitution and the
ways in which capitalism often took precedence over the humane treatment of
others. It will examine how these two ethical dilemmas plagued the American city
and caused nineteenth century Americans to deem the city as a place generally
fraught with immorality. Finally, it will explore Hawthorne’s particular
navigation of these issues by critically examining their impact on the characters of
his novel, paying particular attention to the ways in which urban immorality
ultimately claimed the life of Zenobia.
The Price of Wealth: Capitalism versus Compassion
In 1984, Princeton University history professor Sean Wilentz published Chants
Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 17881850. The text, since heralded as a deeply significant analysis of the working poor
in New York City, received rave reviews from historical organizations and
societies for being, as the New York Times wrote, a “celebrated study of the rise of
the working class in the early Republic”.2 Wilentz’s text is especially useful in
expressing the ways in which the desire for monetary gain at the hands of the
elect left the working poor of the city destitute. As the novel alludes to in Miles
Coverdale’s fleeing of the city for a simpler life, the city was often regarded by
nineteenth century contemporaries as a place of over-commercialization, where
the quest for financial stability and gain often outweighed the fair and humane
treatment of those less fortunate.
Through the publication of Chants Democratic, Wilentz joined a growing
host of historians and other scholars concerned with the class struggles and
inhumane treatment of the nineteenth century worker. His research alludes to the
idea that one of the dominating frustrations with the growing U.S. city stemmed
from the dehumanizing treatment enacted by the wealthy business owners and
managers on the working classes. The city, in its unquenchable appetite for
financial gain, was the birthplace of the cramped, stifling and unsafe
manufacturing plants known contemporarily as sweat shops. These squalid
2
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workplaces would come to define nineteenth century cities, and the abhorrent
working conditions remain today one of the most stirring images when picturing
the flaws of the city. Wilentz writes that the emergence of these factories grew
out of the desire on the part of business owners to maximize their profits without
investing in such expenditures as ample space or proper ventilation for the
comfort of their employees. They were, basically, a prime example of the
“financial gain over all else” mentality that populated the cities and earned them
the reputation as a place of vice and moral debauchery.
Indeed, Wilentz goes into great detail in his narratives on working
conditions within the city, writing at one point of the much wealthier, male
overseers of the nearly universally impoverished women workers. He writes, “the
great villain of the system was the contractor himself, the ‘sweater’, the
‘remorseless sharper and shaver’, who in league with the cruel landlord fed
greedily on the labor of poor women and degraded journeymen”.3 Conditions like
these, as well as the explicit commercialism in the forms of constant, bombarding
advertisements sparked the belief that the city was a place focused solely, or else
predominantly, on wealth and financial prosperity, without regard to common
humanity or the ethical treatment of others.
Further, these displays of immorality were eventually on full public
display, free to influence Americans, especially those already in the city. Take, for
instance, one account detailed by Wilentz. In an entire section of a chapter called
“The Sweated Trades: Clothing, Shoes and Furniture,” he details efforts by
investigative journalists to expose the abysmal sweat shop conditions. He writes,
“In 1845, the New York Daily Tribune prepared a series of reports on the
condition of labor in New York. What the Tribune reporters found shocked them,
and they groped for explanations—especially to account for the outrageous under
bidding and exploitation that riddled the city’s largest trades”.4
An added component to the horrific stories of abuse and unethical
treatment of workers resulted from the alleged sex abuse levelled at the women
and young girls who staffed the sweat shops. As a result of these abuses of power,
the female employees not only contended with the stifling heat, abysmal
overcrowding, unsafe conditions and cruel treatment from superiors, but were also
seen as sexual prey by many of their superiors. Wilentz writes, “The seamstresses
and tailors’ wives-- consigned the most wearisome work (shirt sewing worst of
all) and subjected to the bullying and occasional sexual abuse of the contractors—
bore the most blatant exploitation”.5 While Wilentz seems to allude that this form
of abuse was the exception, not the rule, it was still widespread enough to merit
3
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mention, and the sexual abuse he details furthers the claim that the city’s
industrial powerhouses contented themselves with maximizing profit, regardless
of the human cost.
Stemming from this debate and the common conception that the city’s
emphasis on greed and financial gain for the elite out powered any common sense
of humanity or morality is the investigation of the tenement housing system.
Extensive research and scholarship, both contemporarily and historically, has
been devoted to the tenement houses of urban environments, especially that of
New York City. The seminal piece of this tenement scholarship, journalist Jacob
Riis’s How the Other Half Lives, outlines the various examples he encountered of
tenement houses in New York in the late nineteenth century. He wrote of the
squalor, cramped spaces (in one instance, Riis expressed the frustration of being
in so small a tenement room that he could not fit his camera equipment in it), lack
of access to light and ventilation or habitable conditions. Riis detailed his exploits
both in text and images, describing the houses as places devoid of “neatness,
order, cleanliness” and those of “reckless slovenliness, discontent, privation, and
ignorance”.6 As a result of these abject conditions, owners enjoyed profits nearly
unprecedented in other common business ventures. For instance, Riis reported
that, commonly, the rent for these deplorable conditions often amounted to “seven
dollars and a half a month, more than a week’s wages”,7 although some families
managed to rent for around five dollars a month, still an exorbitant amount of
money for the city’s poor,8 especially when judged in comparison to the
conditions those sums afforded families.
Throughout his collection, Riis argues that the willingness and
complacency of the tenants of these houses de-incentivized the owners from
taking action to improve conditions. His position is that the owners of the
countless tenement houses generally refused to accommodate their tenants with
decent living spaces because there was no financial incentive to do so. When,
eventually, government officials forced tenement owners to reform their
properties to benefit the welfare of the residents, tenement owners across New
York City offered intense rebuttals and protestations, with Riis writing that legal
reformations came “not without opposition; obstacles were thrown at the officials
on one side by the owners of the tenements, who saw in every order to repair or
clean up only an item of added expense”.9 The result of this focus on monetary
gain had real consequences on the city’s impoverished people; the abhorrent
living conditions, as Riis points out, resulted in so many deaths that the city’s
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mortality rate significantly increased “from 1 in 41.83 in 1815, to 1 in 27.33 in
1855, a year of unusual freedom from epidemic disease”.10
Finally, Riis makes an intriguing connection between these tenement
conditions and the other vices that characterized New York City. In his
introduction to How the Other Half Lives, Riis quotes an official of the Prison
Association of New York who, in an 1863 testimony on efforts to determine the
causes of the recent crime spikes, said, “By far the largest part—eighty percent
at least—of crimes against property and against the person are perpetrated by
individuals who have either lost connection with home life, or never had any, or
whose homes had ceased to be sufficiently separate, decent and desirable”.11 It
was the conviction of this official, which Riis would echo twenty-seven years
later in How the Other Half Lives that the tenements were not only vices in
themselves, but they were also sources of additional vices, including, no doubt,
prostitution. Riis felt that “New York made sure at that early stage of the inquiry:
the boundary line of the Other Half lies through the tenements”.12 As such, he
reasoned that, by the reformation of these centers of vice, the city could begin
efforts to reform its immorality on a larger scale. However, these efforts were
hampered by owners fearful of losing profit in the process of repairing the broken
homes.
In short, Riis’s acclaimed text furthers the commonly-held belief by
nineteenth century contemporaries that the city was a place that valued
commercialism and monetary gain over common humanity, which certainly
presents a moral impasse. From the tenement house owners to those of the sweat
shops, each showed the poor rural migrant, fresh into the city, that their value as a
human was second to the value of their dollar or work, their ability to further the
owner’s agenda; he or she could be nothing more than mere hands in ensuring
profit for their wealthy and powerful overseers. The squalid conditions of the
tenements and sweatshops demonstrated, in no uncertain terms, that their
principal worth was merely to further the financial aims of the already privileged.
Further, situations like the tenements or sweatshops fundamentally stripped the
urbanite of his or her identity; he or she became nothing more than members of
the anonymous horde, relegated to having no real identity as he would in the
country, which was a landscape that cherished the individual in a much more
profound way than the masses of the city could have. Thus, it comes as no
surprise that the rapidly growing and changing city was ingrained in the American
conscience as a place where people were little valued aside from being mere
‘hands’ in the factory, as the city’s inhabitants were much more interested in
pursuing their own financial greed.
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To be sure, however, the city would occasionally witness bouts where
campaigns for more ethical and fair treatment of workers gained traction and
prevalence. Wilentz, for instance, lists several societies that emerged in New York
mid-century whose exclusive aim was to usher in legislation, policies and
practices that would serve to create a more favorable atmosphere for the city’s
laborers. The organizations, including the General Society and the American
Institute of the City of New York,13 sought to end indiscriminate firings and the
infringement on “equal rights”.14 Certainly, 19th century New York City was an
especially important undertaking, then, given the huge numbers of immigrants
pouring into Ellis Island daily. In what has been since recognized as a hyperclassed society, immigrants were widely viewed with condescension and distrust,
something the aforementioned societies initially sought to remedy by ensuring
protection from the classist and culturally homogenous New York power structure
that often attempted to indiscriminately fire or otherwise manipulate immigrant or
lower class workers.
Despite the benevolence typically associated with these organizations,
however, they were often nothing more than mere vehicles for further capitalist
gain. Wilentz writes that “It was not that the Institute men—any more than the
General Society, lien-law reformers, or the anti-auctioneers—felt any
ambivalence about capitalist expansion: they welcomed it, provided the masters
had their share of sound bank credit”.15 The true aim of these organizations, then,
was not to protect the city’s working poor; rather it was to ensure that the
financial aims and objectives of the elite, male working class were furthered. For
example, Wilentz goes on to write that, “all these groups were interested in
making America and the New World safe for craft capitalists” and that “the
masters emphasized the need to advance their own interests for the good of the
entire trade—not simply to hold on to their opportunities but to enlarge them”.16
This point is illustrated quite well in the history of The American Institute for the
City of New York. The Institute, founded in 1838, was one whose vast majority
of members were inventors. These men sought to develop new technologies to
mechanize agriculture and production at the cost of the marginalized working
class, who would almost certainly find themselves unemployed at every new
mechanical development that could replace them. Despite this, the Institute
vociferously advocated for the protection of domestic production, and, by effect,
American jobs, thus appealing to many of the working-class New Yorkers who in
reality were most harmed by the Institute’s other efforts. Thus, despite the
argument that lobbying organizations such as these existed to protect the working
13
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classes from the greediness of the city’s wealthy elite, in truth even these groups
sought to further their own agenda and line their own pocketbooks, making the
city’s struggle between capitalism and common humanity inescapable.
Sexual Immorality in the City
Another ethical problem presented itself as the American city continued to
prosper: that of the sex trade and prostitution. Early in April 1836, a New York
City prostitute named Helen Jewett was murdered in an upscale brothel on
Thomas Street. The murder, and the gruesome fashion in which it was enacted,
brought with it increased and widespread speculation and investigation into one of
the city’s most seedy underbellies: the sex trade. Twenty two years later, in 1858,
and likely as a result of the attention garnished by the Jewett murder, Dr. William
Sanger’s piece, The History of Prostitution, Its Extent, Causes and Effects
Throughout the World was published. Sanger embarked on this ambitious project,
as contemporary scholar Rebecca Yamin writes, “with the ultimate purpose of
curing a perceived societal evil”.17 In many ways, Sanger’s condemnation of the
sex trade industry as a social pestilence reflects the pervading sense of rejection of
society’s oldest profession, which had seen an overwhelming increase in numbers.
Sanger’s rejection of prostitution and sex work was certainly not uncommon, born
in part out of the rather prudish Victorian mindset. However, at a deeper level,
society rejected this line of work because of the hazards associated with it. Just as
women were frequent recipients of abuse, both physical and sexual in the
industrial sectors of the city, so too were they abused and commoditized in
prostitution. The profession required a certain degree of risk, as the Jewett
murder so graphically detailed. Further, it entailed that the woman not be
recognized as part of humanity; she was, quite simply, a commodity.
Sanger’s argument, then, hinged on the belief that prostitution was a
“moral pestilence”, one that threatened “every man, woman and child in the
community”.18 Though intensive legal work was done in attempts to ward off the
supposedly unethical profession, the profits associated with it in the city were,
more often than not, too sweet to pass by. Yamin, for instance, details an
indictment dating back to 1843 in which a New Yorker by the name of John
Donohue was charged with operating a brothel in the city. The indictment, which
charged that Donohue had operated a “disorderly house, viz.—a rest for
prostitutes and others of ill name and fame” went to trial on October 30th.
Donohue was found guilty and faced harsh punishment.19
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For scores of people across the city, men and women, the prospect of
making a quick buck by engaging in prostitution or harboring prostitutes was
worth the risk of prosecution, as well as the societal stigma and immorality that
Sanger railed against. He hoped, through the statistical components of his work,
to be “armed with data” so as to better legally “regulate the pestilence”,
recognizing, much to his chagrin, that it would likely be impossible to eradicate
it.20 As a result, “the preservation of female honor”, as well as the general
morality of the city, were likely to be forever tainted by “those who frequent these
haunts of vice”.21
For decades, prostitution in the United States had been assessed through
the prudish Victorian framework of morality, one that Sanger embodied, and
consequently summarily rejected as an acceptable or even condonable trade or
industry. Jacqueline Shelton observed in her Evil Becomes Her that there was a
fundamental shift in the nineteenth century public’s perceptions of the sex trade,
moving from the notion that prostitution, while not ideal, allowed men to rid
themselves of their innate, savage instincts, to a much less forgiving ideology: one
that rejected prostitutes and their trade as being fundamentally void of morality
and worthy of deep and immediate reformation. Women, who comprised an
overwhelming majority of urban prostitutes, were attributed as having little to no
sexual desires, existing purely as vessels for male enjoyment. Thus, it can come as
no surprise that prostitutes, visible symbols of female sexuality and failures of
morality, were under special criticism in the city. Those opposed to the city and
its moral transgressions specifically cited prostitution as one of the principal vices
inhibiting good, moral, and all too often, Christian lifestyles.
Adding fuel to this hatred and vitriol of prostitution, and, by effect, the
prostitutes themselves, American society, in both urban and rural settings,
condemned the sex trade as a sort of catalyst of other forms of societal ills. The
context of the mid-nineteenth century U.S. was one of insurmountable poverty,
disease, unemployment and ethnic tensions, found a familiar scape-goat in
prostitutes like Helen Jewett. It was, as Shelton commented, that “the very
profession provided Americans with an explanation, disease, and unemployment
among the poorest classes”, and that “Americans accepted prostitution as a
‘necessary evil’ discussed in terms of Victorian morality”.22 In essence, problems
of the 19th century U.S., including rampant cholera, smallpox, typhus, and yellow
fever epidemics, were pinned on prostitutes under the guise that their contact with
others spread those diseases. In other absurd instances, prostitutes took the brunt
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of the blame for corrupting the men with whom they did business or in other ways
encouraged moral transgressions.
Still more justifications for condemning the prostitution industry,
particularly in the cities, emerged from the ways in which the profession was
perceived to challenge the rigid gender roles of the nineteenth century. Rather
than view prostitutes as victims of a society bent on the oppression of women,
nineteenth century Americans saw these fallen angels as challengers to the
established, set and staunchly defended roles of men and women. Prostitution
served as one of the few ways in which women in the city could amply provide
for themselves and, if applicable, their children, independent of a man. The
prostitute’s ability to leave the home and earn wages that were, in many cases,
comparable to men of similar classes, served as a hugely damaging detriment to
the pre-conceived gender roles. Take for instance, Mary Hall, whom Shelton
describes as an entrepreneur of sorts. Hall established a brothel in Washington,
D.C. in the late 1830s that soon became a profitable place of business for both the
city’s elected elite and common man. While Shelton concedes that Hall and her
business were well tolerated in the city because of the way in which Hall was able
to profit, her marked departure from traditional gender roles irked many
opponents of the city, who argued that the woman’s role was not on the streets, or,
for that matter, in the sweat shops; rather, she was to remain at home.
Undoubtedly, this concept was especially true for the upper-class women who, in
the hyper-patriarchal society of 19th century America, would never have been
permitted to work in a sweat shop or run a brothel, lest that employment harm her
family’s social standing. In this sense, it seems that upper-class women were
curiously inoculated against the immorality of the city, leaving other less
fortunate women, often desperate to provide even the most basic and rudimentary
needs for herself and her family, to bear the brunt of the social ire. Any departure
from these roles was viewed with contempt, another example of the city’s
polluting effect on established moral principles and societal expectations.
Hawthorne’s Solution: Examining Utopian Communities and The Blithedale
Romance
It was the moral dilemmas like these that prompted Hawthorne and his peers to
found Brook Farm. Seeking to escape the stifling sense of capitalism that
dominated the American city, Hawthorne and his “knot of dreamers” as he would
refer to their fictional counterparts, sought to escape the hectic, overlycommercialized for the more normative simplistic, agrarian lifestyle. They were,
in many senses, united in their belief that, as Hawthorne wrote to his wife from
Brook Farm in June 1841, “a man’s soul may be buried and perish under a dung-
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heap or in a furrow of the field, just as well as under a pile of money”.23 Their
experiences at Brook Farm would eventually evolve into the fictionalized
account, The Blithedale Romance. Hawthorne, acknowledging the capitalist and
sexual immoralities that manifested themselves in the city, sought to discuss their
solution in the novel by establishing characters frustrated by the transgressions of
the city in an idealized community: Blithedale. Ultimately, his texts asserts that
these transgressions cannot be escaped because they are internalized by those who
fled it. These failures to achieve Blithedale’s aims, paired with the dysfunction
that wracked the relationships there ultimately led to the dissolution of the
community and, most significantly, the death of Zenobia.
The ambitions of the Brook Farm community that would come to inspire
Blithedale were, as scholar Maura D’Amore suggests in her Suburban Plots: Men
at Home in Nineteenth-Century American Print Culture, an attempt toward the
ideal communal lifestyle encouraged by the French philosopher Charles Fourier
and his American counterparts, like Albert Brisbane. The intervention that this
group sought to enact at Brook Farm, and the one eventually suggested in
Hawthorne’s novel was to, “collectively purchase land outside but within reach of
major cities in order to live according to a community system, sharing in the
mental and physical labor required to reform the world and bring happiness to all
classes and individuals”.24 D’Amore shows that Hawthorne intentionally set out
to warn his readers that Blithedale was much more than a loosely-fictionalized
account of Brook Farm however, quoting his desire that the community be as a
“theatre, a little removed from the highway of ordinary travel, where the creature
of his brain may play their phantasmagorical antics, without exposing them to too
close a comparison with the actual events of real life”.25 Despite his attempts to
divorce his own experiences at Brook Farm and those lived out in his text, the fact
remains that both were types of reform-minded interventions. It was their hope,
though problematic in practice because of the frustrations the stem from
communal living, that a return to a more rural lifestyle, one dependent on
community and based on equality and concern for others would purge the deeplyrooted immorality rampant in the city.
D’Amore focuses specifically on a new space emerging in the United
States in response to the booming cities: the suburbs. It is her contention that
Hawthorne manipulates the Blithedale community to be representative of this new
space. The suburb—part large city, part small town—are, according to her, “a
space that invites forgetfulness and invites arcadian idealism”.26 By her
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estimation, then, these peculiar spaces were seen as divorced enough from the
corrupting forces of the city so as to hearken back to the more close-knit and rural
communities that Americans had, for so long, resided in. She furthers this claim
by writing that, the suburbs were “a requiem on the part of its planners and
inhabitants for a way of living, interacting, and perceiving the world that they
deem no longer a possibility”.27
Grown out of this spirit and quest for “forgetfulness and acradian
idealism”, Blithedale hoped to present a counter to the capitalist and immoral city,
but this experiment ultimately proved to be an utter failure. The sins of the city
followed the Blithedale participants, creating the sort of discord and selfishness
that they sought to avoid. Eventually, this would lead not only to the dissolution
of the community, but to the death of Zenobia, who, upon realizing that the
immoral spirit of the city was embodied in herself and others at Blithedale, saw
no other recourse but to take her own life.
The novel begins with protagonist Miles Coverdale, an urbanite frustrated
by the oppressive city, who flees in hopes of ushering in a more pure life at the
communal Blithedale. In describing Coverdale’s retreat to Blithedale from the
city, Hawthorne writes that the city, “on either side, seemed to press too closely
upon us, insomuch that our hearts found barely room enough to throb between”.28
To repel and relieve him of this stifling effect of the city on his soul, Hawthorne
states that “when we left the pavements, and our muffled hoof-tramps beat upon a
desolate extent of country roads… then, there was better air to breathe”.29 The
Blithedale community, then, was conceived in an effort to escape the confining,
claustrophobic sense of oppression that the urban environment placed on the
human soul and sense of morality. It was the hope of its founders that, by existing
physically and spiritually apart from the city, a more idealistic, moral and pure
lifestyle could ensue, one unlikely if not impossible to transpire in the urban
environment.
Regardless of this attempt to create an ideal community, one free of the
frustrations of the city, The Blithedale Romance is a novel fundamentally centered
on the failures of humanity and failed human relationships. Despite Coverdale and
his colleagues’ desire to set up what they refer to as a “paradise”, and escape the
dingy, claustrophobic city, Blithedale’s short tenure was eventually wracked with
betrayal, dysfunctional relationships, and sins, many of which could be traced
back to the city.30
The most poignant image of these betrayals and dissolution of the
community comes with the image and eventual fate of Zenobia. Zenobia is given,
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undoubtedly, the most profound physical description of any of the characters in
the novel. Upon their initial meeting, Coverdale describes her as “identical” with
life, “dressed as simply as possible” with hair “dark, glossy, and of singular
abundance” and without “ornament, except a single flower. It was an exotic, of
rare beauty, and as fresh as if a hot-house gardener had just clipt it from the
stem”.31 These graphic, descriptive details of both Zenobia’s person and her
famous accessory, the flower, attempt to depict her, in many senses, as one of the
most pure and vivacious characters inhabiting Blithedale. Zenobia, it appears,
both through Coverdale’s descriptions and her actions, managed to more
successfully achieve the pure lifestyle that all inhabitants of Blithedale sought.
The flower, which makes a near constant appearance in Zenobia’s hair, attests to
this love of life and the idealized, simplified living Blithedale sought to
exemplify.
However, after the betrayal of some of the other inhabitants of Blithedale,
principally Hollingsworth, and following her own betrayal of Priscilla, Zenobia
lost not only those admirable facets of her life, but also the accessory which
symbolized them. After Hollingsworth betrayed Zenobia by revealing that,
despite their intimacy, his real love was Priscilla, Zenobia fell into a state of deep
depression; by the night’s end, she had committed suicide by drowning herself in
the river near Blithedale.
Hollingsworth was not the only one to infiltrate the idealized lifestyle of
Blithedale. In another, more explicit representation of the city, Professor
Westervelt’s visit with Zenobia at Blithedale likely served as another contributor
to her downfall. Westervelt’s private discussion with Zenobia regarded Priscilla,
who had served, unwillingly, as a sort of indentured servant to Westervelt. She
was abused and manipulated by Westervelt into becoming the “Veiled Lady,” a
spectacle that drew men in to pay to watch her. Westervelt, essentially, prostituted
Priscilla out, who, in turn, sought refuge and redemption at Blithedale. Thus,
when he attempted to convince Zenobia to sell Priscilla out, therefore returning
her to service, Zenobia initially resisted, attempting to save Priscilla from the
abuse and humiliation that would accompany her return to the life of the “Veiled
Lady.” Westervelt, in their private, wooded area, with only Coverdale covertly
listening, asked Zenobia, “Why not fling the girl off, and let her go?” Zenobia
responded, maternally, that “She clung to me from the first. I neither know nor
care what it is in me that so attaches her. But she loves me, and I will not fail
her”.32
Despite this initial defense of Priscilla and her adamancy that she will not
betray her, Zenobia eventually relented, giving the girl over to her captor. In so
doing, Zenobia fell victim to the predominate “sins” of the city aforementioned;
31
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not only did she give Priscilla up for prostitution, but she also tacitly approved of
Westervelt’s mission of financial gain above all else, including the care for his
fellow humans. The result of her betrayal of Priscilla served as her own moral
degradation; she had become, despite all of her efforts, the morally deficient
person of the city she sought to escape at Blithedale. Indeed, several critics of the
text, D’Amore included, have pointed to Hawthorne’s choice to depict Blithedale
as a “Modern Arcadia” and its participants as “A Knot of Dreamers” as indicative
of a criticism against the Blithedale inhabitants’ vision as one plagued by class
tensions.33 It would appear, then, through this criticism, that Hawthorne implicitly
informed the reader that the influences of the city that will eventually claim
Zenobia as a victim would be present in the community despite the reform efforts.
Zenobia’s death, however, was not merely the result of Hollingsworth’s
infidelity, Westervelt’s ownership or her own betrayal of Priscilla. Rather, it was
the final acknowledgement that she could not escape the selfish, sinful and
immoral lifestyle of the city; as a result, she eventually falls victim to the city
itself, principally because she is fundamentally an urbanite. It seems that
Zenobia, despite valiant efforts to escape the influences of the city, ultimately was
futile in her attempts to escape her own urbanity and, thus, moral transgressions.
She recognized that Hollingsworth’s deceit and betrayal, paired with Westervelt’s
abuse of Priscilla and her own inability to protect her were similar to the sins
enacted in the city; that, despite the efforts at Blithedale to live a pure, honest,
simple life, Westervelt, Hollingsworth and herself had betrayed that, helping to
usher in the moral decline of the community. Thus, Westervelt and
Hollingsworth, as images and representatives of the vices of the city, led Zenobia
to utter desolation. Convinced by their collective actions that there was no real
escape from the selfish, capitalist nature and deceit of the city, she opted to drown
herself in the river. She had fallen to the degradation of the city that she had, for
so long, sought to avoid.
As a result of these recognitions, Hawthorne portrayed the city as a place
whose very nature was to subvert morality and frustrate efforts to live a morally
pure and just life. Zenobia’s downfall, traced back to these remnants of the city’s
immorality and influences at Blithedale, led her to the ultimate realization that its
influences were not contained to the physical space it occupied. Rather, the
selfishness and carnality that characterized the city was embodied in its
inhabitants, even long after they had left. This resulted in the numerous betrayals
that occurred at Blithedale, for Pricilla’s return to a form of prostitution to further
the financial aims of Westervelt and the other circumstances that ushered in the
decline of the Blithedale community. Zenobia’s eventual fall was not just the
realization of her own decline into the city’s influences, but also the desperation
33
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upon realizing that the nature of the city forced meaningful change to be nearly
impossible to obtain.
In short, Westervelt and Hollingsworth, and, to an extent, Zenobia herself,
all embodiments of the city, continuously reminded Zenobia of the deeply
immoral aspects of the urban environment and their inability to escape them.
Westervelt’s prostitution of Priscilla and Zenobia’s own guilt in selling her out,
paired with the deception and infidelity of Hollingsworth, so pained and deflated
Zenobia’s attempts at living a more ethical, pure lifestyle, that she saw no
recourse other than taking her own life. In the hours preceding her death, Zenobia
confides to Coverdale that “I have been on trial for my life”; Blithedale was
effectively Zenobia’s last chance at the lifestyle she dreamed of, and when the
vices she sought to escape follow her in the forms of Westervelt and
Hollingsworth, she realized that the experiment had failed and resorted to taking
her own life.34
It is, of course, also necessary to examine Zenobia’s own distinct urbanity.
A product of the city, Zenobia was well-regarded throughout it as an
exceptionally beautiful woman, one belonging to the higher social classes before
her Blithedale sojourn. Her urban lifestyle is perhaps no better demonstrated than
in the examination of her family dynamic. It is revealed late in the novel that
Zenobia’s father is Moody, also known as Fauntleroy, and her sister is Priscilla.
Zenobia remains ignorant of these relations in a type of anonymity that only the
crowded nature of the city could afford. While it is true that the city ultimately
ushered in Zenobia’s downfall and demise, it was also the facilitator for the
relative wealth she experienced. Moody, described as once wealthy but now
deeply impoverished, left his daughter Zenobia at a young age. Through the
anonymity of the city, she was able to live her entire life rather sheltered from the
man and his poverty and enjoy a life of relative financial ease. Thus, the city and
its tendencies to strip individuals of their identities, not only served as Zenobia’s
eventual killer, but also enables her fortune.
Final Reflections on the City and Blithedale
In closing, it is important to once again consider the motivations behind the
aforementioned reform movements. The city, in all of its industrial and capitalist
might, was seen by many, perhaps even a plurality of Americans, not just as a
place of invention and progress, but also as a place fundamentally void of the
strict moral principles that characterized rural living. Whether through prostitution
and other manifestations of sexual immorality or through the urban area’s
34
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intensive focus on capitalism and furthering personal wealth, regardless of the
human price involved, the city was unquestionably a place that vastly altered the
Victorian sense of morality that had previously characterized the United States.
In response to these perceived moral crises, Hawthorne joined a growing
crowd of Americans who sought reformation in efforts to purge society of its ills.
As part of these efforts, The Blithedale Romance affirmed that the influences and
moral transgressions of the city were ultimately inescapable and profound in their
impact on its inhabitants. Through the death of Zenobia, Hawthorne posits that
attempts to cultivate a more ethical, idealized lifestyle like the one embodied in
the Blithedale community were not only futile, but destructive. Her death was the
result of her final acknowledgement that any attempts to frustrate or disrupt the
city’s sins were futile, that the moral vacuum of the city could not be defeated.
Zenobia ultimately realized that this immorality was not merely confined to the
physical space of the city; rather, it was embodied and internalized by urbanites,
therefore making it impossible to escape even when divorced from the city and
placed in a utopian community like Blithedale.
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Financialization and Social Theory: An Interview with Dr. Greta Krippner
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Greta Krippner is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of
Michigan. Her research interests include economic sociology, political sociology,
comparative and historical sociology, and social theory. She finds that state
policies created the conditions conducive to financialization that solved some
current policy dilemmas of the 1970s and 1980s, but created major weaknesses
that would ultimately fail in the new millennium. Financialization of the economy
was not a deliberate outcome sought by policymakers, but rather an inadvertent
result of the state's attempts to solve other problems, especially the stagnation and
deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s, the encouragement of foreign capital in the
US economy, and large trade imbalances caused by direct foreign investment.
disClosure Interviewers: Grace Cale and Lydia Shanklin Roll
DC: Our first question is, would you actually consider yourself a social theorist,
and why or why not?
GK: Yes, I strongly identify with social theory and think of myself as a theorist.
My identification as a theorist reflects the fact that for the kind of work I do, a
large part of the challenge is figuring out what the problem is that I’m interested
in exploring. And that is something that requires a deep engagement with theory.
As an example, starting this book project as a dissertation years ago, I was
thinking about the transition in the structure of the economy that I came to refer to
in the book as “financialization.” In setting out financialization as my problem, it
wasn’t immediately obvious what I was after and what the parameters around the
problem were. In historical research, problems tend to be open ended in this way,
and in my mind, theory is necessary in order to see what the problems are and
what is interesting about them. So, I can’t proceed with the kind of work I do
empirically without having theoretical engagement be a salient component of the
process.
DC: At what point do you make that realization, that social theory was going to
have to be something that you really had to engage with in order to do this project
well?
GK: Well, I would say, in terms of my own trajectory, it was relatively late in the
game. I didn’t come into graduate school thinking that I was a theorist. I enjoyed
the sociological theory courses I took. They were, just as for you, part of our
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required curriculum, and I took them and enjoyed them. But I related to those
courses like I did to my statistics coursework. They weren’t really key to my
intellectual identity at the time. And then in the process of developing this project,
for the reasons I’m describing, I found I was increasingly drawn towards thinking
about theoretical questions and couldn’t in fact work through some of the issues I
was interested in without that element.
DC: All right. So, how would you actually describe your work for nonsociologists?
GK: That’s a very hard question, actually. I would say that my orientation is
historical. So, I’m a historical sociologist, probably first and foremost. Which is to
say that whatever it is I’m interested in, the way for me to understand it and get
access to it is to trace its emergence, transformation, and evolution over time.
That’s how I get leverage on the questions that are of interest to me. And I’m
broadly interested in, for lack of a better term, economic questions. I say for lack
of a better term because what we think of as “economic” is too narrow, partly
because of the way the discipline of economics has defined that set of topics. So, I
am interested in economic questions and processes very broadly construed. I
suppose my research has a critical edge as well. The motivation underlying my
research is a desire, as with many scholars, to understand the choices made in the
past that have brought us to where we are now, and to make clear what those
junctures and decisions were, where there were turning points, where there were
other possibilities, to always look for the ways in which social arrangements are
more mutable than we can sometimes see when we’re focused in the present
moment. I think that is the great strength of both historical work and also social
theory, in that they enable one to be more aware where there are alternatives and
what those alternatives might look like.
DC: How would you put your current, or most recent, projects in that context, of
how social theory is brought into your work but more in a way understandable to
a general audience?
GK: So, how would I think about current work I’m doing in terms of the way that
I’ve just characterized my work generally? The current project that I’m
researching explores the emergence and evolution of the notion that we should
bear the cost of our own risk. This is a widely accepted normative principle in
market societies governing how risk should be distributed and shared. So, how did
this become an established way of thinking about how risks are distributed, when
did this come to seem like a natural way of doing things, how has it been
legitimated, and where was it contested? There are other ways of thinking about
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how risk could be shared in our society that were historically available and were
foreclosed.
DC: How would you feel that, this new work, or Capitalizing on Crisis, might fit
into a broader social theory narrative?
GK: I think another underlying issue in my work is about expanding the boundary
around the economy. One of the problems that we encounter as social scientists is
we have these categories that we think with: state, market, community, and so on,
and we tend to bound them off and treat them as pre-constructed realities. That’s a
very prominent problem in economic sociology, which is another one of my
primary intellectual identities. In economic sociology you see this kind of carving
up of the space: here’s the market, here’s the state, and so on. I think one of the
things that my work tries to do is to interrogate where the boundaries between
those spheres of activity are drawn, and how when we relax that boundary we can
see things that we don’t see as easily when we place ourselves within these
categories and treat them as natural. So, if I were to say, here’s a way in which my
work is pushing at social theory, it would be partly to think in a deep way about
what we mean when we talk about the market, as opposed to the state, and what
the relationship between those entities could be and how it has evolved, and not to
start from a preconceived notion of what either one of those things is, and to let it
emerge out of historical analysis.
DC: Might you be able to summarize some of the key findings, or some of the
biggest “take-home” messages of Capitalizing on Crisis, for our listeners who
haven’t had the privilege to discover it yet?
GK: Yes. So, the book is basically dealing with the financialization of the US
economy over the period since the 1970s. By financialization, I’m referring to the
growing importance of financial activities in the economy. The most dramatic
way to see this is to look at where profits in the US economy are generated. So, if
you are looking back at the 1950s and 1960s, financial profits as a share of total
profits in the US economy are around 15 percent. The financial sector is
significant, but does not represent an overwhelming share of profits in the total
economy. By 2001, financial sector profits are over 40% of total profits generated
in the US economy. That is a pretty dramatic change in the structure of the
economy. And that is just the financial sector itself. The other piece you could
look at, and I do look at in the book, is the financial income of non-financial
corporations. What I do in the book, beyond empirically demonstrating this shift,
is to provide an account of the state’s role in creating conditions that were
conducive to financialization. Obviously there’s a lot more going on there than
just state policy: there are changes in firm strategy, in market structure, and in
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available technologies. But my interest in the book is in thinking about the policy
environment that made the turn to finance possible. And, in a nutshell, the
argument of the book is that there were a number of discrete policy decisions that
were quite influential in shaping this outcome, but those policies decisions were
not made with the goal or objective of creating a financialized economy. They
were really ad hoc, inadvertent responses to unresolved distributional conflict in
US society as growth rates in the economy slowed. And one of the interesting
things to me about the financial crisis of 2008-2009 is that those distributional
dilemmas came right back to the surface. Financialization was not a resolution of
these problems, but a displacement of them into the future. It was a kind of
deferral. So, without going into all the details, that is essentially the story of the
book.
DC: I know that some have wondered, and this may perhaps be a little bit of a
Domhoffian argument, that given the various political groups of varying power
levels who really strongly advocated for policies that paralleled the effects of
financialization or neoliberalism, do you think that nobody really anticipated or
encouraged this result?
GK: Well, the interest group story is there. I guess the reason I chose to write the
book as I did, which is not primarily an interest group story, was because I felt
like that story has been overplayed a bit. The financial sector is obviously
incredibly powerful and has been influential in enacting policies that have served
its interests over many decades. That much is evident. But I think the way in
which that analysis can go off track is that it exaggerates, to some degree, the
coherence of the financial sector and therefore overstates its influence. So, with
respect to the particular policy junctures that I determined were most significant
for creating conditions conducive to financialization – the deregulation of the
financial sector being key – the role of the financial industry is very interesting.
First of all, the financial sector industry did not initially support financial
deregulation. They were doing quite well in the existing regulatory environment
and staunchly opposed any change. I’m talking here primarily about the removal
of interest rate ceilings from consumer savings deposits. It turns out, for reasons I
detail in the book, that this seemingly arcane change was very important in terms
of moving to an economy in which credit flowed freely. And if there’s one thing
that gets you to a financialized economy, it is having access to credit that isn’t
subject to any controls or constraints. So, with respect to that particular
deregulation, the impetus for this came not from financial sector actors but
primarily from consumers who were disgruntled that they were not getting better
rates of return on their savings. So, that’s one example. The other example that
gets a lot of attention in the financial deregulation story is Glass-Steagall, the
removal of the Depression era banking laws that required a separation between
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investment banking institutions on the one hand and commercial banking
institutions on the other. In that case, there was a long push to repeal GlassSteagall over three decades. Part of the reason that it took so long to repeal the
law was that financial sector regulations created a compartmentalized financial
system, and industries that had different roles in the financial system also had
different interests vis-à-vis legislation. And so, with efforts to repeal GlassSteagall, one industry group might push for it, but another industry group would
oppose it, and then the bill would get rewritten to accommodate the group that
was opposing it and support for the bill would flip. And that is why it took three
decades to repeal that legislation because there was no unified push behind it. To
put the point more succinctly, the financial sector, while very powerful, is not a
monolithic actor and has never been a monolithic actor. What people who are
writing this kind of narrative tend to do is to look at the total political
contributions that financial sector actors make, which are of course huge. But you
can’t go from this fact to the conclusion that the financial sector, as some kind of
cohesive whole, is exerting effective power because the financial sector itself
wants different things and is internally divided. Once Glass-Steagall was repealed
this changed somewhat, as the segmentation between different financial industries
was removed. It is now up for grabs, and what that means is the possibility for
deeper integration of financial sector actors and more cohesion. Arguably, the
financial sector has become more cohesive and more influential and powerful as a
result of this very deregulation, but that is something that occurs after the
development that I’m describing.
DC: I like that you actually just mentioned that you’ve been focusing on these
trends in particular as they started in the past. So, would you be interested in
sharing with us what you think the long-term implications of this financialization
process could be?
GK: This is where things get dark. One of the things I was thinking about as I was
writing the book is that, as Monica Prasad argues in her new book, there is no
natural constituency for financial regulation. In other words, once you move to a
situation where you have untapped credit, and you’ve given everybody a piece of
that action, then it is not just the financial sector intuitions that are benefitting
from this, it is you and me when we can go get a mortgage with almost no down
payment, and all of the ways that we subsidize our consumption. There is a very
broad societal interest, if you want to put it that way, in having an economy in
which credit is abundantly available. The downside is when you have an economy
in which credit is abundantly available, you also have an economy that is very
prone to asset price bubbles, as we’ve seen, first in the stock market and then in
housing, and the problem is that this creates a lot of volatility. And, in the
meantime, a lot of the social institutions that we’ve had in place to protect people
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from volatility, the welfare state primarily, have eroded. So, this again goes back
to the risk project we were talking about earlier: how our society handles these
risks that are generated by the market, but in an environment where there is less
regulation and more volatility. How do we cushion people from those risks? A
result of financialization is a situation where there isn’t within the political system
any constituency that is there to say, “No, we actually have to regulate these
financial markets.” There are huge political costs to doing so and huge political
benefits to being the political actor that continues to deliver credit. So, that is the
difficulty. Essentially, we have created a situation where we all have an interest
in having a lot of credit, and it is very hard to think about what the political
mechanisms are for moving away from that system even when we recognize it is
dangerous. So, the long-term implication is that we will live in an economy in
which we see more volatility, people more exposed to risk, without having the
proper mechanisms in place to protect people from those risks, other than, again,
going back to the newer research I was describing, asking people to manage on
their own, which is a departure from the way we’ve handled our affairs through
most of the 20th century.
DC: It’s interesting that you mentioned this idea of market volatility because,
throughout our discussions in the market failures seminar, we’ve discussed how
the parallel process of neoliberalism seems to relate also to market instability.
And so, because neoliberalism appears to share a lot of the same causal factors as
financialization, how would you describe the relationship between these two
concepts?
GK: Well, you warned me you were going to ask me this, and I haven’t made a
lot of progress overnight in thinking about it. I think part of the difficulty is it
depends what we mean by neoliberalism. There is the question of what we mean
by financialization too, but at least in my own mind this is clearer, because I’ve
worked in my own thinking to clarify the concept. As for neoliberalism the term
is sometimes used to mean a set of discrete policies – some approach to monetary
policy, a certain kind of tax policy, a certain approach to the welfare state –
there’s a kind of laundry list of things that we think of when we say “neoliberal.”
More broadly, the term is sometimes used to refer to what my colleague, Margaret
Somers, calls “market fundamentalism.” So, the idea that we live in a society
where there is a notion that the market is the preferred social institution by which
we address various kinds of questions, and that we rely on markets to do X, Y,
and Z. The market is privileged over the state, or community, or whatever the
alternatives are thought to be. I think that’s probably the definition of
neoliberalism with which I’m most comfortable. And if we think of it that way,
then the relationship between that idea and financialization is so close that it is
almost hard to separate them. Because the turn to finance is closely connected to
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the deregulation of the market and the growing emphasis on the market in our
society. You can see that in the chapter in the book that deals with the evolution
of monetary policy. It’s a complicated story, but I think the boiled down version is
that policymakers figured out ways of implementing monetary policy that
effectively transferred political responsibility for decisions that would constrain
the economy from the state to the market. The state was never really out of the
picture, but there was a kind of displacement of political responsibility onto the
market. And that, in essence, is a neoliberal governance strategy. So in a sense,
the things that I’m exploring with financialization are so integrally connected to
what usually gets talked about in discussions of neoliberalism that I don’t know
that I can neatly pull them apart and say that one has a causal effect on the other,
because I see them as really bound up together.
DC: So, as you know, returning a little bit to the idea of social theory, a lot of
early graduate students often struggle to determine how to select research
methods or to incorporate theory into their work. For example, you have often
referenced Bell’s works. So, how did you select the theories and methods that
were best for this project over the countless others you could have chosen?
GK: I wish I could say I was systematic, or that there is a method to my madness,
but I’m afraid it is more madness than method. Let me take your question apart by
addressing the method and the theory separately. As far as the method, to be
honest, the only way I know to begin a project is to find some problem in the
present that needs unpacking. In the case of this particular project, I began this
research as a graduate student in the late 1990s. This was the height of the socalled dot-com bubble, when there was financial news on the front page of the
newspaper nearly every day. You just couldn’t avoid it, every minute you were
getting blitzed with finance, finance, finance, and I was really intrigued. Why is
finance so salient in our culture at this particular moment? The way that most of
the accounts that I was encountering talked about it was as a stock market bubble.
And I thought the stock market was part of it, but I also believed the frothiness of
the stock market fit into something much larger. So, I had a vague intuition that
there was something there that was worth exploring, and it helped a great deal
when I met Bob Pollin, who is a heterodox economist at UMass Amherst, and he
started talking to me about “financialization.” I first learned that term from Pollin,
and once I had the term I felt like I had something I could put my hands on and
start to think about more systematically. So the first thing for me is, what is the
problem in the present that I’m trying to understand? And once I’ve figured out
what that problem in the present is, then my method is, again, always historical: I
try to move back in time and to identify the key junctures and turning points.
What was it that gave rise to this? How far am I going to trace this back? As far as
researching my dissertation, I started by going to the business library. I began
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pulling issues of Business Week off the library shelves – this was before
everything was digitized! I actually went through Business Week and read every
issue from the mid-1960s through the early 2000s. This gave me a way of
immersing myself in the period. From my reading, over many months, I was able
to identify what seemed to be the key junctures that later formed the empirical
chapters of the book. And within each chapter, the sources differ, but the method
is basically the same. So, for the monetary policy chapter, for example, I was
aware that there were transcripts from the Federal Reserve meetings, I knew the
changes in monetary policy were extremely important for financialization, and I
knew that I would have to somehow get on top of those developments and learn
about them. And so, I started reading thousands and thousands of pages of Federal
Reserve meeting transcripts, basically from beginning to end. For me, there’s
something about reading sources through – okay, here’s the January 1979
meeting, here’s the March 1979 meeting, here’s the June 1979 meeting – it gives
you the chronology, and I think once you have the chronology you can create a
narrative. Once you have a narrative, you have a theory, because you’ve
implicitly theorized to write a narrative. I mean, when you write a narrative, you
have made choices, and you may not recognize them as theoretical choices, but
they are theoretical choices. So, it’s all about finding the narrative and then
theorizing the narrative. That’s the method part of your question. The theory part
is closely related, and maybe there’s not as much to say, other than to repeat what
I just said: once you have a narrative, you have made theoretical choices. And
then it’s a question of figuring out what those theoretical choices were, and being
able to name them. And that requires reading as widely as you can. In this
particular case, as you mentioned, Daniel Bell’s work turned out to be the key for
the argument that the book makes. Actually I read Bell at the very end of the
project when I was working on the final revision of the manuscript. I had read The
Coming of the Post-Industrial Society, but I had never read The Cultural
Contradictions of Capitalism, which is really the touchstone of the book. As I was
working on the final revision, I thought I’ve got to go and read this Daniel Bell,
and the narrative that I had written was the narrative that Bell allowed me to
theorize. The questions that Bell was grappling with in the 1970s were questions
that illuminated the process that I was describing in the book so well. So, there’s a
bit of luck involved, but figuring out what the relevant pieces are and weaving it
all together is for me the most satisfying part of research.
DC: You’ve mentioned several times that you really strongly identify as a
historical sociologist. You also mentioned economic sociology, and political
economy. So, how did you particularly select your research specializations? Were
they kind of already a function of preexisting interests? Or, did you find that you
just, kind of, stumbled across them as you worked on other research projects? Or,
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might it have been something else that brought you to that realization that, you
know, ‘I can place myself within these professional categories’?
GK: Political economy was the term that I had grabbed onto as an undergraduate
to characterize my interests. Beyond that, economic sociology, historical
sociology, social theory were all things that I discovered along the way and were
not identities I had already developed when started graduate school. I didn’t even
know what economic sociology was, actually, and the same is also true of
historical sociology. I was more familiar with social theory, but as I said earlier,
this wasn’t something I identified with at the beginning in defining my interests.
So, I was a young graduate student when I started, and an unformed one, for
better or worse. Now we see students coming in with very specific ideas about
their future dissertation work, and they are much more professionalized and have
a much clearer sense of what the discipline is than was the case for me. I just had
no idea. The only thing that was constant was an orientation to political economy
questions. Everything else fell into place as I took classes, sifted through what
was interesting to me and what wasn’t, and especially, as I started to work on
research. And it was a continual process of searching, and one that was a little bit
angst ridden for me, because I never felt like I really fit anywhere, I never quite
felt like I was a card-carrying anything. I felt a little bit at the margin of all of
these areas, but over time I’ve come to feel quite the contrary, that I inhabit all of
them quite comfortably. So, that is just a process that takes time, or took time in
my case, and I think it is good to be open to the journey. It seems to me that
we’ve gotten overly anxious about getting people stamped as soon as they walk in
the door. I don’t think that’s necessarily conducive to having the best intellectual
experience.
DC: That is all we have for you. Thank you for coming to speak with us.
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DC: We were interested in knowing why you decided to study economics. What
inspired you to study economics?
PT: I was an undergraduate at Swarthmore College, outside of Philadelphia, and it
ran something called the honors program where you only took two seminars a
semester there. With it being a small college, there were student-faculty teas, and
I was persuaded by a friend of mine to go to one of them. By the time of this
student-faculty tea, I had had some economics, and at this event I met an
economics teacher that I thought was totally fascinating. I wanted to take one of
his seminars. But because there were so few seminars, in order to get a seminar
from him I had to become an economics major. So I became an economics major.
DC: Wow, just to take a class with him. What was the name of the professor?
PT: His name was William Brown. He died prematurely. I had always been a
math major with an economics and a history minor, but then I became an
economics major with a math and a history minor. I studied economics to take his
seminar—which was wonderful; it was well worth it. And when I decided what I
wanted to do later, economics had really attracted me and I decided to go further
into economics. Good teachers are the key to everything.
DC: To go along with the social theory theme, how do you see your work as part
of social theory?
PT: Well I am an economist, but I am also a historian. Thus, I look at both
economy and history, but I am not totally sure what social theory is. I am aware
that the models of economists capture only part of the experience of people and
therefore one needs to bring in other factors for further explanations of things. For
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example, my presidential address to the Economics History Association was
entitled, ‘Is it Kosher to Talk About Culture?’ Thus I try to broaden out a bit.
DC: So, which is your theoretical approach, or how do you place yourself within
economics and history, if it is possible?
PT: As an economist, I tend to approach things from the point of view of
economists, looking at data, prices, and evidence about how people are acting.
But I am also aware of the political and cultural context in which people are
operating. I try to consider that economics is embedded (what may be considered
a loaded or dangerous term to use) in society.
DC: Well, the themes of this year’s class is ‘Market Failures, Famines and
Recessions’ And we were interested on hearing your perspective on, in theory,
what is a market failure?
PT: A market failure is where people are not able to do what they want at the
existing prices. The purpose of a market is to bring people who want to supply
goods and services, together with people who want those goods and services.
When the market works you get an equilibrium, where supply equals demand, and
a price in one form or another. A market failure is when the suppliers and
demanders cannot get together to make that agreement. What I am going to talk
about this afternoon is unemployment, people who want to work at the existing
wage but cannot find jobs.
DC: Can the market self-regulate? Or is this an assumption of liberal economics?
How does this idea affect our understanding of what a market failure means?
PT: The market is a very abstract concept. I will make a bold statement but there
will be exceptions to this. When I say markets, I do not mean all markets, I mean
generally markets. Markets are not self-regulating; markets need some kind of
control because in our society, most people are socialized to follow the rules in
markets. But there are also other people, we call them criminals, crooks, who do
not want to follow the rules. So, think about Target and the credit cards being
stolen. Those are people who are not following the general rules. They are trying
to get money without selling the goods, which is what Target does. The question
is how do you control the people and the market that Target is trying to have?
You look for goods, find what you want, find the price you want, and you buy
them, while co-existing with these other people (rule breakers). I use the word
criminals because we have a legal system which says that what Target does is
legal, and what these other people are doing is illegal. And if we catch them we
put them in jail. This is a form of market regulation. My argument is that most
markets need some kind of regulation. Legal regulation is what you do in a big
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case, in much smaller cases there may be social recognition, or political decisions
that affect how much markets can work, etc. I think the better way to phrase the
question is not whether markets need regulation, but what kind of regulation is
appropriate for any given market.
DC: In your article ‘The Gold Standard and the Great Depression,’ you argue, in
collaboration with Barry Eichengreen, that the Great Depression was the result of
a cultural condition, which you refer to as the ‘gold standard mentality’. So, using
a parallelism, which would be the cultural condition, or mentality, that produced
the financial crisis of 2007, or 2008?
PT: Yes, in 2008, the crisis started in 2007 and continued until everything fell
apart in 2008. Yes, there is quite a bit of parallelism. The gold standard of course
was very explicit. In this article, Eichengreen and I describe how the gold
standard caused the Great Depression. The ideology back then was that the gold
standard would be the way to prosperity. Similarly in 2008, the view that financial
markets by themselves would increase efficiency (which I think they can) and
would make everybody better off, but the markets in this particular case did not
do this. Eichengreen and I did go into this, but sometimes, in teaching this, I talk
about how the gold standard worked rather well before the First World War, but
not so well after the First World War. Why it worked well one time and not the
other, I tend to think of it mathematically. If you have an interior solution, if
everybody is following the rules and is able to follow the rules, then the system
works. But when you get into a situation, after the war, in which some countries
could not pay their bills. Like the crooks in Target, they did not have the money,
they could not follow the rules because they could not afford it, and thus the
system broke down. In 2008 some of these firms were running the financial
system with very little regulation, when it was supposed to be self-regulating, the
way the gold standard was. These firms could not pay their bills, they had gotten
themselves over extended, the way countries had gotten themselves over extended
in the 1930s, thus the system crashed. It was basically an old-fashioned banking
panic or currency crisis. But it did not come out looking like that, it came out as
bankruptcy and government taking over, and all sorts of things.
DC: But, there was like a mentality?
PT: Exactly like the gold standard mentality.
DC: How would you call that mentality if you could put a name to it?
PT: Well, I suppose it is what now would be called a libertarian philosophy.
DC: Libertarian? What is that philosophy about?
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PT: The philosophy is that people left to their own devices would operate well
without having these regulations that we were talking about. The belief that
regulations hold people back instead of being the grease in the wheels that allow
them to work more efficiently. They are like sand in the wheels that they clog up
the wheels. In wheels and gears, we say that oil and grease in gears will make it
work better; sand in gears will slow it down. There is a kind of soft libertarianism
and a hard libertarianism. Soft libertarian says that you just want to have less
regulation, so you want to let the financial markets go, but you still want to have
controls about what people can do and laws about what they do. Whereas hard
libertarians say no rules, they’re really anarchists. For example in Lexington there
is a rule that you drive on the right side of the road. If you drive on the wrong side
of the road you can be put in jail for endangering the peace, etc. A strong or hard
libertarian would say “No people would understand that you have to stay to the
right, you don’t need to punish those people, etc.” I don’t think there are a lot of
hard libertarians around, but there are a lot of soft libertarians around.
DC: You just discussed the idea of ideology of the Great Depression, which you
also mention in your book ‘Lessons from the Great Depression’. Particularly you
note: “the gold standard ideology shaped policy makers’ interpretation of the
Depression.” I am curious about the definition of this concept. I am thinking of
Marxism as one of the principle approaches that discussed the concept of
ideology. I am curious, how do you understand and conceptualize ideology? Does
your concept of ideology come from this tradition? What is the role of ideology in
a market failure?
PT: Good question, but economists do not like the word ideology. That must have
been something that survived, that some editor did not take it out. Barry
Eichengreen and I mostly use mentality, which is a euphemism, but does not have
the word ideology in it. We are in concepts that are not well defined. Let us go
back to the Great Depression, we can do that simply and then we can go back to
today. In the ideology, or the mentality of the Great Depression people, who
believed (libertarians in this case) in this mentality, thought that the reason we had
the Depression was not because the gold standard caused it, but because people
had not followed the rules of the gold standard. What do we mean by the rules of
the gold standard? Well, for the United States in the 1920s people were sending
gold, which was the basis of the money supply to America, because it was safer—
since Europe was having a lot of problems. The United States with more gold
should have had more money, and should have had higher prices. However, the
Fed and the Treasury decided to sterilize the gold inflow, put it down in Fort
Knox and did not increase the money supply. This was against the rules of the
gold standard. The argument is, if everyone had followed the rules of the gold
standard then the gold standard would have worked and we would not have had
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the Great Depression. It was not the gold standard that caused the Great
Depression, it was the unwillingness of people to follow the rules of the gold
standard. Following the rules of the gold standard are very much part of the gold
standard. People followed some rules and not other rules; that is just the way
people are. You need to take the package, and get rid of the package in order to
solve the problem of the Great Depression.
Come back to today, people have this ideology of the market, the
libertarian notion. One argument (people who favor the libertarian notion) is that
there were some people who just did wrong, they made too many loans, got bad
mortgages. They were doing things that the United States was doing it in the
1920s, they were not following the rules. Therefore, the financial panic was the
problem of the individuals not following the rules. It was not the rules themselves.
My argument about ideology is that rules and the people who follow them or do
not follow them, they are all a package. You cannot say, it is not the rules, if
people do not obey the rules. It is that rules are only rules when they are followed.
Even with respect to the rules that you drive on the right side of the road, most
people obey the rules most of the time, but some people do not. They get drunk,
they are in a hurry. One of you is pregnant and somebody is trying to get you to
the hospital. In fact, we have special vehicles with have bright lights on them, we
call them ambulances, who can break the rules to do these things. We have tried
to minimize the incentive for people to drive on the left side, on the wrong side of
the road. My argument is that part of the financial system has to have regulations
that do the same thing for financial activities, as we do for driving on the right
side of the road.
Can I ask you a question? You see, when you are coming home late from a
party and there are no people around and you come to a red light. There are no
cars any place. Do you stop for the red light?
DC: Sometimes we do not. No I do not.
PT: Well, you see that is a test of whether people have internalized the rules or
not. And then there’s the question of should there have been a police waiting so
when you go around ‘where!’
DC: So do you?
PT: Do I? I tend to stop.
DC: You mentioned that ideology is related to specific rules. But the gold
standard had specific rules that you had to follow; however, the rules that were
going on at that time did not work. So, my question is, when do rules become
ideologies and when are they just rules?
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PT: This is why the gold standard is a very clear case. Because the gold standard
is very simple. A country goes on gold by being willing to buy or sell its currency
for a fixed amount of gold. There is no inflation/deflation, or anything like that in
it. The rules were very simple. This notion that a country should inflate when it
gets gold or deflate when it does not have gold is a very old view. It was
articulated very well by David Hume in the 18th century, a very long time ago.
This is not just something that comes about. Recently people have talked about
the rules of the game. The rules of the game were rules that were not written
down. They were not anything the governments agreed to, but people in their
culture knew about these rules. That is why we called it mentality or ideology. It
was a kind of view that they were supposed to have. The gold standard would
work well when people had these views. Now how did it work in the earlier
period?
Before the First World War, people who did not follow the rules of the
game went off the gold standard. Spain never got on the gold standard because it
was too rigid, Latin American countries used to go on and off gold when they had
to do it, etc. But as it turned out, it was only developing countries rather than the
main industrial countries which had problems. Due to the cost, the capital
movements, and the complexity of the First World War, it was not just Argentina,
but it was also Germany that had problems in this area after the war. That’s why
the gold standard failed.
There were always people who did not follow the rules, but those would
be considered isolated cases and the basic system could go. But as a result of the
disturbance in the First World War, what was thought of as the center of the world
economy even had problems following the rules. That is when it became
destructive.
DC: One of the assumptions of policy makers during the period of the Great
Depression was that the stability that the gold standard had in the past (such as
before World War I) would be reproduced after the war to stabilize the future. In
this sense, how does the past affect our visions of the future? And, since you are a
historian, how can we conceive the past as a lesson instead of a repetition; in
particular, when there is a period of economic crisis?
PT: Yes, that is very difficult. I am a historian not a prophet, I do not know what
is going to happen. But let me give you a historical example from the Great
Depression and then we will come back to the current example. When Franklin
Delano Roosevelt ran for the presidency in 1932, the Depression was terrible. He
ran on a promise to balance the budget, part of this ‘rules of the game’ of the gold
standard. FDR was very conventional when he was elected. He got elected and
then he abandoned this rule once he got into power. He took the oath of office in
March of that time (not January but March), and in April he took the United
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States off of gold completely. By no longer having the constraint of the gold
standard, he abandoned this ideology. If you think about Roosevelt, he was
running on the mentality of the gold standard, however we do not know whether
he believed it or not, because he is dead. We cannot ask him, even if we asked
him he might not know or be able to tell us. But FDR used it as his slogan
because he thought a lot of people who were going to vote thought that way, and
he had to appeal to them. Once he got into office, in order to deal with all the
unemployed, he decided that the Gold Standard ideology was not useful to him
and he changed it. Went off gold, single most important thing he did in April of
1933, went off gold.
Today, people are running for office on this ideology of libertarianism (the
analogue of the gold standard), saying that markets will be self-regulating and that
we should leave things alone. We do not know whether they will win the election.
The more interesting question is, let’s say that in 2016, instead of a democrat
following President Obama, it’s a tea-party guy, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio,
whoever it turns out to be, then these people, like Roosevelt, will have run on a
particular ideology. Now Roosevelt took office in March, by April (about six
weeks after) he had already figured out this was no way to go, and he reversed
course. Well, if these guys get elected, will they turn around and say “Oh being in
the opposition we can say anything we want, but when we get into power we have
got to actually do something.” We do not know the answer to that question. Some
of us do not want to do the experiment to find out. But it is an open question.
DC: I was thinking about the role of history and how you have studied different
disciplines, like economics, history, and math. And in the same article, ‘The Gold
Standard and the Great Depression’, you discuss the history of economics in
relation to this period. You argue that it does not take into account the gold
standard and some of the historical explanations as a possible cause for the
depression. I was thinking about the importance of interdisciplinary approaches,
specifically when analyzing market failures or crises. What is the importance of
studying economics not only from an economical perspective, but also a mixture
of both?
PT: As an economic historian, I am interdisciplinary. I believe that it is important
to have disciplines. But I also believe that it is very important to have a primary
discipline. It is very important for anyone going into these kinds of interfaces or
boundaries between the fields to have one field that the person really understands
is important. If you think about what are the differences between economics and
history, one thing that economists like are models and math. You have to know
about models and math if you are an economics person. On the other hand, what
do historians know? They know about sources, about using things that other
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people can see so that they can go back over your work, being faithful to sources
and finding out the sources. Historians believe in fitting the sources together into
a pattern to describe people. Thus these are different kinds of things. It is fine to
know both of them, and I think it is good. We should know these things and we
can study other fields too, I just happen to know those two particular fields. It is
important for your education to have at least one field, maybe you are bright
enough and you can do two fields, but at least one field that you really know very
well.
DC: How does interdisciplinarity help us in understanding crisis?
PT: If you have a crisis, a big crisis, like the Great Depression, or the current
situation, it is pretty easy to agree that something is wrong. People who come
from different views, different ideologies, disagree about what is wrong. It helps
to have an interdisciplinary approach because if you want to have a new approach,
you also want to have an approach that you can convince other people of. I have
my own views, but that does not affect policy. Just as Roosevelt had to get
himself elected; you need to have something that you can debate with people and
for that you need to be able to debate with people who come at it from different
points of view. The question is how do you convince people? I will be talking
about that this afternoon
DC: In your essay about the gold standard, you note that the First World War had
weakened the position of European producers’ in international markets and
strengthened that of other regions such as in Latin America and India. This
particularly made me think of the connections between the North and South parts
of America. During 2007, and even after, countries in Latin America (like
Venezuela or Ecuador) were not necessarily facing a crisis but their economies
were in fact growing. At the same time, these countries stopped using IMF recipes
or they also rejected free trade agreements with the U.S. I am wondering do these
political and economic changes in the relations between U.S. and Latin America
actually produce, or were factors that influenced the crisis of 2008 in the U.S.? Is
it possible to even create that connection or not?
PT: That is a really complicated question. I do not know how much time we have.
That is going take us a couple hours.
I am reading a book at the moment, it goes back to Aristotle-that is how
far back it goes and how interdisciplinary, it says that there’s something called the
proximate cause, the cause that actually sets things off, and that is finance. Then
there is also something called the ultimate cause, which Aristotle distinguished a
very long time ago. In this book the author is arguing that the proximate cause,
which everybody talks about in today’s politics, is not so important. What is
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really important is the ultimate cause. His view of the ultimate cause is that it
affects things like the ideology that Eichengreen and I talked about. This also goes
into the changing structure of the world, as it is now. From North America we talk
more about China than we do about Latin America, because we have got these
trade issues with China. But there is an argument that the United States has not
dealt well with its international economic relations. This argument states that it is
the imbalances with these other economies that has unbalanced the American
economy. I wrote a book about this, called the ‘Leaderless Economy’ and there is
a book by Jeff Frieden and others called ‘Lost Decades’, there are a whole bunch
of people who have written about this. Not in the terms that you ask it, but it is the
same view. I like this book that I was just reading on the airplane, and how it
broke it down in this Aristotelian way, that was a good way to think about it.
DC: How does this imbalance produce a crisis? Do you have some hypothesizes?
PT: I have a lot of ideas about it, and I can tell you about it. I use something
called the swan diagram, which is a tool of economic analysis. The swan diagram
is a simplification (that is what economists’ do), a little model of internal balance
and external balance. We talk about big countries; the United States is a big
country so we just talk about the internal balance. But the argument of the swan
diagram is that you not only need to have internal values, you also need to have
external balance to get to a reasonable equilibrium. The swan diagram is a way to
put those things together. The United States is out of internal balance at the
moment, but it is also out of external balance. The argument of the swan diagram
leads you to the conclusion that you cannot fix the internal balance reliably in a
lasting way until you also solve the external balance. I believe that.
DC: In your book that is being used for our course, you talk about unemployment
and the Great Depression, and we were interested in what were the roles of
workers in the creation of economic stability? And what are the consequences of
diminishing the living standards of workers in a crisis?
PT: That is another complicated question that we could spend all day talking
about. These are very tough questions. The costs of unemployment has not been
recognized very much. There are two basic kinds of costs that have not been
recognized. One is the cost to workers themselves. Extensive unemployment is
really very harmful to the people being unemployed. It is terrible to lose the
income, it has effects on children, etc. A lot of literature has been written on this,
Mark Usen and others have written about the costs to the unemployed, and this is
one kind of cost. The other kind of cost, is the cost to the stability of the political
and the social system. Unemployed people, as they get more unemployed, may
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threaten the stability of a political system. Where can we see this? You do not see
this in the United States very much, for complicated reasons; but we do see it in
the Middle East. There are a lot of young people who cannot find work, so they
are unemployed. As a result, they go and say “the political system, etc. is terrible”
and they revolt. It has become very hard to make the government operate when
you have all these people floating around who are very unhappy with the situation
that they are in. The Middle East is really very far from the United States, thus
here we emphasize the cost to the individual. But we know that it is costing the
individual to get large amounts of costs. Can we see signs of our approaching
these Middle Eastern kinds of situations? Let us go back to the case of Target, the
people who are doing this, we do not know who they are, but they are likely
people who cannot find work, cannot find activities that pay them what they want
to earn. Thus they turn to doing destructive things like stealing, etc. If the Target
case turns out to be an isolated case, we will say “oh well that is just their
problem,” but if it becomes a common problem, then the society has to change.
Yesterday, there was a column in the Boston Globe saying that Target should do a
smarter credit card, and so we need to fix the credit care problem to do this. But
fixing the problem, then that is at society’s cost, we must go to a new technology
to fix this problem. If there are more and more of these attacks, then you have to
do more and more things, and as a result the society changes. Eventually (we are
not close to this), you end up like the Middle East where there are so many things
that needed to be changed that the whole thing collapsed. Unemployment is
potentially really dangerous.
DC: What is the role of unemployment in the crisis of 2008?
PT: Unemployment is the result of the crisis of 2008. And the policies that have
been followed since then. It did not cause the crisis. It may have caused another
crisis in the way I just described, but unemployment is an effect of the crisis
rather than a cause of the crisis.
DC: Thank you, and thank you for your time and this opportunity to meet with
you.
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DC: Thank you for coming. We thought it would be good to begin by asking you
a very simple question. How would you define social theory?
MA: Well, social theory is something you can’t get away from. It’s indispensible.
People in the street are social theorists. They don’t know it, they wouldn’t
appropriate the label, but what they’re doing is social theorizing. They do that
every time they say things like, “Well, there wouldn’t be any benefits from doing
that, would there?” Or, “That’s just how you would expect the bankers to behave,
isn’t it?” It’s social theorizing. It may be crude. Quite often you can find that
sociologists, really well established names, are saying very much the same thing.
It’s just that their language is more technical or sometimes it’s just more
pretentious than lay or folk social theorizing. We should respect lay social theory,
not just because we are respecting the people who voice it, which we should do,
but because this is what prompts their action. So, whether they’re right or wrong
in what they say, that’s why, that’s their motive for acting. It’s usually a lot more
interesting than the alternative. Namely, because we can’t get away from talking
about human motives, we, the investigators, impose our own interpretations on
them; our beliefs about why they’re doing what they’re doing, and these can be
wildly wrong. May I give you an illustration?
DC: Absolutely.
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MA: This is one I use with first years, because for 15 years I used to teach the
foundation course in social theory. The most important thing in the first year was
to try and convey to them that theorizing is not an option. It’s indispensable and
unavoidable. Whether you call it theorizing or not, you are theorizing. So, we’ve
got to know what theory is doing and how it’s related to action, and then we can
get into discussing the founding fathers. Not because they have the best answers.
They didn’t, but they certainly had some of the best questions. So, you’ve got to
come to grips with theory because you may think you’re just writing something
entirely descriptive and objective. This is something that first year students often
think about ethnography, for example. That you can just give a neutral ‘view from
nowhere’, as Thomas Nagel put it; be it a descriptive account of a farmer in
Wyoming or wherever, a horse breeder in Kentucky, how to raise the next winner
for the Kentucky Derby. There are theories galore about that out there in the
Kentucky countryside. We want to understand what they’re doing when they’re
taking their own theories on board.
So, one example I give them is a PowerPoint. It’s just meant to be an
absolutely average, quite elderly couple. Maybe in their early 80s, or maybe
they’ve had a hard life and are in their mid-70s. They’re talking to one another,
perhaps making plans and you need to know about their context to understand
what they are saying and going to do. Well, there are some objective things.
They’ve got x dollars in the bank, and they’ve got y dollars coming in each week,
each month, from a variety of possible sources: the state, their occupational
pension, if they have one, or sometimes their family makes regular payments to
see that they’re okay. So, that’s their objective base, if you want to know things
about how they are living.
Now, for example, when the 2008 economic crisis came, the response was
largely, in every country in the world, austerity measures of one kind or another.
They varied, but they all meant people were worse off, apart from the 1%, than
they were before. Now, what I just gave is an objective statement, and it’s a
perfectly correct one. On the money they’ve got they can buy less than they
bought previously. That’s the ultimate truth of this. But, what do they buy less of?
There’s been a tendency in social theorizing for the investigator, then, to become
all knowing, the fount of wisdom. This old couple has to be doing things like
trading heating off against eating. Well, you can see the logic to that. If you’re
eating gourmet meals, you’ll have difficulty paying the public utility bills. But,
the underlying assumption made by most economists, for example, would be that
the things they cut are luxuries. Okay, perfectly logical on the surface of it. Until
you ask, what is a luxury?
There’s a British survey, for example, in which a luxury was defined, in
Britain by these particular researchers, as “We’ll get rid of the land line phone
because it’s expensive” (and they’re not the generation that needs it for internet
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access). These are not the big Internet users, though we’re breaking the silver
barrier, or the blue rinse barrier, or whatever you want to call it. So, the landline
will go because it’s a luxury. I just want to take a closer look at imputing this to
our anonymous old couple because I think it’s a really good illustration. My book,
Being Human argues that who we are, what our identities are, is a matter of what
we care about. I call them our ‘concerns’. It’s just meant to be a neutral word for
the things that matter to us.
Well, back to this old couple. They have kids. Those kids, for reasons that
could be psychological, wanted to get away from where they were brought up for
whatever reason. The reason could quite simply be that they met a partner who
came from somewhere else and the partner was more determined to stay close to
where they were raised than they were. Or, with great reluctance, the kids could
have left because far away was the only place they could get the kind of job that
they were after. We’re all getting more and more mobile, within the country and
internationally. May not be for life, but changes of address are much more
common for your generation than they were for my generation, and certainly for
my grandparents’ generation, who I don’t think changed address. Certainly didn’t
change the village they lived in. Now, if that’s the case, and if this couple is very
fond and attached to their kids and want to know about their grandkids, if there
are any, that phone would be a lifeline for their concerns. It’s not a luxury in their
book. They might trade, if we want to be an economist about it, they might trade
both the heating and the eating in order to stay in touch with their children,
grandchildren, and so on. So, that’s where their personal subjectivity comes in,
but it’s not free and unconstrained. It’s very constrained, because they have to live
within their means, which are less than they were. But, within those constraints
they do have degrees of agential freedom, and it’s what they care about most
which will be their top priority and the thing they let go of last. Does that begin to
answer “why theory”? And then we might be prompted, through our findings, to
go on and theorize some more, linking up with other theories that people have put
forward.
We might want to ask a very simple additional theoretical question: simple
to ask, but not to answer. Well, is this practice engendered? Do women want to
keep in touch with their kids and grandkids more than men do? Now, it’s not as
simple as it sounds because it may be that this has just become a convention. It’s
the female that talks to the kids and it’s the male who makes other sorts of
decisions. Then, you might want to go down that trail. Where did that come from?
Why did that become the established practice, if it’s the case that it is? It might be
the case in Britain, but it might not be the case here? Here, it might be the case in
some groups of one ethnic origin and not in groups of a different one. There might
be geographical variations for all sorts of reasons. One of them could be, for
example—it’s just a hypothesis; once you start theorizing you can go on forever
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because one question and the answer to it leads on to the next one—it might be
that if one of this now elderly couple had worked much further away from the
family home, and it will probably have been the male, given traditions in the past
about child rearing and gender roles, that he was just not there to place these
phone calls or receive them. Maybe it was something as simple as that, but
ultimately nothing is simple. Why was it the male who was doing the work that
was a long way from home, rather than the female?
So, we just can’t stop being theorists. It’s not an option in life. All that’s
optional is which kind of theory you advance and on what grounds are you
selecting one kind of theoretical position over another.
DC: That’s fantastic. I feel like I may have to share that with 101 students.
MA: Well, it came out of 101. Some of them found that incredibly difficult
because they thought, well you know, it all is objective and the investigator is
going to be much less biased and subjective about it than the subjects are
themselves. But, actually it’s the subject, it’s his or her subjectivity, that makes
them act. It’s not my theory about what is making them act that has any effect
upon them whatsoever. I could have a crazy theory about sun spots and occult
influences. That’s not going to change their behavior at all, but their own ideas
are.
DC: So, that kind of makes an interesting segue then, because from there we
would ask, what brought you personally into social theory? What brought you to
this place and this kind of work?
MA: I was not intended to by my very selective single sex, school. There was no
preparation in my day, we’re talking early-60s, for people to go and do degrees
like sociology or anthropology, which has a much longer history in Britain than
sociology does. So, I was being prepared to be what they call a “Girton girl,”
Girton College, Cambridge, or a “bluestocking,” and go and do English
Literature. I love English Literature, I’m a voracious novel reader to this day and
have always got one that I’m reading. But, the idea that a fulfilled life, a morally
justifiable life, consisted in deconstructing Beowulf or Chanson de Roland, as we
put it, “until the cows come home,” didn’t seem to me like a well-spent life. So,
much to my school’s annoyance I applied to London School of Economics to read
sociology and got in there. I had one hell of a dressing down from the
headmistress, “Girls from this private school don’t go near places like LSE, let
alone subjects such as sociology.”
Well, the second thing that brought me into it was, whilst at school, age
15, I got involved in the peace movement, CND (Campaign for Nuclear

Social Theorizing 162

Disarmament), and that was also allied to the anti-apartheid movement in South
Africa. The wonderful unintended consequence of that, because you really do go
in for these things hoping to make some change and do some good, not to get
something out of it personally, but I really did because there were full-time
assistant, associate, full professors marching along beside us. We did a thing in
England called the Coast to Coast March, which isn’t as terrifying as if you tried
to do it here. It’s not a big walk there, the only trouble is you actually meet more
sheep than you do people. So, we had long conversations with these academics
and that’s where I first heard the words Max Weber (who at that age I thought
was spelled with a V) and that fuelled the interest a lot more. Many of these Profs
were Marxists of one kind or another, so they were theorizing, not just in an
abstract way, but theorizing, as they saw it, for a better society. I don’t think that
theme has ever gone away from my work, but it’s never been distinctively
Marxist. I thought that far too formulaic and times had changed. Some of the
concepts needed changing. We have no proletariat now, the poor are a
heterogeneous category, the main thing they have in common is their poverty, not
being members of the proletariat, and so on. No, I would never describe myself as
a Marxist, but never deny that it was a powerful formative influence. So, that was
really part one of your question.
Why social theory? Well, before these terrible days, and I don’t really
know the States well enough to say whether it’s as bad here as it is in Europe (the
curriculum is restricted, each module is evaluated, there are league tables,
research is evaluated etcetera). They’re just trembling in fear in England at the
moment because in three days’ time the Research Evaluation Exercise results will
be published for each university and each department within each university, and
it’s cash-driven. So, it’s not just about repute, it’s about your budget. Those are
constraining factors in all sorts of ways. Very, very destructive, in my book.
You’ll find a little paragraph at the end of that first article we were discussing this
afternoon that just sums it up; about how collegiality turns into competition,
student care turns into keeping your office hours, and publications become a
constrained matter of only publishing in particular quality journals. The rest
doesn’t count.
During my first degree time, we had a loose curriculum and syllabus, with
many choices in every year and at different points. I was just incredibly lucky,
because it was the time at LSE where some of the all-time greats were giving their
last courses. Oh, you weren’t confined to your department, so, in my second year,
I did nothing but philosophy of science with Karl Popper and his colleagues. It
was, literally, the last undergraduate series of lectures he was going to give,
although he lived many years after that, but he taught graduates and gave public
lectures and that sort of thing. A very obese lady with a huge cassette recorder
came up onto the stage of the main lecture theatre, and he said, “No, no, go

163 disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory

away!” “But, it’s your last lectures, Sir Karl,” she said and he replied “Oh, no it’s
not.” So, there was Popper, there was Imre Lakatos, there was John Watkins, who
was perhaps the doyen of methodological individualism. It was a really rich year,
and a very formative one. It was a great experience, a real privilege. In many
ways we really did have it, not just easier, but it was richer, more sparkling than it
is now. We’ve all been dumbed down into bureaucratic academics.
DC: How would you feel that your theoretical work fits into the broader social
theory narrative?
MA: Okay, point one: I think in both of our countries there’s been a huge
domination by empiricism. There’s absolutely nothing wrong, but everything
right about doing empirical work, but not empiricism where the data supposedly
speaks for itself. Theorizing to an empiricist is just like a kid taking a bucket
along the seashore, filling the bucket up with pebbles, bringing it back home, and
tipping it up. The data will speak for itself, the pebbles will form a pattern.
There’s really not much to this theorizing job. Patterns can be complicated, that’s
as tough as it gets.
I’ve told you the really good side of my undergraduate career, which was
the second year and its freedom. The really bad side was when I came to do my
Ph.D., and I’d rather not say under whom, because he was a nice guy but he was
one of Britain’s leading empiricists and he wanted me to be the same. I expressed
a kind of interest in sociology of education. What really intrigued me was what
did account for those inequality facts in outcome, in opportunity, which became
much more interesting to me than outcome because I thought that depended on
opportunity. He didn’t want me to talk about education as a social institution. I
could talk about schools, I could talk about exams, I could talk about teacher
assessments, but I couldn’t talk about the structure of the educational system as
centralized, decentralized, which determined the national curriculum, or
allowed/forbad local variations, all of which I thought were hugely important.
But, no. Out, out, out. So, the whole thing ended up as the only piece of work,
quite honestly, I have ever done that a) I never published, and b) I’m pretty
ashamed of. So ashamed that it got me out of England and into France, to try and
get away from empiricism by working with Pierre Bourdieu.
I think, for an awful lot of theorists, we are as much shaped by those
theories that we’re trying to get away from as we are by those that we are
attracted to. So, my very close friend and co-author, Pierpaolo Donati, has had to
fight all his life with the ghost of Talcott Parsons and the additional ghost of
Luhmann. For me, it was not functionalism. That never even featured very
heavily in anything that we were taught or made to read. It was empiricism. For
me, theory was to stop being empiricist, stop working all on one level, stop
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dealing in terms of observables, stop thinking that the answer to theoretical
questions was to run a regression or perform correlations or do multivariate
analysis. In fact, these are what set the theorists problems; they’re not the answers
to problems.
So, if you find there’s a high correlation between a family’s income and
any measure of school success of the child or children, well that’s a problem for
you to explain because you can’t account for the outcome just in terms of parents’
spending money, either on a private school or a load of books or a lot of
educational experiences, trips to museums, or private tutors, and so on. You very
rapidly run out of the families that spend a lot of money on their kids’ early
education. In fact, what they’re doing is something that that’s income related and
income dependent, but it’s not income explained. It’s still a conversation we have
with American colleagues with young children about to start school. They would
put a lot of effort into sussing out which are the best zones, catchment areas, for
them to live in in order for their young kids to get the best education available in
that area surrounding the university in which they work. Well, that’s one way of
playing the game, and that’s the way people know to play the game. That makes
you think about multiple strategies and whether other factors play a role for
people with occupations that pay less well and, in those days, had less access to
support services. So, did people who were dependent upon their proximate family
network stay in an area, an educational catchment area, close to where they could
get childcare for their other kids from a grandmother, an aunt, whatever? Has this
now gone? Was this what happened in the 60s but no longer happens 50 years,
half a century, later?
DC: Could you give us a brief description of what you feel the main thrust of your
work has been, possibly for a non-sociological or a non-philosophical audience?
MA: The elevator version, which is absolutely true, is that one book led directly
to the next always, and still does. When you finish a book, as far as I’m
concerned, I hope I’ve answered some questions, but I have probably posed more
than I answered, hence the next book. Okay, the next postcard version is, what’s it
all about? It started with this experience of going to France and living there for
the first time, and appreciating how totally different French education and its
structure were from the British. In this connection you could say British and
American. I mean, certainly you’re federal and Britain isn’t, but we both have
decentralized educational systems. I’ve never written about American education
because you’d have to write a separate history for every state. You’d need a
research team to do that. But, what came to the surface was that centralization was
crucial in accounting for what had happened in French education.
Decentralization was vital for what happened in British. And so, my first book,
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Social Origins of Educational Systems, was about how did one get to be
centralized, the other to be decentralized? And then, what were the consequences
of this difference in structure? Now, in theoretical terms, centralization and
decentralization are emergent properties. The ways the different parts of the
system are, literally, linked together. The top-down, rather streamlined centralized
system, versus the messy decentralized situation that we live with on both sides of
the Atlantic, but which is actually creative, whereas the centralized system is very
constraining because of national curriculums, set textbooks and so forth. A
Minister of Education who is probably apocryphal, is supposed to have gone into
a classroom and said, “Ah! 3:15. every pupil in France in lycée grade (whatever)
will be construing page 94 of Virgil.” He could never make that statement in the
U.S. of A. or in G.B.
DC: How might you characterize the connection, if any, between your theoretical
work and that of Pierre Bourdieu?
MA: Sadly, because he was a good friend. He was very good to me, indeed. This
was a not a common experience, for important French professors to be kind to
little foreign visiting post-docs. It really wasn’t. So, he was an exception in that
sense, and I kind of like put it on record. Therefore, it hurt me, as it hurt many of
his research team - people like Luc Boltanski and later Laurent Thévenot, when
we came to the parting of the ways. You see, Bourdieu thought, he maintained
until he died—and we were good friends, he used to come and stay at my place in
London in the 70s and early 80s—he thought that he was putting forward a
general theory; general in the sense that it worked everywhere. I wrote an article,
which you can check out if you like, in the European Journal of Sociology in
1982, called “Process without System.” Fundamentally, he was very acute in
analyzing the processes of French education, but then he wrongly universalized
this by saying that that process was the same anywhere, regardless of the structure
of that system. I said, no, I can’t agree. I think the kind of standardization he was
talking about was something that a centralized structure monumentally reinforced,
whereas in a decentralized structure you could have all sorts of people who didn’t
like it, for one reason or another but they could do something about it. Plenty
didn’t like it in France either, but could do nothing. Particularly the French
industrialists who were coming on the educational scene in the latter part of the
19th century and were finding a very intellectualized syllabus that didn’t help
them produce engineers. Conversely, in England, if you wanted to found what
was the beginning of our polytechnics and if you had the money, you just founded
one. It could be a school for auto manufacturing or refrigeration. The area where I
was brought up, it was manufacturing cement. Well, let’s have a part of the
curriculum that is about the chemistry of cement making, then how to make
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reinforced concrete, so on and so forth. That was why the parting of the ways
came. It came over the sociology of education, but more generally it was over the
effect of structure on agency. That’s what led on to the next work, which is
usually associated with Anthony Giddens.
DC: We know graduate students often wrestle with working with theory,
including this interplay between structure and agency. What might you say to help
those who are struggling to find a way to really use theory in their research?
MA: I’ve said it many times, but I found a way of saying it a couple of years ago,
in print, in a little acronym, SAC. All sociological explanation comes in a SAC.
Meaning, there is no good sociological explanation that doesn’t make reference to
structure, agency, and culture. Now, they don’t all need be of equivalent
importance in every piece of work that you do, but unless you have structure
there, you can’t describe the context of what it is that you’re studying. It doesn’t
matter what it is. Everything has a context and that context was developed before
whatever problem the researcher is looking at developed. There is no such thing
as decontextualized action or situation-less action. So, we’ve got to theorize
somewhat about the structural context in which things happen and how it came to
be.
Equally, Agents are not just billiard balls that are pushed around by social
forces. There are things that go on in here (in the head) that are just as important
as some of the things that go on out there (in the outside world). That’s a gross
generalization; they’re not always as important, sometimes they’re more
important. Depends what we’re looking at and when we’re looking at it. So, that’s
the second one: Activity dependence. Nothing happens by itself; elections aren’t
won, fortunes aren’t lost, firms don’t go bust unless people do something. So,
we’ve always got to have activity dependence.
Then, we have concept dependence, which is where the culture comes in.
We had a good example in our discussion earlier, with people, quite rightly, really
deeply regretting that the Occupy movements had not been richer in putting
forward alternative ways for society to develop and people to flourish in it. It’s
interesting that so many books on it have titles like, “Sources or Resources of
Opposition,” because we do draw on theories articulated in the past, lodged in the
archive, and to some extent we all climb on the shoulders of giants, in this case
giant ideas, to try and bring forth something new by adapting them to the
circumstances of our times. Unless we know what we’re doing, have some idea of
what we’re doing, then again we can’t explain because we won’t account for the
concept dependence that the agents involved are actually using.
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DC: What would you say to those graduate students who shudder at the thought of
theory?
MA: The same I’d say to those students who shudder at the sight of a table, a
diagram, a calculation, when they turn the page. Doing stats is not doing maths.
Doing stats is just understanding logical relationships. You can give a course
teaching first years how to do a correlation coefficient without introducing any
maths at all. Why bother, they all have computers? Understand the logic. But,
they mustn’t shudder about theory because they really have to take on board. If
you’re not putting in a theory that you think is useful, then you’re putting in some
rubbish that is still theory. You may think you’ve dodged the issue, but you
haven’t. I mean, I do think this flight into ethnography, and there’s nothing wrong
with ethnography at all, unless you’re doing it because you’re running scared.
But, if you think you can hide behind that Nebraskan farmer, or wherever we put
him, and get away from theorizing, you can’t. You’ll be picking out some features
of his context, some features about him, some features about his culture, and
you’ll be giving them importance that you, the grad student, haven’t theoretically
justified. So, you use your own SAC if you don’t construct a SAC out of what’s
on offer in the university shop.
DC: Now we would like to turn to the topic of the talk you will give tomorrow
night, “‘We Believe’—but Who Are ‘We’?: The Relational Subject Versus the
Plural Subject.” We found this to be a fascinating topic. For someone who has
never really gotten into it before, but hopefully will feel compelled to explore, is
there anything that you might be able to say to ease a person into this topic?
MA: Let’s put it this way. There’s a decision that’s reached, and let’s say it’s a
decision that’s reached in the House of Representatives or Parliament. When
we’re talking about decisions of that kind we really do mean aggregate decisions,
because specific individual people have voted for or against. So, whether a bill
passes and a decision gets made—I’m taking this down to bare bones—is really
simply a matter of how many yeses you’ve got against how many noes you’ve
got. Those people who say yes may have very little in common besides the fact
that they say yes, and the same for the noes. So, it’s just a matter of aggregate
individualism, and it’s absolutely no different from doing a market survey on how
many people prefer white bread versus brown bread. That’s just aggregate
individualism, and you can do a whole marketing campaign on the basis of
aggregate individualism.
Now, I would hope that the kinds of ways we make decisions in the
family, in the university department, in whatever voluntary associations we work
for, and ultimately in politics and economics themselves, mean that we’re not just
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adding up what individuals feel, because that aggregative individualism is part of
individualistic philosophy. It’s just me and my preference schedule, and how
many other folks living in the same department, family, town, whatever it is, think
the same way that I do and have the same preference schedule. It’s what
mainstream economics is based on. That’s one of the main reasons why we’re in
the mess that we are in. So, can we have a genuine collective decision making,
feeling that we have solidarity as people, whether it’s academic solidarity,
familial solidarity etcetera? There can be all sorts of different bases for “we-ness,”
and some of them can be solidarity for and solidarity against. Sometimes with
church membership, there can be very strong solidary within a church and quite
hostile feelings to the next-door church members.
So, the real question is: Can we have solidarity? This is the question that
bothered Émile Durkheim, bothered Karl Marx, and bothered Max Weber. This is
why I said they all asked the best questions, even if their answers were quite
different. To me, one of the worst things of our time is the decline in social
solidarity. There are so many signs of it. In Britain, 50% of people have kids, or
have a kid, without being married. Marriage is a great thing, but wanting to marry
is one sign of solidarity, felt solidarity at that moment. There’s that. There’s the
fact that on the last British census, the most common form of household was
people living alone. Again, over half. Well, there’s also the intergenerational loss
of solidarity, people don’t look after their own old folks the way they used to,
often for good reasons. So, can we find an authentic way in which we can talk
about the “we” and the “ours,” and ultimately the common good? That’s the
supreme relational good, the common good. It’s quite different from the general
good or the greatest good of the greatest number, the utilitarian definition of it.
You can put it this way: Those are just addition sums, the greatest good of
the greatest number. Of course, the good becomes higher if you exclude some
people, if you say, “Let’s not count the people who can’t work because,
obviously, they can’t earn.” Or, “Those who have mental problems or conditions
that mean they probably can’t live alone or do an ordinary day’s work for an
ordinary day’s pay? Let’s leave them out because they’re just dragging down the
greatest number.” Well, the more you do that, “Why don’t we leave the illiterates
out? Why don’t we leave people with diabetes out?” You know, you can end up
excluding more of the population than you included! Of course, your measure, in
dollar terms of the greatest good, gets higher and higher and higher the more you
leave out. So, that’s your addition sum. Now, imagine multiplication sums, the
simplest. Suppose we’re multiplying three terms, and one of those three terms is a
naught. What’s your multiplication sum? There’s a naught in it. If you do times
zero, the answer to your sum is zero. So, that’s the common good. It’s when you
never insert a naught. When every living individual in the town, the state, or our
single global society today, where not one single one of them is left out because
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the well being of the rest of us depends on the well being of each and every other
one. It’s an old classical philosophical thought; it’s not original thinking. But, it is
what leads me to get to be involved in human trafficking, because I think that’s
one of the most horrendous forms of degrading other human beings—it treats the
trafficked as a naught. It’s one that we can do something about, hopefully.
DC: For our final question, where do you think micro-level sociology is headed,
especially in light of this kind of tendency to sharply divide between the micro
and the macro?
MA: I don’t see mine as a micro-level theory at all. I see myself as theorizing
from the micro up to the macro and then working the other way round. So, there’s
upward causation, then downward causation from the macro to the micro. The
reason why it sounds kind of utopian is because it takes an awfully long time to
do. You’re looking at the almost completed career of a person who started young!
There’s been time for this. So, we start with this 800-page book, which is a macro
book, on how do educational systems got to be different, centralized rather than
decentralized. Then, you could say structure and agency represented the macro,
the structure, with the micro, as the agent. This isn’t always the case. You could
be talking about a very small structural feature and a very large social movement,
of class or revolution or whatever. Then, you get to my reflexivity trilogy, which
is certainly micro in the empirical work, but it didn’t end up remaining micro.
That was just doing, well, a very American thing, using your own students. It led
on a Springer series of books on, can we talk at the most macro-level about where
modernity is going and link it back, both upwards and downwards, to the
changing modes of reflexivity of people’s subjectivity? So, it keeps going, up and
down, down and up again – always over time. The reason is, usually, you can
only handle so much in one head at one time. I don’t think I’ve ever been very
good at using lots of big data very profitably. So, I would always prefer a kind of
rich canvas of petit point tapestry, and kind of disentangle strands from it. There
has to come that point where people, grads or perhaps post-docs, are thinking
about their first book that isn’t under somebody’s supervision. It really is theirs;
they have to take ownership of it and authorial authority for it. That’s when the
key thing really is get to know yourself. You get most out of it when you put most
into it, something productive and enjoyable. The two do tend to go together.
DC: That is all. Thank you for speaking with us.
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DC: You’ve had a really wonderful career. How have you seen social theory
evolve over the course of your career? How do you imagine the future of social
theory within this kind of global academic and interdisciplinary moment?
AC: Well, I think when I was at the kind of stage that you’re all at it was a real
struggle to get social theory recognized as something legitimate. There was
sociological theory, but that was quite narrow and disciplinary and dominated by
the thought of people like Talcott Parsons. I was trained in philosophy, but also I
was trained at a British university
First of all, a connection between philosophy and a larger ideological and
social context was highly contested. The idea that continental thought was
relevant was highly, highly contested and so it was a battle for people of my
generation to get the kind of people we were interested in: Marx, Althusser,
Foucault, Derrida, you know, people who are now very, very well established
reference points; it was a real fight to get them taken seriously and addressed. So
in that sense, the situation is incomparably better now than it was when I was
young. I think a consequence, however, of this widening and pluralization of
social theory is inevitably a degree of fragmentation partly because there are all
these different great masters to study, but partly also because I think that, because
of the enormous impact of philosophers associated with post structuralism,
fragmentation was built into the kind of intellectual agenda that they, or that their
reception I should say, tended to promote.
I think in the last ten or fifteen years there has been something of a
reaction against this dual fragmentation, and the emergence of figures who are
primarily philosophers but have had an enormous influence right across different
folds of critical theory. The prominence of people like Alain Badiou, the

170

Considering Crises and Neoliberalism 171
	
  

unavoidable Slavoj Žižek-- we all laugh at the very mention of his name, but I
hope in a good way-- the fact that they’ve been so influential represents a reaction
against the fragmentation, and a desire of finding some kind of framework, in
which, to use an old fashioned word, one can totalize, and try to establish the
connections between different issues, different disciplinary demands.
DC: You mentioned post-structuralism and how it’s facing a bit of a backlash. I’m
kind of curious if you see that as at all connected to post-structuralism’s resistance
to think in a totalizing manner. Is that in any way connected to poststructuralism’s inability to really think on a structural level at a time when
thinking about this in relation to a lot of social crises that we’ve been facing? Do
you think that part of that backlash is because post-structuralism has a hard time
thinking as a form of a total structure, and therefore isn’t able to respond to a lot
of the crisis we’re seeing at this juncture of history?
AC: I think that’s basically right. I think there’s been a problem there’s been
resistance, and perhaps I should distinguish between resistance and reaction. I
mean there was a reaction, certainly in Britain, to the reception of poststructuralism, which was philistine. For example, when Derrida was awarded an
honorary degree at Cambridge University I think the 1990s, there was a huge
campaign against it on a completely indefensible basis of, you know, “we don’t
need this kind of fancy French theory.” And I want to give that example partly to
emphasize that I think there are all sorts of positive things about the influence of
people like Foucault and Derrida and so on, we’re clearly in their debt in lots of
ways.
Essentially, in terms of the reaction against post-structuralism that we’ve
seen over the last ten or fifteen years, I think it’s been of a different character.
And I think fundamentally, it is as you say: because of the principle rejection of
totalization that is common to the different thinkers we tend to describe as poststructuralists, I mean to put it simplistically, what’s missing from all of their
discourses is capitalism. And capitalism is something that I think is very hard not
to totalize about. In this context, Fredric Jameson is a very interesting figure
because he of course is famous for insisting on the necessity of totalizing, but
doing so in a way that is open to the positive and productive elements that we find
in the post-structuralists.
Sure, capitalism is an unavoidable topic these days. To the extent that we
have to talk about capitalism, we have to talk about Marx, we have to grapple
with the necessity, however problematic it may seem, to be of totalizing.
DC: I have been reading your Anti-Capitalist Manifesto which is inspiring and
great, and one of the things that I noticed and found interesting was the notion of
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globalization that’s at play in the book because it seems to constitute both a
prodigious threat to the world but also an extraordinary promise for a better one.
In your introduction you cite Richard Falk’s distinction between two principal
notions of globalization. And he says, “globalization from above, reflecting a
collaboration between leading states and the main agents of capital formation, and
globalization from below, an array of transnational social forces animated by
environmental concerns, human rights, hostility to patriarchy, and a vision of
human community based on the unity of diverse cultures seeking an end to
poverty, oppression, humiliation, and collective violence.” So, it would seem that
everything depends on how this dialectic plays out in the future, and that if the
Anti-Capitalist movement is to achieve victory over global capitalism,
globalization from below must prevail. But, unfortunately, globalization from
above appears to be the one picking up steam, even though globalization from
below has made extraordinary advancements against it. So, I guess if one of the
most pernicious effects of this globalization from above, this movement is to
impose the logic of capital upon societies and individuals around the world, how
can a movement of international solidarity counter and overcome it?
AC: First of all, I think the kind of ambivalence I talk about in globalization,
really that ambivalence stems from the character of capitalism. I referred to
Jameson earlier, and Jameson has this great comment on Marx’s The Communist
Manifesto, where he says that what Marx is saying is that capitalism is
simultaneously the best and the worst thing that has ever happened to humankind;
it is both incredibly destructive, but also dynamic, in certain ways liberating. It’s
the source of what we call “globalization,” so, if there’s an ambivalence, it’s
crucially to do with the character of capitalism. Jameson has this really good
comment somewhere where he says we should experiment and replace every
reference to globalization with a reference to capitalism, and I think that is a very
healthy suggestion.
More concretely, on the question of globalization from below, I’m more
optimistic than you are. The last time I was in the States was in the autumn of
2011, which was the moment of Occupy. Now, that’s a moment that has in a
certain sense passed, but it’s worth stressing how incredible it was. Here we have
an occupation of a park in Manhattan, close to what really is the financial capital
of the world, that was inspired by what? It was inspired by the occupation of
Tahrir Square in Egypt. It’s astonishing that you had this movement, and I was in
New York when Occupy was going on, which was having an enormous impact on
the city, a city where there is a lot of support for the state of Israel, that was
inspired by a revolutionary moment in the most important city in the Arab world.
That’s not exactly international solidarity, but it’s an example of the way in which
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images of resistance, and inspirations, cross what’s in the past seemed like
impossible barriers.
There’s this cliché, of which I’m afraid that Jameson is also the source,
that it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than it is the end of capitalism. But
it seems to me the moment of Occupy, and I stress it only was a moment, shows
that we can imagine all sorts of other things. We can imagine ourselves as part of
a global movement of resistance. The problem with Occupy was that it was a
moment, but it was an enormously suggestive moment. So, I think there’s more
going for globalization from below than you suggest.
DC: Going back to your recent book, Bonfire of Illusions, in there you talk about
how there is this prevalent mindset among the economic establishment that what
should be done is that the state should come in, during this moment of crisis, prop
things up, and recede. I think you compare it to the Lone Ranger coming in to
save the day. This resistance to thinking crisis as symptomatic, rather than just
momentary, I was wondering if you could say something about what you think
that says about the way that Neoliberalism thinks about crisis, in general, and how
Neoliberalism thinks itself. How does Neoliberalism sees its own weaknesses, if it
sees its own weaknesses? And how does that maybe relate to the material
conditions of financialization?
AC: I should say that I wrote Bonfire of Illusions in 2009-2010, so at a
comparatively early moment in the crisis. If revolution is process, so are crises.
They’re not instantaneous events. Things have developed since then, and I think
things are now much clearer now how particularly here, because there’s a
confidence about responding and handling crises in the United States, which is,
for example, not the same as what we see in Europe. But I think we can be clearer
about how Neoliberalism, particularly here, thinks about crises, in the sense that
“sure, we use the state to save us, and to save the banks.” It’s one of the great
ironies of the crisis that all the things that the U.S. Treasury, along with the IMF,
used to tell other countries they had to do if they got into financial trouble, were
completely ignored in the drive, in particular, to save the banks, but more
generally to stabilize the economy. But also, the crisis was used to radicalize
Neoliberalism. Now, that side, I think, is clearer in Europe than the U.S., because
it was in Europe, in different ways in Britain and the Eurozone, but generally in
Europe, where the drive to austerity took place. It’s clear that the drive to austerity
isn’t just about making the books balanced, reducing the deficit, all that kind of
stuff. It’s about a further phase of Neoliberal restructuring, shrinking the Welfare
State, and making labor markets more flexible. And, of course, we’ve seen that
agenda, under the pressure of the Tea Party, but not reducible to the Tea Party,
happen here. So, we have this kind of duality in the way in which Neoliberalism
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has turned to the state: “the state will save us, but, at the same time, we need to
further, if you like, Neoliberal counterrevolution.”
I think that has, in part, to do with the enormous power that the banks
have. You talked about financialization. But I think we have a much clearer sense
of just how powerful the banks are. This is a striking contrast with the crisis of the
1930’s, where Roosevelt and the Democratic congress, from 1933 onwards, dealt
with the banks very, very robustly. J.P. Morgan was broken up, with no hesitation
about that. So the banks were subjected to much tougher controls than they had
been previously. We have seen absolutely nothing like that this time, which shows
how central the banks are to the way in which contemporary capitalism functions.
The only other thing I’d say, though, and this is a problematic aspect of the crisis
from the point of view of the ruling classes, is that, and I’d forgotten I’d used the
Lone Ranger metaphor, well, the Lone Ranger is still here, he’s still having to
hold the thing together. This is very clear in the fact that Quantitative Easing
continues. The Fed is still creating $45 billion a month to prop up the financial
system. The European Central Bank is considering its own version of Quantitative
Easing at the minute. So, in some ways, the drive toward austerity has shown the,
if you like, the robustness of Neoliberal capitalism, the way in which it’s used the
crisis to drive things further in direction in which it wants things to go; but, at the
same time, Neoliberal capitalism is not so robust, because it depends on the crutch
of support from the central banks, now nearly seven years after the crisis started.
So, it’s quite a contradictory picture, I would say.
DC: I was wondering if, while we are thinking about that, you could talk a little
bit about the fact that there has recently been this rash of statements coming from
very wealthy bankers and tech moguls, it seems to be centered on San Francisco,
there’s been a lot of, what I would characterize as very shrill claims about how
they, the wealthy, the One Percent, are being persecuted by critiques of them, one
[Tom Perkins] compared it to Kristallnacht, with the One Percent being treated
like the Jews were in Germany during Hitler’s ascendancy. This contradiction that
you talk about, is it perhaps connected to this sensitivity that we’re seeing on the
part of those who have, for all intents and purposes, fared very well under the
crisis?
AC: Yes, they’ve been behaving like spoiled brats, really. The super rich, and the
corporations they control, enjoy incredible protection, and, as you say, have
benefited enormously. There’s this new book by the French economist Thomas
Piketty that’s attracted a lot of attention, in which he shows that the levels of
inequality are now comparable to those before the First World War. So, you have
these people from enormously privileged positions complaining, not because
anyone is doing anything to them: their taxes haven’t increased significantly, in
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reality financial regulation is a bit of a paper tiger, the banks’ lobbying power has
ensured that Dodd Frank has had most of its teeth removed. And then they
complain because people don’t like them. That’s really what it comes down to,
because very little has actually happened to them. I think, though, that it does
reflect a change in the ideological climate, because, although Occupy was a
moment, it was a moment at which they, the One Percent, although it seems like
it’s the .1% who are the really rich ones, stood in front of a glare of hostile
publicity. And, I think that these complaints from the corporate rich and the
bankers and so on reflects that one respect in which the Occupy moment has
continued, is that the criticisms of the inequalities and irresponsiblities of the rich
have carried on.
DC: I want to ask a follow up to that and contextualize neoliberalism within
higher education especially in the United States because they’ve become very
entangled within one another. I think especially at the state universities, who,
when the state legislature puts it on the table that a significant budget cut of 5,
7%, like we are experiencing here at the University of Kentucky—when those
sort of cuts exist I think universities are often forced to seek funding from
corporations and that’s why we have classrooms named after them and buildings
named after corporations, so how do you imagine this rescue to take place if
we’re to begin separating, or how would we extract higher education from the
neoliberal grasp that seems to be holding it?
AC: The details are different but the picture is the same in Britain. Particularly
because U.S. universities are held up as a model that we have to assimilate to.
And one respect in which the crisis is proved an opportunity from the neoliberal
point of view is that this process has accelerated very sharply in Britain in the last
few years.
I suppose I’d say a couple of things. A starting point is that there’s this
deep conflict about how we understand the value of higher education. Is higher
education there essentially as an economic asset either to the individuals who are
getting the degrees, or to their employers, or the government? Or is it something
that is an intrinsic value? My personal opinion is that it makes sense to exploit
both those aspects, clearly given how technologically advanced contemporary
capitalism is, it needs universities and the people who are produced in them. One
of the things that’s happening in Britain is the much tighter subordination of
academic research to corporate needs—that’s bad, but it reflects the fact that the
corporations need universities. So, I think that it’s a factor in universities’
subordination to capital, but it’s also a source of strength. That we can say, “you
need us”—us, when I say us, both the people who work and the people who study
in universities—so treat us properly.
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So I think we should say that. Of course the other issue is to do with
education as something of intrinsic value crucially because of the way in which it
contributes to people’s self development quite independently of whatever
economic consequences a university education might have. Now I think it’s
important to explore that aspect of universities. It’s difficult because very often
this kind of view of the university is framed in a very elitist way. There’s a
famous lecture that the British Catholic intellectual Cardinal Newman gave in the
1860s called “The Idea of a University” where he says “What are universities for?
They’re for forming gentlemen”—no, I don’t think so. But, tied up with that very
elitist conception of the university is an idea of university education as a process
of self-development. So I think there’s an ideological effort that has to be made to
detach the notion of university education as something intrinsically valuable from
the elitist way in which it’s tended historically to be framed.
When you put those elements together both the economic value of
universities and the intrinsic value of a university education, and also of course,
the research that goes on in universities, we have a very powerful case. And I
think, I think very often, I’m just talking about Britain—actually I may be
involved as an academic in a form of industrial action in a couple of week’s time
because we’ve got a campaign to improve our pay and so on—but very often
when we campaign we do it in a very defensive and depressed kind of way. But I
think there’s a very powerful case for what happens in universities that we should
put to the rest of society, which of course, blurs into us anyway because
universities are so big and so many people go to them these days, in a much more
confident way. Now of course just saying things doesn’t change anything, but
there is an ideological struggle that we have to pursue.
DC: I was going to ask one question, I guess it’s a good follow up because it’s on
values. Toward the end of your manifesto, I think you bring up the really
important question of value, and how, sort of, a realization under Neoliberalism of
some of the most important values to humanity amounts to their destruction, or if
that’s too strong, maybe their perversion, but you have this great quote where you
say, “Neoliberal capitalism reduces freedom to the right to buy and sell and
equality to a legal form. This disintegrates solidarity to privatized individualism,
and threatens the very planet on which all humans depend to realize their desires
and pursue their projects.” That’s a trenchant critique, and I see the problem as
people are conditioned by capitalist society from the outset, and so their values
get shaped in accordance with the logic of that society to a certain degree. So, I
feel like what could happen, and I’m not saying this will necessarily happen, but,
based on your account, I think you might agree, that Freedom, Equality, and
Solidarity tend to get stripped of their deeper meaning, they get trivialized, they
just become empty ideals. And then you get this dangerous tendency, this general
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sort of depoliticization of society. With Occupy, that was great, because you saw
this re-politicization of society. But, nevertheless, there still seems to be this
withdrawal of, or a lessening or a weakening of, the political will that
Neoliberalism tends to bring about, almost ruthlessly. But, you say, towards the
end of the book, that the movement, the anti-capitalist movement, offers a
radically different reading of these values, and that they could be realized in a
completely different way. But it has to be done against, and through a
replacement of, global capitalism. So, if the transformation of these values, which
are so important, depends ultimately on the success of this movement, it follows
that what is most important is that people believe in this movement. So, and I
think your book when a really long way in accomplishing this, but I guess what
do you think the status of such a belief is today? Belief in revolutionary change,
Belief in emancipatory politics? And how do we get people to believe that
Liberty, Equality, and Solidarity are worth struggling for, when every day they’re
being bombarded with this society that doesn’t seem to value these very important
ideals?
AC: First of all, talking about Liberty, Equality, and Solidarity, those aren’t ideas
that I picked out of my head; those are the values that represent the heritage of,
among others, the American and French Revolutions. So these are ideals that
emerge in a bourgeois context, and to which our own societies constantly pay lip
service, and for which act as a reference point. I think that’s quite important
because, going back to the question of inequality, there would be societies where
inequality wasn’t a problem. If you complained in Feudal Britain about
inequality, people would think you were completely crazy, because hierarchy was
the norm. Equality is meant to be the norm in our societies. There’s a very
important piece by Etienne Balibar where he talks about the way in which these
ideas, which he calls Egaliberté, a kind of fusion of equality and liberty, are open
to a constant process of reinterpretation and renegotiation that radicalizes them,
starting with workers and feminists in the 19th century, but carrying on with all
sorts of different groups more recently. Now, it’s true that we live in societies
where these values are thoroughly debased, but they’re quite powerful,
crosscutting forces.
You said you were interested in Castoriadis. Now, Castoriadis has this
really good argument where he says that no capitalist enterprise can function
without the creative input of the workers and the kind of cooperation among
themselves that allows the enterprise to function in a way that, on its own, it
wouldn’t. My experience has always been that, if you look at any workplace, it’s
precisely because the way in which the workers sidestep the formal rules. Very
often, the managers don’t have a clue what’s happening.
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And this is true in social life more generally. There are all sorts of
informal ways which people cooperate and, in their daily lives, actually enact
those values. Without overstating it, there are elements of the alternative society
that are sort of embedded in the everyday life that we experience under
capitalism. And capitalism, as in the example that Castoriadis gives, lives off and
exploits that kind of creative cooperation, but it’s an important reference point if
we’re feeling too depressed about the banality and depoliticized character of our
societies; it’s worth remembering how much they depend on us.
The question is how to tap those resources of creativity and solidarity.
That can be hard. It can be hard partly because the fragmenting, individualizing
and depoliticizing pressures that come from the structures of the societies, but
also because it was a precondition of Neoliberalism being successful that
movements of resistance were radically weakened. And I think what we’ve seen
in the last 10 years or so is a series of protracted efforts to rebuild much stronger
movements that can cease just to be movements of resistance and become
movements of emancipation. And it’s difficult. You have steps forward, like at
Seattle, or with Occupy, or with the beginning of the Arab revolutions in Tunisia
and Egypt. And then there are setbacks; forces get dispersed, there can be
repression, as there is in Egypt at the minute, and so on. So, I would say we’re in
the middle of quite a long process of rebuilding, reconstructing, the emancipatory
forces in our societies.
DC: Going off that, I was curious: when we think about revolution, we tend to, at
least historically, think of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject, as the group,
the organization, which will bring about revolution. Because the proletariat’s
position as revolutionary subject was, in many ways, an outcome of industrial
capital, I’m wondering if the proletariat still maintains an important role in
becoming the revolutionary subject in financialized capitalism. And, if not
proletariat, then who is implied by financial capital to step up as the revolutionary
subject?
AC: Well, I think that what we see in the Neoliberal era is a great extension of
proletarianization. That’s happened extensively. Look at all those Chinese
peasants who are now powering the biggest industrial complex in the world in
Southeastern China. But it’s also happening intensively. When if referred to the
fact that I might be involved in industrial action in a couple of weeks, that reflects
the way in which university professors have been proletarianized in Britain. I
mean, I don’t want to whine about it; lots of people have suffered worse. But I’ve
been on strike quite a lot over the past 10 years, which I never was in the earlier
part of my academic career. In Britain, even more amazingly, lawyers have been
on strike a couple of times recently because they’ve got a dispute with the
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government about the legal aid program that the government funds. Now, if
lawyers can go on strike, anyone can, really. I mean, that’s an exaggerated
example, but the point that I’m trying to make is that the scope of the proletariat,
in the sense of wage labor subordinate to capital, has greatly increased in the last
generation. What happened, though, was the particular form that the working
class movement took, which was very much centered on the great Fordist
factories of the second Industrial Revolution. If you look at the great wave of
working class militancy that took place, including here, in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s,
tremendously it centered on auto factories. That working class was broken up, and
defeated, and dispersed. That was necessary for Neoliberalism to triumph, and
we, and I say “we” in the largest possible sense, haven’t yet come up with a
secure basis for reconstructing the working class movement.
It would be a very different working class movement, because of the
proportion of women in the wage labor force, because of the importance of
migrant workers almost everywhere these days, South as well as North. Certainly
in countries like the U.S. or Britain, there would be a lot fewer people working in
factories in that new working class movement. But part of the process I was
talking about is the process of creating a different kind of working class subject
and it’s still, I would say, early days in that process. But it’s something that’s
happened a number of times in the history of capitalism. The Chartists, the great
British working class movement of the 1830’s and 1840’s was composed of
workers in textile factories, in very brutal and oppressive conditions. The kind of
trade union movement that emerges toward the end of the 19th century, after
Chartism was defeated, was of a very different character. So, these processes of
recomposition and reconstruction have gone on throughout the history of
capitalism.
DC: In your book [An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto], you pose a crucial question: “Is
the enemy neoliberalism, that is, the policies embodied in the Washington
Consensus and the Anglo-American model of capitalism that those policies seek
to universalize or the capitalist mode of production itself?” The primary goal of
the anti-capitalist movement, I believe that you argue rightly, should be the
struggle against the capitalist mode of production itself and not so much its
negative side effects. But I think that’s important distinction that needs to be
carefully unpacked because when one says the “problem of capitalism” or
describes capitalism as a problem in and of itself and stresses that neoliberalism,
for instance, springs from the capitalist mode of production, it is not always clear
what that means exactly or people may simply not believe it. So, I see the
problem of capitalism or, more precisely, the capitalist mode of production as
proceeding from a system that is driven by a desire for profit and by an
aggressive, competitive accumulation of capital—a system that has little to no
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interest in the democratic values of equality, justice, and autonomy. In my
opinion, that’s the central tension of our society. Now, I know, generally
speaking, that social democrats want to reconcile, or try to reconcile, the
democratic drive with the capitalist drive, but I don’t see them as being
reconcilable. And I don’t think that it’s cynical to make that claim; I just don’t see
how one can overcome their opposition. This being said, if you had to unpack that
distinction between neoliberalism and the capitalist mode of production and try to
articulate what the problem of capitalism actually is, a problem that is often
overlooked, how would you do that?
AC: I would say that the defining features of capitalism, as Marx develops his
critique in Capital, are two. First of all, there’s the exploitation of wage labor; in
other words, the system rests on the way in which economic pressures force the
people who do the producing to sell their labor power, their ability to work, but on
the basis of weak bargaining power, which leads them to being exploited at work.
Secondly, competitive accumulation; in other words, the capitalists who exploit
the workers aren’t this kind of unified blob, but are internally divided and
compete with each other, and that process of competition then leads to
accumulation--in other words, the bulk of the profits being reinvested in expanded
and more efficient production. Those are the fundamental features of capitalism.
Now, that’s a very abstract set of statements. Those structural features can be
realized in a wide variety of institutional forms. In Britain, it was on the basis of
small family firms and free trade. At the beginning of the twenty-first century,
you have the emergence of what the Austrian Marxist Rudolf Hilferding called
“organized capitalism” where by which the stage the firms are much bigger, they
often collaborate in cartels, and, at least in countries like Germany, big industrial
firms and the banks are closely integrated together with the state kind of
coordinating the whole entity, which is primarily nationally organized, so it’s
nationally organized, organized capitalism. Now, crucial to the context of
neoliberalism is the way in which between the fifties and the eighties that
nationally organized capitalism breaks down, competition is increasingly
international, dominated by transnational corporations, and the kind of financial
markets that broke down during the crisis of the 1930s re-establish themselves
and come to drive investment internationally and so on. And it’s those structural
changes that then create the conditions in which neoliberalism, in the sense of an
ideology and a policy that gives priority to competition and the market, comes to
prevail. So, neoliberalism is one institutional realization of the basic structural
features that arose in a very specific historical context. Now, I would say that the
position that I argued for in my book—that the enemy is capitalism—was a
minority in the anti-globalization movement. Most people, and this is very clear in
Europe, thought that the problem was neoliberalism and that it would be possible
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to return to a more regulated, if you like, organized form of capitalism, although
there was a lot of puzzlement, and still is, about who’s going to do the regulating.
Is it back to the nation-state? That’s problematic because of the much greater
level of globalization and of international integration. In Europe, you had the
argument that maybe the European Union can do the regulating, and then the
crisis has shown that the European Union can’t regulate anything. But it’s
certainly true that some very intelligent critics, like the French Marxist Gérard
Duménil and Dominique Lévy, argue that the recent crisis is an opportunity to
create a more humane and regulated version of capitalism. But what we can see is
how deeply entrenched the neoliberal variant is. That doesn’t mean that there
couldn’t be some reconstruction of capitalism to move away from neoliberalism,
but the obstacles seem to be much bigger than I personally had thought and the
people who positively advocate it seem to realize.
DC: Connected to that, you were discussing the question of whether we can use
the nation-state as a means of regulating capitalism, which is, as you know, a very
fraught notion. In Bonfire of Illusions, near the end of the book, you criticize a lot
of people. You particularly talk about John Holloway and his idea that we should
avoid taking state power, and I think [Alain] Badiou has a similar concept when
he talks about his politics of subtraction. I’m wondering, on the one hand, since
the state is no longer the central organizing unit of capitalism--it is now
transnational in neoliberal times--and because you do advocate that the state is
important, how can the state be revolutionary in these transnational times?
AC: Well, first of all, I don’t think that the state has been transcended. As I was
saying earlier, the nation-state has been critical to dealing with the crisis, not
simply with the bailouts. Austerity is essentially a state project. The European
Union is a slightly strange entity, but part of its strangeness is that it’s still
dominated by national governments and some national governments in particular
at the minute, especially Germany. So, the nation-state remains the crucial
political form through which capitalism is managed and part of the mistake I think
that people like Holloway make, and it’s particularly clearly in Hardt and Negri,
is that they bought a lot of the publicity for globalization, which is that it’s doing
away with the nation-state. The nation-state is still very powerful. One of the
things I argue in An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto is that the anti-capitalist movement
needs not just to recognize that, but also to recognize that there is also positive
stuff you can do with the state. The state is a very powerful mechanism for
redistribution and because the welfare state is essentially a system for limited
redistribution within a capitalist framework, that’s a resource that could be
exploited by a powerful movement to force greater redistribution from the
existing state. But at the limit, I don’t think that it is possible to get rid of
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capitalism—well, how shall I put it?—I’m a very orthodox Marxist, so I agree
with Marx that you can’t transform society from capitalism to socialism using the
existing state. So, again, as he puts it in one of the things he wrote after the Paris
Commune, what we need is a revolution against the state. But my difference still
with people like Hollway is that that doesn’t mean evading politics, but rather
developing a movement that is strong enough to confront the existing state and to
replace it. Holloway is basically arguing that we can build kind of islands, that is,
we can exploit the cracks that exist in capitalism to create islands of emancipated
existence and therefore we don’t need to worry about the state. My argument is
that the state and capitalism more generally won’t leave those islands alone, and
therefore we need to develop a movement that has the strength to confront the
state and to replace it and, in doing so, to develop the kind of political forms that
can provide the framework in which we move to an emancipated society. I know
that that probably sounds like a set of slogans more than anything else. It’s the
definition of a problem, not a solution.
DC: To finish up, I’m not sure how much you want to disclose, but we wanted to
ask you about your future work and what you’re working on now and any ideas
percolating in your head about stuff you want to write.
AC: Well, I’ve just finished a book, which is a study of Marx’s Capital that will
be published later on this year. It’s going to be called Deciphering Capital, and
it’s a study that it’s particularly concerned to clarify the nature of Marx’s method
in Capital and, through clarifying that, to throw light on more concrete debates
both about Capital and within Marx’s political economy. And I did my PhD on
Marx’s Capital, so, in a sense, this is something that I’ve been working on for a
frighteningly long period of time and it’s a project that’s particularly important to
me. What I’m going to do now that I’m finished with it, to be honest, I’m not
particularly sure because I’m trying to recover from the process of finishing the
book. But there are a whole series of debates in Marxist political economy that I
expect that I’ll pursue. Perhaps it’s worth emphasizing that this is a quite a
creative moment in Marxist political economy. I looked at an article that I wrote
fifteen years ago where I said that the Marxist theory of crisis had fallen on hard
times. I wouldn’t say that now with people like David Harvey and Dominique
Lévy and all sorts of other people who are working on developing Marx’s
political economy. But one of the things that’s interesting about this renaissance is
that it’s combined with a tremendous amount of discussion of Capital itself. So,
you have Harvey writing books about capitalism but also writing his
commentaries on Capital. And I find that quite a good combination because I
think it is important to try to recover and understand properly what Marx argued,
but there’s always a danger that that becomes purely philological or like a form of
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piety. On the whole, however, the recovery of Marx’s own thought is combined
with an attempt to use that thought or how you interpret that thought to better
understand capitalism itself. So, I would like to think that my book is part of that,
and I hope to continue to contribute to this renaissance in Marxist political
economy.
DC: Okay, we would like to thank you on behalf of the Social Theory Committee
at UK for an extremely rich and productive conversation.
AC: Thank you, and thanks for all your good questions.

